Marco Celentani

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Professor

Calle Madrid 126

Getafe, 28903

Spain

  • Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

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    • Tel: +34-91-624 9546
    • Fax: +34-91-624 9875
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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Top 23,131

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1,994

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Top 13,170

in Total Papers Citations

29

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Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

Downloads 909 ( 24,343)

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 464
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Jul 2000
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 909 (23,933)

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corruption, competition, public procurement

Corruption and Competition in Procurement

European Economic Review, Vol. 46, Pp. 1273-1303, 2002
Posted: 14 Oct 2002
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

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corruption, competition, public procurement

2.

Career Concerns and Contingent Compensation

CEMFI Working Paper No. 0205
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 03 Dec 2002
Guillermo Caruana and Marco Celentani
Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
Downloads 265 (112,930)

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Compensation, career concerns, pay-performance, risk

3.

Combating Corruptions in International Business Transactions

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 670
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 Sep 2003
Marco Celentani, Juan-José Ganuza and Jose-Luis Peydro
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences and Government of Catalan - Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)
Downloads 253 (118,589)

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International corruption, OECD convention

4.

What Form of Relative Performance Evaluation?

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 744
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 12 Jul 2004
Marco Celentani and Rosa Loveira
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 196 (151,915)

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Executive compensation, relative performance evaluation

5.

Corruption and the Hadleyburg Effect

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 382
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 1999
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 139 (204,201)

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6.

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

Downloads 134 (210,294)

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 526
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 13 Jun 2001
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
Downloads 134 (210,948)

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Competitive and organized corruption, institutional response

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 109, Nos. 1-4, pp. 293-315, January 2002
Posted: 19 Sep 2002
Marco Celentani and Juan-José Ganuza
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics and Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

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Competitive and organized corruption, institutional response

7.

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing

Downloads 67 (331,125)

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 593
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 18 Jul 2003
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 50 (387,642)

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Endogenous policy, complete markets, efficiency, risk sharing

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3866
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Jun 2003
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 17 (548,520)
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Endogenous policy, complete markets, efficiency, risk-sharing

8.

Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 417-448, August 2004
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Jul 2004
Marco Celentani, Juan-José Ganuza and Jose-Luis Peydro
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences and Government of Catalan - Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)
Downloads 18 (523,425)
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9.

Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4385
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 09 Jun 2004
Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Klaus Desmet
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) and Southern Methodist University (SMU)
Downloads 13 (552,460)
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Inflation, risk sharing, security markets, terms of trade, monetary cooperation, currency union