Santiago Balseiro

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations

Assistant Professor

3022 Broadway

New York, NY 10027

United States

Google Research

  • Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

23

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11,072

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 10,266

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 10,266

in Total Papers Citations

117

CROSSREF CITATIONS

25

Scholarly Papers (23)

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1.

Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-1
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 06 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2019
Hana Choi, Carl F. Mela, Santiago Balseiro and Adam Leary
University of Rochester - Simon Business School, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and CBS Interactive
Downloads 1,923 (14,521)
Citation 14

Abstract:

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Display Advertising, Literature Review, Real-Time Buying, Programmatic Buying, Real-Time Bidding

2.

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

Management Science 65 (9), 3952-3968
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 23 Feb 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jan 2020
Santiago Balseiro and Yonatan Gur
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,218 (29,018)
Citation 22

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Sequential auctions, online advertising, online learning, stochastic optimization, stochastic approximation, incomplete information, regret analysis, dynamic games

3.

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-11, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/55
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2014
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 1,071 (34,826)
Citation 15

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auction design, revenue management, ad exchange, display advertising, internet, budget constraints, dynamic games, mean field, fluid approximation

4.

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

Number of pages: 110 Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian and Vahab Mirrokni
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 971 (39,886)
Citation 8

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Repeated Auctions, Internet Advertising, Budget Constraints

5.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 28 Nov 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research and Google Inc.
Downloads 618 (73,543)
Citation 14

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dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

6.

The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 580 (79,106)
Citation 2

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Autobidding, Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization

7.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-10
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 22 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 551 (84,741)
Citation 1

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dynamic mechanism design, limited commitment, budget constraints, fluid approximation, display advertising, internet auctions, revenue management

8.

Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks

Accepted by Management Science. Available at https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3735
Number of pages: 97 Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 03 Nov 2020
Santiago Balseiro, David B. Brown and Chen Chen
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Duke University - Decision Sciences and New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai
Downloads 517 (91,278)
Citation 3

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Dynamic Pricing, Resource Relocation, Hub-and-Spoke Networks, Lagrangian Relaxations, Asymptotic Optimality

9.

Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 09 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jul 2016
Santiago Balseiro and Ozan Candogan
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 516 (91,700)
Citation 7

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Intermediary problems, mechanism design, Internet advertising, repeated auctions, budget constraints

10.

Multi-Stage Intermediation in Display Advertising

Number of pages: 86 Posted: 18 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 17 Aug 2019
Santiago Balseiro, Ozan Candogan and Huseyin Gurkan
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 514 (92,365)
Citation 4

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Intermediary Problems, Mechanism Design, Internet Advertising, Extensive Form Games, Second-Price Auction, Multi-Stage Intermediation

11.

Multi-Agent Mechanism Design without Money

Number of pages: 95 Posted: 10 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Huseyin Gurkan and Peng Sun
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, ESMT European School of Management and Technology and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business
Downloads 454 (107,296)
Citation 12

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dynamic mechanism design, social efficiency, multi-agent games, resource allocation without money

12.

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4081457
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Apr 2022
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 442 (110,105)

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internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, budget constraints, return-on-spend constraints

13.

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design

Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 25 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim and Daniel Joseph Russo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Columbia University - Columbia Business School
Downloads 310 (164,514)
Citation 1

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robust mechanism design, strategic learning, dynamic mechanism design

14.

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 85 Posted: 10 Apr 2021 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2022
Santiago Balseiro and Antoine Désir
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and INSEAD
Downloads 306 (166,822)
Citation 1

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Online retailing, sponsored advertising, assortment optimization, mechanism design, information externalities.

15.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 May 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 305 (167,391)
Citation 1

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

16.

Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 01 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 14 Nov 2015
Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago Balseiro, José Correa and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Diego Portales University, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Chile - Engineering Department and Facebook
Downloads 212 (240,366)
Citation 4

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Contract Theory, Principal-Agent Problem, Price of Anarchy, First-Order Method

17.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 174 (284,558)
Citation 5

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

18.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 166 (296,088)

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dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

19.

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 09 May 2022 Last Revised: 13 Oct 2022
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago Balseiro and Omar Besbes
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 93 (457,323)

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prior-independent, robust mechanism design, minimax regret, second-price auction with random reserve

20.

A Black-Box Reduction in Mechanism Design with Private Cost of Capital

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Santiago Balseiro, Negin Golrezaei, Vahab Mirrokni and Sadra Yazdanbod
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Research and Google Inc.
Downloads 80 (501,423)

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21.

Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 10 Feb 2023
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 32 (751,763)

Abstract:

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internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, return-on-spend constraints, two-part tariff

22.

Robust Auction Design with Support Information

Number of pages: 80 Posted: 21 May 2023 Last Revised: 27 Aug 2023
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago Balseiro and Omar Besbes
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 19 (868,967)

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robust mechanism design, minimax regret, maximin ratio, support information, prior-independent, standard mechanisms, second-price auctions, pooling

23.

The Price of Unobservability: Moral Hazard and Limited Liability

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2016
Posted: 21 Feb 2018
Felipe Balmaceda, José Correa, Santiago Balseiro and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Diego Portales University, University of Chile - Engineering Department, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations and Facebook

Abstract:

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Moral hazard, Limited Liability, Price of Anarchy, Welfare Loss