John Zhu

University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department

3620 Locust Walk

Philadelphia, PA 19104

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

DOWNLOADS

565

SSRN CITATIONS

3

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.
Downloads 416 ( 69,373)

Contracting with Synergies

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 320/2011
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 13 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2018
Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein and John Zhu
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
Downloads 395 (73,101)

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contract theory, complementarities, principal-agent problem, multiple agents, teams, synergies, influence

Contracting with Synergies

NBER Working Paper No. w17606
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Nov 2011
Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein and John Zhu
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
Downloads 21 (533,347)

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Contracting with Synergies

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9559
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 17 Jul 2013
Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein and John Zhu
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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complementarities, contract theory, influence, multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams

Contracting with Synergies

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9747
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 19 Nov 2013
Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein and John Zhu
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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complementarities, Contract theory, influence., multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams

2.

Impatience vs. Incentives

Econometrica, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2015
Marcus M. Opp and John Zhu
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
Downloads 149 (196,432)
Citation 4

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Oscillation, Cycles, Self-Enforcing contracts, Differential discounting, Dynamic contracts, Principal-agent models