Santiago Balseiro

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations

Assistant Professor

3022 Broadway

New York, NY 10027

United States

  • Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

22

DOWNLOADS
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8,900

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 12,277

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 12,277

in Total Papers Citations

72

CROSSREF CITATIONS

25

Scholarly Papers (22)

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1.

Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-1
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 06 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2019
Hana Choi, Carl F. Mela, Santiago Balseiro and Adam Leary
University of Rochester - Simon Business School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and CBS Interactive
Downloads 1,777 (13,476)
Citation 14

Abstract:

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Display Advertising, Literature Review, Real-Time Buying, Programmatic Buying, Real-Time Bidding

2.

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-11, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/55
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2014
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 972 (33,112)
Citation 15

Abstract:

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auction design, revenue management, ad exchange, display advertising, internet, budget constraints, dynamic games, mean field, fluid approximation

3.

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

Management Science 65 (9), 3952-3968
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 23 Feb 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jan 2020
Santiago Balseiro and Yonatan Gur
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 830 (41,357)
Citation 13

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Sequential auctions, online advertising, online learning, stochastic optimization, stochastic approximation, incomplete information, regret analysis, dynamic games

4.

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

Number of pages: 110 Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian and Vahab Mirrokni
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 689 (52,906)
Citation 4

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Repeated Auctions, Internet Advertising, Budget Constraints

5.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 28 Nov 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 585 (65,228)
Citation 14

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dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

6.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-10
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 22 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 495 (80,295)
Citation 1

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dynamic mechanism design, limited commitment, budget constraints, fluid approximation, display advertising, internet auctions, revenue management

7.

Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 09 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jul 2016
Santiago Balseiro and Ozan Candogan
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 473 (84,843)
Citation 7

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Intermediary problems, mechanism design, Internet advertising, repeated auctions, budget constraints

8.

Multi-Stage Intermediation in Display Advertising

Number of pages: 86 Posted: 18 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 17 Aug 2019
Santiago Balseiro, Ozan Candogan and Huseyin Gurkan
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 433 (94,036)
Citation 3

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Intermediary Problems, Mechanism Design, Internet Advertising, Extensive Form Games, Second-Price Auction, Multi-Stage Intermediation

9.

Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks

Accepted by Management Science. Available at https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3735
Number of pages: 97 Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 03 Nov 2020
Santiago Balseiro, David B. Brown and Chen Chen
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Duke University - Decision Sciences and New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai
Downloads 422 (96,923)
Citation 9

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Dynamic Pricing, Resource Relocation, Hub-and-Spoke Networks, Lagrangian Relaxations, Asymptotic Optimality

10.

The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 392 (105,507)
Citation 1

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Autobidding, Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization

11.

Multi-Agent Mechanism Design without Money

Number of pages: 95 Posted: 10 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Huseyin Gurkan and Peng Sun
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, ESMT European School of Management and Technology and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business
Downloads 374 (111,294)
Citation 12

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dynamic mechanism design, social efficiency, multi-agent games, resource allocation without money

12.

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design

Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 25 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim and Daniel Joseph Russo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Columbia University - Columbia Business School
Downloads 263 (161,506)
Citation 1

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robust mechanism design, strategic learning, dynamic mechanism design

13.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 May 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 236 (179,417)
Citation 1

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

14.

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 85 Posted: 10 Apr 2021 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2022
Santiago Balseiro and Antoine Désir
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and INSEAD
Downloads 191 (218,270)

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Online retailing, sponsored advertising, assortment optimization, mechanism design, information externalities.

15.

Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 01 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 14 Nov 2015
Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago Balseiro, José Correa and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Diego Portales University, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Chile - Engineering Department and Facebook
Downloads 184 (225,466)
Citation 3

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Contract Theory, Principal-Agent Problem, Price of Anarchy, First-Order Method

16.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 136 (289,025)
Citation 5

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

17.

Survey of Dynamic Resource Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 18 Nov 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Dana Pizarro
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Toulouse School of Economics- Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Downloads 132 (295,510)

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dynamic optimization, resource allocation, certainty equivalent, model predictive control, online matching, dynamic pricing, dynamic bidding, network revenue management

18.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 131 (297,253)

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dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

19.

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Apr 2022
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 107 (345,562)

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internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, budget constraints, return-on-spend constraints

20.

A Black-Box Reduction in Mechanism Design with Private Cost of Capital

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Santiago Balseiro, Negin Golrezaei, Vahab Mirrokni and Sadra Yazdanbod
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 59 (482,848)

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21.

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 May 2022
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago Balseiro and Omar Besbes
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 19 (702,031)

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prior-independent, robust mechanism design, minimax regret, second-price auction with random reserve

22.

The Price of Unobservability: Moral Hazard and Limited Liability

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2016
Posted: 21 Feb 2018
Felipe Balmaceda, José Correa, Santiago Balseiro and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Diego Portales University, University of Chile - Engineering Department, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Facebook

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Moral hazard, Limited Liability, Price of Anarchy, Welfare Loss