2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37235-1819
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
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Cournot models, Cournot equilibrium, oligopoly, multi-stage models of competition, best-response functions
Settlement, Bargaining, Negotiation, Litigation
Multiple litigants, externalities, asymmetric information
Discretionary Review, Dissenting Opinions, Judicial Dissent, Applications of Game Theory to Judicial Processes
Imperfect competition, quality, signaling, oligopoly
Market Structure, Strategic International Trade
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Products Liability, Safety, Contractual Liability, Strict Liability
disclosure, signaling, quality, efficiency
oligopoly, torts, safety, liability, social optimality
settlement bargaining, litigation funding, non-recourse loan, signaling
Settlement Bargaining, Signaling, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Signaling, quality, safety, confidentiality, duopoly
products liability, disclosure, signaling, safety, quality
Privacy, public goods, disclosure, signaling, esteem
Liability determination, settlement bargaining
private information, welfare, moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, partnership
Lawsuits, Settlement, Aggregation, Dynamics
Products liability, strict liability, negligence, cumulative harm, product quality
Signaling, Agency, Search, Contingent Fee
Settlement negotiation, information revelation, information suppression, asymmetric information
plea bargaining, informal sanctions
File name: jems.
Evidence Suppression, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Disclosure, Team Organization
products liability, imperfect competition, cumulative harm, investment in safety design
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