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Santiago Balseiro

Duke University - Decision Sciences

Assistant Professor

100 Fuqua Drive

Durham, NC 27708-0120

United States

  • Duke University - Decision Sciences

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
Rank 16,102

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Top 16,102

in Total Papers Downloads

2,440

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-11, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/55
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2014
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Duke University - Decision Sciences, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 791 (24,579)
Citation 1

Abstract:

auction design, revenue management, ad exchange, display advertising, internet, budget constraints, dynamic games, mean field, fluid approximation

2.

Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 09 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jul 2016
Santiago Balseiro and Ozan Candogan
Duke University - Decision Sciences and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 183 (63,182)

Abstract:

Intermediary problems, mechanism design, Internet advertising, repeated auctions, budget constraints

3.

Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 01 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 14 Nov 2015
Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago Balseiro, José Correa and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
University of Chile - Engineering Department, Duke University - Decision Sciences, University of Chile - Engineering Department and Facebook
Downloads 157 (145,428)

Abstract:

Contract Theory, Principal-Agent Problem, Price of Anarchy, First-Order Method

4.

Multi-Stage Intermediation in Display Advertising

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 18 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 31 May 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Ozan Candogan and Huseyin Gurkan
Duke University - Decision Sciences, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Students
Downloads 23 (121,013)

Abstract:

Intermediary Problems, Mechanism Design, Internet Advertising, Extensive Form Games, Second-Price Auction, Multi-Stage Intermediation

5.

Multi-Agent Mechanism Design without Money

Number of pages: 74 Posted: 10 Mar 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Huseyin Gurkan and Peng Sun
Duke University - Decision Sciences, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Students and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business
Downloads 0 (286,565)

Abstract:

dynamic mechanism design, social efficiency, multi-agent games, resource allocation without money

6.

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-18
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 23 Feb 2017
Santiago Balseiro and Yonatan Gur
Duke University - Decision Sciences and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 0 (164,650)

Abstract:

Sequential auctions, online advertising, online learning, stochastic optimization, stochastic approximation, incomplete information, regret analysis, dynamic games

7.

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 27 Dec 2016
Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian and Vahab Mirrokni
Duke University - Decision Sciences, Stanford University, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 0 (171,270)

Abstract:

Repeated Auctions, Internet Advertising, Budget Constraints

8.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 26 May 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Duke University - Decision Sciences, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 0 (105,913)

Abstract:

dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

9.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-10
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 22 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 14 Jun 2016
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Duke University - Decision Sciences, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 0 (91,832)

Abstract:

dynamic mechanism design, limited commitment, budget constraints, fluid approximation, display advertising, internet auctions, revenue management

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