Marco Celentani

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Professor

Calle Madrid 126

Getafe, 28903

Spain

  • Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

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    • Tel: +34-91-624 9546
    • Fax: +34-91-624 9875
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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2,008

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 31,535

in Total Papers Citations

8

CROSSREF CITATIONS

13

Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

Downloads 917 ( 25,632)

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 464
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Jul 2000
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 917 (25,212)
Citation 11

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corruption, competition, public procurement

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

European Economic Review, Vol. 46, Pp. 1273-1303, 2002
Posted: 14 Oct 2002
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

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corruption, competition, public procurement

2.

Career Concerns and Contingent Compensation

CEMFI Working Paper No. 0205
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 03 Dec 2002
Guillermo Caruana and Marco Celentani
Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
Downloads 265 (119,743)
Citation 2

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Compensation, career concerns, pay-performance, risk

3.

Combating Corruptions in International Business Transactions

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 670
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 Sep 2003
Marco Celentani, Juan-José Ganuza and Jose-Luis Peydro
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences and Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)
Downloads 256 (124,217)
Citation 1

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International corruption, OECD convention

4.

What Form of Relative Performance Evaluation?

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 744
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 12 Jul 2004
Marco Celentani and Rosa Loveira
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 197 (160,118)
Citation 2

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Executive compensation, relative performance evaluation

5.

Corruption and the Hadleyburg Effect

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 382
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 1999
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 139 (216,122)
Citation 4

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6.

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

Downloads 135 (221,261)

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 526
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 13 Jun 2001
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 135 (221,937)
Citation 2

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Competitive and organized corruption, institutional response

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 109, Nos. 1-4, pp. 293-315, January 2002
Posted: 19 Sep 2002
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

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Competitive and organized corruption, institutional response

7.

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing

Downloads 68 (347,171)
Citation 2

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 593
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 18 Jul 2003
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 51 (406,143)

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Endogenous policy, complete markets, efficiency, risk sharing

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3866
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Jun 2003
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 17 (580,620)
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Endogenous policy, complete markets, efficiency, risk-sharing

8.

Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 417-448, August 2004
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Jul 2004
Marco Celentani, Juan-José Ganuza and Jose-Luis Peydro
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences and Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)
Downloads 18 (553,866)
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9.

Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4385
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 09 Jun 2004
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 13 (585,151)
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Inflation, risk sharing, security markets, terms of trade, monetary cooperation, currency union