260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States
Iowa State University
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Affirmative Action, Dynamic Reserves, Market Design, Matching with Contracts, Strategy-Proofness, School Choice
Market Design, Matching, Maximal Matching, Fairness, Object Allocation, School Choice
Affirmative Action, School Choice, Matching with Contracts
Market Design, matching, reserve systems, de-reservation, affirmative action
Market design, affirmative action, vertical reservations, horizontal reservations, de-reservations, India, lexicographic choice, cumulative offer mechanism.
Affirmative action, market design, lexicographic choice, reservations, India
Market design, matching, distributional constraints, affirmative action
Market Design, Matching, Affirmative Action
Bilateral substitutes, Unilateral substitutes, Substitutes, Doctor separability, Pareto separability, Irrelevance of rejected contracts
Matching markets, deferred acceptance, information acquisition, game the- ory, lab experiment
Market design, affirmative action, gradual matching, position-specific priorities, India
divided enrollment, school partitions, school choice, fairness, non-wastefulness, manipulation
Over and above choice rule, affirmative action, India
Market Design, reserve systems, de-reservation, soft reserves, India, assignment function
Market design, affirmative action, gradual matching, India.
