SSRN logo
Public User
Advanced Search

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School

Professor of Law, Economics and Finance; Director, Corporate Governance Program

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Research Associate

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fellow

  • Harvard Law School

    • Email
    • Tel: 617-495-3138
    • Fax: 617-812-0554

  • National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

132

DOWNLOADS
Rank 11

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 11

in Total Papers Downloads

256,336

CITATIONS
Rank 35

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 35

in Total Papers Citations

4,439

Scholarly Papers (132)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

What Matters in Corporate Governance?

Downloads 30,530 ( 39)
Citation 460

What Matters in Corporate Governance?

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 783-827, February 2009, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 491 (2004)
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 21 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 17 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School
Downloads 30,530 (38)
Citation 460

Abstract:

Corporate governance, agency costs, boards, directors, takeovers, tender offers, mergers and acquisitions, proxy fights, defensive tactics, entrenchment, anti-takeover provisions, staggered boards, corporate charters, corporate bylaws, golden parachutes, poison pills

What Matters in Corporate Governance?

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 783-827, 2009
Posted: 25 Jan 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

G30, G34, K22

2.

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

Downloads 9,154 ( 366)
Citation 1

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 802, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 115, 2015, pp. 1085-1156, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-66
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 07 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang
Harvard Law School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
Downloads 9,133 (367)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Corporate governance, short-termism, managerial myopia, long-term value, investor horizons, market efficiency, shareholder activism, hedge fund activism, shareholder rights, takeovers, proxy fights, takeover defenses, hedge funds

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

NBER Working Paper No. w21227
Number of pages: 85 Posted: 08 Jun 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang
Harvard Law School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
Downloads 21 (450,517)
Citation 1

Abstract:

3.

The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 3, pp. 833-914, January 2005, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 500
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 17 Mar 2003 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 8,470 (355)
Citation 132

Abstract:

corporate governance, shareholders, managers, directors, boards, stakeholders, agency costs, mergers, takeovers, acquisitions, proxy contests, corporate charters, charter amendments, state competition, dividends, distributions, free cash-flow, empire-building, myopia, short-termism, corporate reform

4.

Regulating Bankers' Pay

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 247-287, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 641
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 30 May 2009 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Holger Spamann
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 8,054 (392)
Citation 53

Abstract:

executive compensation, banks, financial regulation, financial firms, financial crisis, TARP, restricted shares, options, moral hazard, risk-taking, prudential regulation, say on pay, compensation committees

5.

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 647-673, 2005, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 8-22, 2005, Academy of Management Perspectives, pp. 5-24, February 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 528
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Jul 2005 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 8,020 (390)
Citation 55

Abstract:

Keywords: Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, disclosure, stealth compensation, compensation consultants, camouflage.

6.

The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 27, 2010, pp. 257-282, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 657, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 287
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 26 Nov 2009 Last Revised: 01 Dec 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School
Downloads 7,921 (383)
Citation 34

Abstract:

Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, the financial crisis, banks, executive compensation, risk-taking, compensation structures, bonus compensation, stock options, restricted shares, moral hazard

7.

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Downloads 7,513 ( 545)
Citation 281

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, pp. 71-92, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Jan 2003 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 7,362 (553)
Citation 281

Abstract:

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

NBER Working Paper No. w9813
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 05 Jul 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 98 (224,555)
Citation 281

Abstract:

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3961
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Aug 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 53 (320,847)
Citation 281

Abstract:

M14, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, executive loans, compensation consultants, expensing

8.

A Plan for Addressing the Financial Crisis

The Economists' Voice, Vol. 5, No. 5, Article 6, 2008, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 620, September 2008
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 26 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 29 Jun 2012
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 7,080 (579)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Financial crisis, bailout, subprime mortgages, creditor run

9.

The State of Corporate Governance Research

Downloads 6,402 ( 708)
Citation 36

The State of Corporate Governance Research

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23. No. 3, pp. 939-961, 2010., Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-20 , Charles A. Dice WP 2009-21, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 652
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 21 Nov 2009 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Michael S. Weisbach
Harvard Law School and Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 6,236 (730)
Citation 36

Abstract:

corporate governance, investor protection, shareholders, shareholder activism

The State of Corporate Governance Research

NBER Working Paper No. w15537
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Nov 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Michael S. Weisbach
Harvard Law School and Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 166 (147,954)
Citation 36

Abstract:

10.

Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

Harvard University Press, 2004, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 537783
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 6,115 (686)
Citation 316

Abstract:

Corporate governance, managers, executives, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, principal-agent problem, pay for performance, agency costs, stock options, rents, camouflage

11.

A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 127-170, 1999, Columbia Law School, Center for Studies in Law & Economics Paper No. 131, November 1999
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 03 Jan 2000 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 5,700 (771)
Citation 188

Abstract:

12.

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Downloads 5,670 ( 882)
Citation 232

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 751-846, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 366, June 2002
Number of pages: 97 Posted: 19 Jun 2002 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 5,508 (915)
Citation 232

Abstract:

corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage, insider trading, indexed options, vesting

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

NBER Working Paper No. w9068
Number of pages: 101 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 129 (183,016)
Citation 232

Abstract:

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3558
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 33 (389,840)
Citation 232

Abstract:

Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage

13.

The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 675-732, 2007, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 567, October 2005
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 23 Jun 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 5,310 (989)
Citation 62

Abstract:

Corporate governance, directors, boards, shareholders, shareholder rights, shareholder voting, shareholder franchise, corporate elections, corporate ballot, proxy fights, proxy contests, access to the ballot, staggered boards, confidential voting, majority voting, bylaws, entrenchment, myopia

14.

Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 398
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 04 Nov 2002 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 4,308 (1,340)
Citation 11

Abstract:

adverse selection, asymmetric information, corporate governance, investor protection, security design, private benefits of control, agency costs, expropriation, minority shareholders, IPO, going public, corporate charter, contractual freedom, private ordering, takeovers, antitakeover provisions, self-dealing

15.

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Concentrated Corporate Ownership, (R. Morck, ed.), pp. 295-315, 2000, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 249
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 01 Feb 1999 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George G. Triantis
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 4,066 (1,455)
Citation 178

Abstract:

Pyramids, dual-class, cross-ownership, cash flow nights, votes, agency costs, corporate governance, law and finance

16.

Paying for Long-Term Performance

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 158, pp. 1915-1959, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 658
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 14 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 4,005 (1,364)
Citation 14

Abstract:

executive compensation, executive pay, equity-based compensation, restricted shares, options, risk-taking, long-term, retention, backdating, spring-loading, unloading, insider trading, hedging, derivatives

17.

The Growth of Executive Pay

Downloads 3,975 ( 1,616)
Citation 97

The Growth of Executive Pay

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 283-303, 2005, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 510
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 14 Jan 2005 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
Harvard Law School and Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Downloads 3,917 (1,634)
Citation 97

Abstract:

executive compensation, equity-based compensation, cash compensation, growth of compensation, managerial power

The Growth of Executive Pay

NBER Working Paper No. w11443
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 12 Jul 2005
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
Harvard Law School and Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Downloads 58 (306,842)
Citation 97

Abstract:

The Growth of Executive Pay

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, Issue 2, pp. 283-303, 2005
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
Harvard Law School and Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Abstract:

18.

Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Downloads 3,961 ( 1,625)
Citation 33

Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 04/2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 336
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Apr 2003 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,832 (1,707)
Citation 33

Abstract:

Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions

Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

NBER Working Paper No. w8633
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 129 (183,016)
Citation 33

Abstract:

19.

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy

Downloads 3,632 ( 1,923)
Citation 102

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 54, pp. 887-951, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 353
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 18 Mar 2002 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 3,525 (1,989)
Citation 102

Abstract:

Takeover, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, defensive tactics, staggered boards, poison pills

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy

NBER Working Paper No. w8974
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 30 May 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 107 (210,970)
Citation 102

Abstract:

20.

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 807-822, 2005, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 653125, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 505, February 2005
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Feb 2005 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 3,458 (1,917)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Executive compensation, agency problems, pay for performance, nonperformance pay, performance pay, soft landing, golden goodbyes, camouflage, misreporting, restatement, earning manipulation, incentives

21.

Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns

Downloads 3,341 ( 2,224)
Citation 24

Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 323-348, May 2013, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 667
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 14 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 12 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Business School
Downloads 3,124 (2,454)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Corporate governance, governance indices, GIM, G-Index, E-Index, shareholder rights, entrenchment, market efficiency, learning, earning announcements, analyst forecasts, IRRC provisions, behavioral finance, asset pricing

Learning and the Disappearing Association between Governance and Returns

NBER Working Paper No. w15912
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 Apr 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Business School
Downloads 217 (114,877)
Citation 24

Abstract:

22.

Director Liability

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 1011-1045, 2006
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 Nov 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Joseph E. Bachelder, Roel C. Campos, Byron S. Georgiou, Alan G. Hevesi, William Lerach, Robert Mendelsohn, Robert A.G. Monks, Toby Myerson, John F. Olson, Leo E. Strine Jr. and John C. Wilcox
Harvard Law School, Bachelder Law Offices, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, New York State Office of the State Comptroller, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, Royal & Sun Alliance, Harvard College, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Government of the State of Delaware - Supreme Court of Delaware and SODALI
Downloads 3,235 (2,123)
Citation 1

Abstract:

delaware, journal, corporate, law, transcript, personal liability, directors, Harvard Law, Corporate governance, directors, boards, shareholders, shareholder suits, liability, plaintiffs lawyers, derivative suits, securities litigation, D&O insurance

23.

Letting Shareholders Set the Rules

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 119, pp. 1784-1813, 2006
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 17 Mar 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,847 (2,685)
Citation 21

Abstract:

corporate governance, shareholders, managers, directors, boards, centralized management, corporate law, agency costs, corporate charters, charter amendments, incorporation, state competition, IPO, proxy contests, corporate reform

24.

Lucky CEOs

Downloads 2,797 ( 3,084)
Citation 24

Lucky CEOs

Journal of Finance, 2010 (published as "Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors"), Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 566
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 20 Nov 2006 Last Revised: 09 Dec 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 2,750 (3,106)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Executive compensation, corporate governance, options, backdating, spring-loading, inside information, CEO, independent directors

Lucky CEOS

NBER Working Paper No. w12771
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 23 Dec 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 47 (339,333)
Citation 24

Abstract:

25.

The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 157, pp. 1263-1317, 2009, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 633
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 08 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 2,772 (2,765)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Corporate governance, investor protection, agency costs, law and finance, governance indices, global standards, best practices, controlling shareholders, CGQ, anti-director index, anti-self-dealing index.

26.

A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control

Downloads 2,713 ( 3,258)
Citation 157

A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control

EFA 0285, 1999, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 260
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 22 Aug 1999 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,607 (3,397)
Citation 157

Abstract:

A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control

NBER Working Paper No. w7203
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 13 Mar 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 106 (212,389)
Citation 157

Abstract:

27.

The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 113, No. 6, pp. 1637-1694, October 2013, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 755
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Apr 2013 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,711 (2,166)

Abstract:

Short-termism, myopia, corporate governance, shareholders, boards, managers, long-term value, investor horizons, shareholder rights, shareholder power, shareholder activism, takeovers, corporate elections, entrenchment, antitakeover defenses, market efficiency, hedge funds

28.

Misreporting Corporate Performance

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 400
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 07 Dec 2002 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Oren Bar-Gill and Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,684 (3,034)
Citation 43

Abstract:

Asymmetric information, acquisitions, corporate governance, disclosure, myopia, short-termism, executive compensation, stock options, insider trading, accounting, financial statements, earnings management, auditor, financial reporting

29.

The Market for Corporate Law

Downloads 2,613 ( 3,460)
Citation 22

The Market for Corporate Law

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, pp. 134-172, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 377
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 28 Jun 2001 Last Revised: 17 Aug 2009
Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza and Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School, University of Virginia School of Law and Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,543 (3,542)
Citation 22

Abstract:

corporate law, managers, shareholders, regulatory competition, Delaware, private benefits of control, network externalities

The Market for Corporate Law

NBER Working Paper No. w9156
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 23 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and Michal Barzuza
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 42 (355,812)
Citation 22

Abstract:

The Market for Corporate Law

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3553
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 04 Nov 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and Michal Barzuza
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 28 (412,473)
Citation 22

Abstract:

Network externalities, private benefits of control, Delaware, regulatory competition, shareholders, corporate law

30.

CEO Centrality

Downloads 2,509 ( 3,706)
Citation 21

CEO Centrality

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 601, 2007
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 15 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Martijn Cremers, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Urs Peyer
University of Notre Dame, Harvard Law School and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 2,451 (3,754)
Citation 21

Abstract:

Executive compensation, corporate governance, CEOs, executives, options, equity-based compensation, non-equity compensation, Tobin's Q, firm entrenchment, CEO turnover, independent directors, CEO chair, acquisitions, CEO turnover, pay for luck., variability of returns, pay distribution, internal pay

CEO Centrality

NBER Working Paper No. w13701
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 31 Dec 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, University of Notre Dame and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 58 (306,842)
Citation 21

Abstract:

31.

The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Downloads 2,499 ( 3,727)
Citation 154

The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 409-433, 2005, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 478
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 2,425 (3,835)
Citation 154

Abstract:

Corporate governance, Tobin's Q, firm value, agency costs, boards, directors, takeovers, tender offers, mergers and acquisitions, proxy fights, defensive tactics, antitakeover provisions, staggered boards, poison pills

The Costs of Entrenched Boards

NBER Working Paper No. w10587
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 74 (268,737)
Citation 154

Abstract:

32.

Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate

Downloads 2,344 ( 4,146)
Citation 78

Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate

Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 383-425, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 351, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 003
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 11 Apr 2003 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 2,293 (4,221)
Citation 78

Abstract:

Delaware, incorporation, corporate governance, regulatory competition, managers, shareholders, takeovers, antitakeover statutes, antitakeover defenses, home bias

Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate

NBER Working Paper No. w9107
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 Aug 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 51 (326,915)
Citation 78

Abstract:

33.

Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 25, April 2014, pp. 140-154, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 683
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 02 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Business School
Downloads 2,174 (3,533)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Golden Parachute, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Acquisitions, Takeovers, Acquisition Likelihood, Acquisition Premiums, Agency Costs, Tobin’s Q, Dodd-Frank

34.

How to Make TARP II Work

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 626, 2009
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 14 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 29 Jun 2012
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,117 (4,841)

Abstract:

Troubled assets, Bailout, Financial Crisis, Banks, Financial Stability

35.

Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors

Journal of Finance, Vol. 65, No. 6, pp. 2363-2401, 2010, Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 39-09, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 03 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2011
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 2,076 (5,137)
Citation 40

Abstract:

Executive compensation, corporate governance, options, backdating, timing, spring-loading, inside information, CEO, independent directors

36.

Firm Expansion and CEO Pay

Downloads 1,876 ( 6,097)
Citation 22

Firm Expansion and CEO Pay

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 533, 2005, Johnson School Research Paper No. 27-06
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 07 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
Harvard Law School and Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Downloads 1,837 (6,178)
Citation 22

Abstract:

executive compensation, firm size, acquisitions, distributions, repurchases, stock issuance, empire-building, sales growth, pay for performance, options

Firm Expansion and CEO Pay

NBER Working Paper No. w11886
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 06 Apr 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
Harvard Law School and Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Downloads 39 (366,509)
Citation 22

Abstract:

37.

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Downloads 1,864 ( 6,175)
Citation 14

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23. No. 3, pp. 1089-1119, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 603
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 28 Mar 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 1,829 (6,234)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Investor protection, corporate governance, corporate law, interest groups, political economy, law and finance, insiders, institutional investors, entrepreneurs, equity capital, agency costs, private benefits of control

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

NBER Working Paper No. w13702
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 31 Dec 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 35 (381,664)
Citation 14

Abstract:

38.

Rethinking Basic

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 671-697, May 2014, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 764
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 24 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,825 (5,144)

Abstract:

Basic, Class Action, Class Certification, Fraud-on-the-Market, Halliburton, Securities Litigation

39.

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Downloads 1,717 ( 7,149)
Citation 9

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 291-326, 2004, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 487, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 583861
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,681 (7,291)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Executive compensation, pay for performance, agency costs, rent extraction, stealth compensation, camouflage, retirement benefits, deferred compensation, executive pensions, perks

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

NBER Working Paper No. w10742
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 22 Sep 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 36 (377,738)
Citation 9

Abstract:

40.

Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 124, pp. 83-117, 2010., Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 676
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 01 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 14 Dec 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 1,646 (6,491)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Public Corporation, Political Contributions, Campaign Finance, Citizens United

41.

Executive Pensions

Downloads 1,616 ( 7,947)
Citation 27

Executive Pensions

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 823-855, 2005, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 507
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 30 Mar 2005 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 1,541 (8,394)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Executive compensation, executive retirement benefits, executive pensions, stealth compensation, camouflage, pay for performance

Executive Pensions

NBER Working Paper No. w11907
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 22 Jan 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 75 (266,533)
Citation 27

Abstract:

42.

Buying Troubled Assets

Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, 2009, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 636
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 24 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 15 Sep 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,613 (7,659)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Troubled assets, toxic assets, public-private investment program, bailout, financial crisis, banks, financial stability, U.S. Treasury

43.

A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition

Downloads 1,576 ( 8,237)
Citation 55

A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 111-164, 2001 , Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 309
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 06 Feb 2001 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,532 (8,471)
Citation 55

Abstract:

Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, regulatory competition

A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition

NBER Working Paper No. w8148
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 08 Mar 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 44 (349,074)
Citation 55

Abstract:

44.

Lucky Directors

Downloads 1,556 ( 8,419)
Citation 19

Lucky Directors

Journal of Finance, 2010 (published as "Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors"), Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 573
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 18 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 14 Dec 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 1,520 (8,569)
Citation 19

Abstract:

Executive compensation, corporate governance, stock options, backdating, spring loading, inside information, CEO, independent directors, outside directors, entrenchment

Lucky Directors

NBER Working Paper No. w12811
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 05 Jan 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 36 (377,738)
Citation 19

Abstract:

45.

The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure

Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 40-60, Spring 2012, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 702, Columbia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 405
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 14 Jul 2011 Last Revised: 05 Jun 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 1,547 (6,388)

Abstract:

46.

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments

Downloads 1,545 ( 8,521)
Citation 5

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 697
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 13 Nov 2010 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Business School
Downloads 1,514 (8,630)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Corporate governance, staggered boards, takeover defenses, antitakeover provisions, proxy fights, Tobin's Q, firm value, agency costs, Delaware, chancery court, Airgas

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments

NBER Working Paper No. w17127
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 20 Jun 2011
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Business School
Downloads 31 (398,474)
Citation 5

Abstract:

47.

Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 106, pp. 1793-1839, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 558
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 29 Aug 2006 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 1,501 (8,419)
Citation 9

Abstract:

State competition, regulatory competition, Delaware regulations, incorporations, Corporate Charters, corporate law, corporate governance, securities regulations, SEC

48.

Pay Distribution in the Top Executive Team

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 574
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 12 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 18 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer
Harvard Law School, University of Notre Dame and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 1,497 (8,334)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Executive compensation, corporate governance, CEOs, options, equity-based compensation, non-equity compensation, Tobin's Q, entrenchment, independent directors, board size, CEO tenure, CEO turnover, acquisitions, variability of returns, pay distribution, and internal pay equity

49.

Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 101, April 2013, pp. 923-967, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 728, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 431
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 1,466 (6,420)

Abstract:

Political spending, SEC, disclosure, transparency

50.

The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 59, pp. 43-66, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 428
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 05 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,450 (8,616)
Citation 28

Abstract:

corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC

51.

How to Fix Bankers’ Pay

Daedalus, Vol. 139, No. 4, Fall 2010, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 677
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 07 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,300 (9,700)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Financial Crisis, Executive Compensation, Banking, Risk-Taking

52.

Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements

Downloads 1,183 ( 13,117)
Citation 11

Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, pp. 713-753, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 420
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 13 Feb 2004 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,145 (13,533)
Citation 11

Abstract:

corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, takeover bids, tender offers, takeover defenses, antitakeover charter provisions, staggered boards, corporate charters, IPO, mandatory rules, sunset arrangements

Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements

NBER Working Paper No. w10190
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 04 Jan 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 38 (370,169)
Citation 11

Abstract:

53.

Chapter 11

Downloads 1,124 ( 14,198)
Citation 8

Chapter 11

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 3, pp. 219-224, 1998, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 227
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Apr 1998 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,081 (14,785)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Chapter 11

NBER Working Paper No. w6473
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 24 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 43 (352,410)
Citation 8

Abstract:

54.

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Downloads 1,117 ( 14,345)
Citation 20

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 973-1035, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 361, 2002
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 31 May 2002 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,054 (15,421)
Citation 20

Abstract:

corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, takeover bids, tender offers, takeover defenses

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

NBER Working Paper No. w9078
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 26 Jul 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 40 (362,867)
Citation 20

Abstract:

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3445
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 27 Aug 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 23 (439,066)
Citation 20

Abstract:

Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, takeover bids, tender offers, takeover defences

55.

Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freezes

Downloads 1,093 ( 14,824)
Citation 18

Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freezes

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 11, pp. 3519-3555, 2011, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 623
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 13 Dec 2008 Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Itay Goldstein
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
Downloads 933 (18,471)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Credit freeze, self-fulfilling crisis, run on the economy, global games, coordination failure, capital injection, government policy, lender of last resort

Self-Fulfilling Credit-Market Freezes

AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 17 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Itay Goldstein
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
Downloads 134 (177,442)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freezes

NBER Working Paper No. w16031
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 04 Jun 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Itay Goldstein
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
Downloads 26 (422,643)
Citation 18

Abstract:

56.

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, pp. 885-917, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 393
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 10 Dec 2002 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 1,084 (14,198)
Citation 22

Abstract:

Takeover, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, defensive tactics, staggered boards, poison pills, premia, independent directors

57.

One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets

Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, pp. 827-836, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 534
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 10 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago Law School
Downloads 1,073 (14,311)
Citation 10

Abstract:

contracts, standard form contracts, contracts of adhesion, reputation, opportunism, observability

58.

Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 114, No. 6, pp. 1549-1594, October 2014, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 772, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-386
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 01 Mar 2014 Last Revised: 09 Dec 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School
Downloads 1,027 (11,267)

Abstract:

Corporate governance, Mergers and acquisitions, takeovers, tender offers, antitakeover defenses, poison pill, Williams Act, preemption, state antitakeover statutes

59.

Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?

Downloads 1,002 ( 16,886)
Citation 43

Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?

California Law Review, Vol. 90, pp. 1775-1821, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 352
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 06 Mar 2002 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School
Downloads 974 (17,302)
Citation 43

Abstract:

Delaware, incorporations, corporate charters, regulatory competition, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, takeovers, antitakeover statutes

Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?

NBER Working Paper No. w9380
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 09 Dec 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School
Downloads 28 (412,473)
Citation 43

Abstract:

60.

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Downloads 891 ( 20,167)
Citation 8

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 114, pp. 2386-2436, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 321, 2001, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 49
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Apr 2001 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 833 (21,864)
Citation 8

Abstract:

bankruptcy, insolvency, secured debt, security interest, collateral, valuation, bankruptcy reform

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w8276
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 05 May 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 58 (306,842)
Citation 8

Abstract:

61.

On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 06 Sep 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jay W. Eisenhofer, Stuart M. Grant, Michael J. Barry and P. Bradford DeLeeuw
Harvard Law School, Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A., Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A., Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. and Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.
Downloads 845 (20,550)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Takeovers, takeover defenses, poison pill, bylaws, charter, fiduciary duties, corporate governance, agency costs, directors, shareholders, Delaware

62.

Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and What Can Be Done About it?

Duke Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 27-53, 1989, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 50, 1988
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 28 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 845 (20,652)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Investment bankers, fairness opinions, takeovers, freezeouts, corporate governance, conflict of interest, professionals

63.

Symposium on Corporate Elections

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 448, 2003
Number of pages: 131 Posted: 01 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 845 (21,114)
Citation 3

Abstract:

corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, corporate elections, SEC

64.

Bundling and Entrenchment

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 7, pp. 1551-1595, 2010, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 659, USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-2
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 04 Aug 2009 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2013
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law
Downloads 837 (20,135)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Bundling, entrenchment, staggered boards, mergers, charter amendments, charter provisions, shareholder voting, shareholder approval

65.

Pre-Contractual Reliance

Downloads 831 ( 22,330)

Pre-Contractual Reliance

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 30, pp. 423-457, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 319, 2001, U of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 00-009
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 11 Dec 2000 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago Law School
Downloads 787 (23,788)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Contracts, bargaining, negotiations, reliance

Pre-Contractual Reliance

NBER Working Paper No. w8235
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 13 Apr 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago Law School
Downloads 44 (349,074)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Pre-Contractual Reliance

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 192
Posted: 20 Jan 1997
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago Law School

Abstract:

Contracts, Negotiations, Reliance

66.

On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition

Business Lawyer, Vol. 57, pp. 1047-1068, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 363, 2002
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 24 May 2002 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 830 (21,678)
Citation 46

Abstract:

Delaware, incorporations, corporate charters, regulatory competition, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, takeovers

67.

Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 329–360, February 2010., Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 653,
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 Nov 2009 Last Revised: 09 Aug 2012
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 800 (19,504)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholder voting, corporate elections, corporate governance, directors, default rules, private ordering, boards

68.

Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 7, pp. 1443-1510, 1992
Number of pages: 87 Posted: 10 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 785 (21,593)
Citation 78

Abstract:

Delaware, state competition, federalism, race to the top, race to the bottom, corporate governance, corporate law, agency costs, managerial opportunism, private benefits of control, takeovers

69.

The Harvard Law School Proxy Access Roundtable

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 661
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 21 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 06 Feb 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 740 (24,853)

Abstract:

Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholder voting, corporate elections, corporate governance, directors, boards

70.

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control

Downloads 720 ( 27,449)
Citation 64

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 136
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 24 Mar 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 684 (28,975)
Citation 64

Abstract:

Corporate control, sale of control, control blocks, large shareholders, mergers and acquisitions, private benefit of control, minority shareholders

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control

NBER Working Paper No. w4788
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Aug 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 36 (377,738)
Citation 64

Abstract:

71.

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

Downloads 710 ( 27,985)
Citation 20

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.487-502, 1999, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 179, February 1996
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Jun 1998 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Christine Jolls
Harvard Law School and Yale Law School
Downloads 667 (30,039)
Citation 20

Abstract:

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

NBER Working Paper No. w6919
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 25 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Christine Jolls
Harvard Law School and Yale Law School
Downloads 43 (352,410)
Citation 20

Abstract:

72.

Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy

Downloads 699 ( 28,616)
Citation 14

Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy

European Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 829-843, 2000, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 271, 1999
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 27 Mar 2000 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 652 (30,942)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Bankruptcy, reorganization, options

Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w7614
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 21 May 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 47 (339,333)
Citation 14

Abstract:

73.

Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 1-34, Fall 2013, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-33
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 30 Apr 2013 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr. and Wei Jiang
Harvard Law School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Columbia Law School and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
Downloads 675 (18,078)

Abstract:

Corporate governance, disclosure, Williams Act, takeovers, proxy fights, takeover defenses, poison pills, control contests, shareholder activism, activist investors, hedge funds, blockholders

74.

Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy

Downloads 668 ( 30,479)
Citation 27

Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy

Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 445-460, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 328, 2001
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 21 Jul 2001 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 612 (33,752)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, corporate reorganizations, workouts, absolute priority, moral hazard, asset dilution, claim dilution

Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w8388
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Jul 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 29 (407,709)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2914
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 27 (417,435)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, corporate reorganizations, workouts, absolute priority, moral hazard, asset dilution, claim dilution

75.

Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts

Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Randall K. Morck, ed., University of Chicago Press), pp. 247-259, 2000, New York University, Center for Law & Business, Working Paper No. 99-008, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 248, January 1999
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 01 Feb 1999 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 647 (29,817)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Corporate freezeouts, minority shareholders, private benefits of control, expropriation, agency costs, appraisal

76.

Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral

Michigan Law Review, Vol. 100, pp. 601-639, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 347, 2001
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 20 Feb 2002 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 646 (30,436)
Citation 16

Abstract:

externalities, property rights, liability rules, ex ante investments, regulation

77.

Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale

Downloads 624 ( 33,367)
Citation 27

Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 284-312, 1991, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 78
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 Nov 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 571 (37,002)
Citation 27

Abstract:

contracts, breach, damages, precautions, information, communication

Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale

NBER Working Paper No. w3696
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 28 May 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 53 (320,847)
Citation 27

Abstract:

78.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 857-934, 1996, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 166
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 19 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 623 (25,748)
Citation 34

Abstract:

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

79.

The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 12, pp. 911-949, 1987
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 27 Dec 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 613 (29,167)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting

80.

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

Downloads 582 ( 36,640)
Citation 12

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 489-520, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 343, November 2001
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 10 Dec 2001 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 526 (41,241)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Shareholders, managers, directors, default rules, interpretation, takeovers, antitakeover statutes, poison pill, and staggered boards

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

NBER Working Paper No. w8703
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 10 Jan 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 35 (381,664)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3140
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 29 Jan 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 21 (450,517)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Shareholders, managers, directors, default rules, interpretation, takeovers, anti-takeover statutes, poison pill, staggered boards

81.

Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 98, pp. 1695-1808, 1985, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 5, 1984
Number of pages: 129 Posted: 08 Aug 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 572 (32,108)
Citation 27

Abstract:

takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, targets, acquirers

82.

The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John Wilcox

Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 11, pp. 17-19, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 410, February 2003
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 03 Mar 2003 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 547 (37,910)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Takeover, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, defensive tactics, staggered boards, poison pills, premia, independent directors

83.

Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice

Downloads 543 ( 40,123)
Citation 4

Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 26 Sep 2001 Last Revised: 18 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 420 (54,752)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 20 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 18 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 95 (229,391)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3006
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 29 Oct 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 28 (412,473)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Takeover law, regulatory competition, federal takeover, state takeover, shareholder

84.

A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101, pp. 775 – 804, 1988, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 37,
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 09 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 532 (38,184)
Citation 54

Abstract:

Chapter 11, reorganization, bankruptcy, absolute priority, options

85.

The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a Microsoft Breakup

Downloads 526 ( 41,762)

The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a Microsoft Breakup

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 56, pp. 459-481, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 296, 2000
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 31 May 2001 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 491 (45,020)

Abstract:

Valuation, Microsoft, breakup, spin-off

The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a Microsoft Breakup

NBER Working Paper No. w8089
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 19 Jan 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 35 (381,664)

Abstract:

86.

The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1395-1415, 1989, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 63
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 01 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 513 (37,298)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Corporate charters, freedom of contract, corporate governance, corporate law, corporate voting, midstream opportunism, collective action

87.

An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies

Downloads 489 ( 45,799)
Citation 11

An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies

Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 775-808, 1999, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 180, 1996
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 11 Jul 2000 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Andrew T. Guzman
Harvard Law School and USC Gould School of Law
Downloads 448 (50,597)
Citation 11

Abstract:

An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies

NBER Working Paper No. w6521
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 12 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Andrew T. Guzman
Harvard Law School and USC Gould School of Law
Downloads 41 (359,271)
Citation 11

Abstract:

88.

Unfreezing Credit Markets

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 622
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 13 Dec 2008 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 453 (49,059)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Credit freeze, credit crunch, credit thaw, financial crisis, self-fulfilling crisis, banks, financial institutions, run on the bank, coordination failure

89.

Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, pp. 553-615, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 376, July 2002
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 24 Aug 2002 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2015
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 450 (49,468)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Corporate Governance, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Barriers to entry, Network Externalities, Federalism

90.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Downloads 429 ( 53,882)
Citation 16

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 82, pp.1279-1348, 1997, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 224
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 27 Jan 1998 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 397 (58,687)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

NBER Working Paper No. w6472
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 11 Jun 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 32 (394,061)
Citation 16

Abstract:

91.

Designing a Shareholder Access Rule

Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 04 Mar 2004 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 422 (53,433)
Citation 2

Abstract:

corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC.

92.

Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 397
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 16 Jan 2002 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 422 (53,433)
Citation 1

Abstract:

externalities, property rights, liability rules, ex ante investments, regulation

93.

Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

Downloads 417 ( 55,809)
Citation 1

Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, pp.1615-1627, 1999, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 255, 1999
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 19 Sep 1999 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 390 (59,927)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

NBER Working Paper No. w7106
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 13 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 27 (417,435)
Citation 1

Abstract:

94.

Consent and Exchange

Downloads 412 ( 56,617)

Consent and Exchange

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 39, pp. 375-397, 2010., Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 590, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-21
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 09 Mar 2011
Oren Bar-Gill and Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 372 (63,389)

Abstract:

ownership, exchange, restitution, property rights, bargaining

Consent and Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w13267
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 23 Jul 2007
Oren Bar-Gill and Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 40 (362,867)

Abstract:

95.

Negative-Expected-Value Suits

Downloads 406 ( 57,647)
Citation 8

Negative-Expected-Value Suits

PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Chris Sanchirico, ed., 2011, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 656
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 12 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2014
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alon Klement
Harvard Law School and Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University
Downloads 368 (64,212)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Litigation, settlement, frivolous suits, negative expected value suits, positive expected value suit, divisibility, credibility, fee-shifting, contingent fees, retainer

Negative Expected Value Suits

NBER Working Paper No. w6474
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 21 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 38 (370,169)
Citation 8

Abstract:

96.

A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests

California Law Review, Vol. 78, 1071-1136, 1990, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 77, 1990
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 10 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 401 (53,295)
Citation 23

Abstract:

corporate governance, proxy contests, proxy fights, corporate voting, corporate elections, boards, shareholders, institutional investors, shareholder activism

97.

Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 102, pp. 1820-1860, 1989, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 46
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 10 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 348 (61,277)
Citation 21

Abstract:

corporate charters, freedom of contract, corporate governance, corporate law, corporate voting, midstream opportunism, collective action

98.

Placing Election Bylaws on the Corporate Ballot

Harvard PON Working Paper No. 915403
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 10 Jul 2006 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Allen Ferrell, Reinier Kraakman, Mark J. Roe and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 346 (66,749)

Abstract:

Corporate elections, shareholder voting, proxy contests, access to the ballot, by-laws, by-law amendments, proxy fights, proxy contests, corporate governance, agency costs

99.

The Business Roundtable's Untenable Case Against Shareholder Access

Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot, 2009, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 557-568, 2005, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 516, 2005
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 16 Mar 2005 Last Revised: 24 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 310 (75,927)

Abstract:

corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC, Business Roundtable

100.

The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead Counsel

Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 80, pp. 889-899, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 390
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 24 Nov 2002 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 297 (80,609)

Abstract:

class actions, lead counsel, attorney fees, contingent fees

101.

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Downloads 295 ( 83,427)
Citation 17

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

NBER Working Paper No. w8661
Number of pages: 113 Posted: 14 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 246 (101,137)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3112
Number of pages: 115 Posted: 17 Jan 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 49 (333,123)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, private benefits of control, agency costs, rent extraction

102.

Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

Downloads 285 ( 86,747)
Citation 28

Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, pp. 253-279, 1992, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 80
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 21 Nov 2003 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
Downloads 260 (95,365)
Citation 28

Abstract:

Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

NBER Working Paper No. t0097
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 29 Dec 2006
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
Downloads 25 (427,921)
Citation 28

Abstract:

103.

The Effect of offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement

Downloads 222 (112,712)
Citation 7

The Effect of offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, pp. 489-513, 1999, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 164
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 13 May 1998 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
Downloads 196 (126,856)
Citation 7

Abstract:

The Effect of offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement

NBER Working Paper No. w6509
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 23 Jun 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
Downloads 26 (422,643)
Citation 7

Abstract:

104.

Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards

Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.157-184 (2013).
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 28 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 24 May 2016
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Scott Hirst and June Rhee
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Yale University - Yale Program on Financial Stability
Downloads 188 (89,879)

Abstract:

Staggered boards, classified boards, shareholder proposals, shareholder voting, shareholder activism, public pension funds, corporate governance

105.

A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, pp. 1-25, 1996, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 158
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 22 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 183 (123,019)
Citation 25

Abstract:

Litigation, suit, settlement, credibility, negative-expected-value suit, frivolous suit

106.

Corporate Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality

Downloads 135 (175,889)

Corporate Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality

NBER Working Paper No. w5584
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 04 Aug 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 135 (176,375)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Corporate Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality

Working Paper #181, Harvard Law School Center for Law and Economics
Posted: 06 Jun 1996
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

107.

Suits with Negative Expected Value

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Peter Newman, ed., Vol. 3, pp. 551-554, Palgrave MacMillan, 1998, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 226
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 24 Mar 2004 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 125 (179,132)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Litigation, settlement, frivolous suits, negative expected value suits.

108.

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: the Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights

NBER Working Paper No. w6951
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 01 Jul 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George G. Triantis
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 97 (194,171)
Citation 176

Abstract:

109.

The 'Lemons Effect' in Corporate Freeze-Outs

NBER Working Paper No. w6938
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Jun 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 96 (199,187)
Citation 6

Abstract:

110.

Federalism and Takeover Law: the Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

Downloads 70 (274,517)

Federalism and Takeover Law: the Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

NBER Working Paper No. w7232
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 29 Aug 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 70 (277,483)
Citation 44

Abstract:

Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 5, pp. 1168-1200, June 1999, Reprinted in Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (D. Esty and D. Geradin, ed., Oxford University Press) pp. 68-94, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 257, June 1999
Posted: 11 Aug 1999 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

111.

Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects

NBER Working Paper No. t0098
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 05 Jan 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars Stole
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 69 (252,140)
Citation 51

Abstract:

112.

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3073
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 11 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 64 (288,069)
Citation 23

Abstract:

Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions

113.

Takeover Bids Below the Expected Value of Minority Shares

NBER Working Paper No. w2524
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 04 Jul 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 48 (316,049)
Citation 16

Abstract:

114.

The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value

NBER Working Paper No. t0095
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Chaim Fershtman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 35 (342,806)
Citation 3

Abstract:

115.

An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivoloussuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11

Downloads 33 (380,829)

An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivoloussuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11

NBER Working Paper No. w4731
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 24 Nov 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School
Downloads 33 (389,840)
Citation 15

Abstract:

An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 371-403, 1996, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 135, 1993
Posted: 16 Oct 2000 Last Revised: 24 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School

Abstract:

An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11

University of Southern California Law Center Working Paper 94-3
Posted: 07 Jul 1999
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang
Harvard Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law School

Abstract:

116.

Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer

NBER Working Paper No. w2161
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 22 Mar 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
Downloads 32 (352,388)
Citation 34

Abstract:

117.

The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects

NBER Working Paper No. t0096
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 27 Jun 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Chaim Fershtman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 28 (362,543)
Citation 1

Abstract:

118.

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3514
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 02 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 22 (430,861)
Citation 76

Abstract:

Delaware, incorporation, corporate governance, regulatory competition, managers, shareholders, takeovers, antitakeover statutes, antitakeover defenses, home bias

119.

Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

NBER Working Paper No. w4079
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 22 (410,930)
Citation 17

Abstract:

120.

Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals

NBER Working Paper No. w4078
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 10 Jul 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 19 (420,602)

Abstract:

121.

How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp. 99-106, Winter 2010
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 31 Mar 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 4 (520,156)

Abstract:

122.

The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 Jun 2017
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Scott Hirst
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (105,116)

Abstract:

institutional investors, investment managers, mutual funds, index funds, hedge fund activism

123.

Recent Board Declassifications: A Response to Cremers and Sepe

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 18 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 May 2017
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 0 (159,575)

Abstract:

124.

The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 905, Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 2017-6
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 20 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 06 May 2017
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (44,669)

Abstract:

Corporations, Dual-Class, Controlling Shareholders, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, Sunset

125.

Dancing with Activists

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-44
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 10 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2017
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and Thomas Keusch
Harvard Law School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics and INSEAD
Downloads 0 (55,978)

Abstract:

Corporate governance, hedge fund activism, activist settlements

126.

Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 07 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 02 May 2017
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University - Faculty of Law
Downloads 0 (47,428)

Abstract:

Controlling Shareholders, Corporate Control, Independent Directors, Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, Conflict of Interest, Self-Dealing, Controller Opportunism, Tunneling, Boards of Directors

127.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 08 Nov 2015
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr., James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian JM Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe and Helen S. Scott
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, Widener University Delaware Law School, Yale Law School, Columbia Law School, New York University School of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Stanford Law School, Harvard Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, BC Law School, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School and New York University (NYU)
Downloads 0 (52,561)

Abstract:

corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

128.

Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 257
Posted: 26 May 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

129.

Damage Measures for Inadvertant Breach of Contract

International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, 1999
Posted: 29 Mar 2000
Ivan P. L. Png and Lucian A. Bebchuk
National University of Singapore (NUS) and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

130.

Concentration in the Israeli Economy and Bank Investment in Nonfinancial Companies

Posted: 05 Sep 1997
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

131.

The Effect of Fee-Shifting Rules on Settlement Terms

Posted: 31 Jan 1997
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School

Abstract:

132.

On Divisibility and Credibility: The Effects of the Distribution of Litigation Costs Over Time on the Credibility of Threats to Sue

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 190
Posted: 16 Oct 1996
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School

Abstract:

Submit a Paper Section 508 Text Only Pages

Quick Links

Research Paper Series Conference Papers Partners in Publishing Organization Homepages Newsletter Sign Up

Rankings

Top Papers Top Authors Top Organizations

About

SSRN Objectives Network Directors Presidential Letter Announcements Contact us FAQs
Elsevier logo
Copyright Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy

Cookies are used by this site. To decline or learn more, visit our Cookies page. This page was processed by apollobot1 in 5.313 seconds

Relx Group logo