Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny

Paris, Cedex 16 75775

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

DOWNLOADS

490

CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 07 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 01 Jul 2016
Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris
Université Paris Dauphine and University of Cyprus
Downloads 94 (272,607)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Nash Implementation, Strategy-proof, Unanimity, Indirect Mechanisms

2.

Competing over a Finite Number of Locations

Economic Theory Bulletin 4, 125–136.
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 25 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 02 Jan 2018
Matias Nuñez and Marco Scarsini
Université Paris Dauphine and LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza
Downloads 79 (303,575)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Hotelling games, pure equilibria, large games, political economy

3.

Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining

UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2015-08
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 27 Apr 2015
University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Université Paris Dauphine and University of New South Wales (UNSW)
Downloads 64 (341,077)
Citation 1

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Approval voting, bargaining, partial honesty, consensual equilibrium

4.

Large Spatial Competition

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 29 Jun 2015 Last Revised: 09 May 2016
Matias Nuñez and Marco Scarsini
Université Paris Dauphine and LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza
Downloads 61 (349,408)
Citation 2

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Hotelling games, large games, Poisson games, valence

5.

A Map of Approval Voting Equilibra Outcomes

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 06 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2015
Sebastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez
University of Cergy-Pontoise and Université Paris Dauphine
Downloads 40 (419,105)

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Approval voting, Condorcet winner, Voting equilibria, Candidates in The Race

6.

How Proper is the Dominance-Solvable Outcome?

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 15 Jul 2015
Yukio Koriyama and Matias Nuñez
Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics and Université Paris Dauphine
Downloads 36 (435,214)

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Weak dominance, Iterated elimination, Proper equilibrium

7.

Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for Large Populations

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 03 Jul 2016
Matias Nuñez and Marcus Pivato
Université Paris Dauphine and THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Downloads 33 (447,729)
Citation 1

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Large Elections, Truth-telling, Incentives

8.

Implementing the Median

UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2018-11
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 12 Jul 2018
Matias Nuñez, Carlos Pimienta and Dimitrios Xefteris
Université Paris Dauphine, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Cyprus
Downloads 29 (466,295)

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Nash Implementation, Bayesian Implementation, Robust Implementation, Detail-free, Median rule, Strategy-proofness, Single-Peaked Preferences, Condorcet Winner

9.

Revisiting the Connection between the No-Show Paradox and Monotonicity

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 20 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 04 Jul 2016
Matias Nuñez and M. Remzi Sanver
Université Paris Dauphine and Bilgi University
Downloads 28 (471,206)

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Monotonicity, No-Show Paradox, Participation, Reinforcement, Threshold Scoring Rules

10.

Overstating: A Tale of Two Cities

APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 01 Aug 2011 Last Revised: 28 Aug 2013
Matias Nuñez and Jean-Francois Laslier
Université Paris Dauphine and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 25 (487,052)

Abstract:

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Strategic voting, voting equilibria

11.

Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, Issue 2, pp. 346-374, 2017
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 Mar 2017
Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris
Université Paris Dauphine and University of Cyprus
Downloads 1 (643,651)
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Abstract:

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Entry threshold, Poisson games, strategic voting