Marcel Kahan

New York University School of Law

Professor of Law

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012-1099

United States

European Corporate Governance Institute

Fellow

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium

Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat

1000 Brussels

Belgium

  • New York University School of Law

    • Email
    • Tel: 212-998-6268
    • Fax: 212-995-4341

  • European Corporate Governance Institute

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

55

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136

CROSSREF CITATIONS

332

Scholarly Papers (55)

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1.

Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control

Downloads 8,931 ( 617)
Citation 77

Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 1021, 2007, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-16, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-37, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 76/2006
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 25 Jul 2006 Last Revised: 21 May 2009
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 8,741 (638)
Citation 13

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Corporations, Organizations, Hedge-Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, Hedge Funds, Securities Regulation, Short-Term Payoff

Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control.

NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-012
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 31 Oct 2008
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 190 (174,146)
Citation 17

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2.

The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, p. 1227, 2008, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-18, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-29
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 15 Aug 2007 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2009
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,404 (14,448)
Citation 5

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shareholder elections, technology of corporate voting, voting systems, ownership structure, legitimacy

3.

Embattled CEOs

Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 987, 2010, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-25, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-43, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 116/2009
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 29 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 05 Aug 2010
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,306 (16,130)
Citation 19

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Public corporations, chief executive officers, CEO power, boards of directors, shareholder activism, corporate governance rules, executive compensation, regulatory backlash, shareholder initiatives

4.

The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?

Emory Law Journal, Vol. 59, p. 869, 2010, University of Penn, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-24
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 20 Oct 2010
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,270 (16,825)
Citation 5

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Corporations, securities regulation, proxy votes by shareholders, empirical findings, influence on proxy voting

5.

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, Pg. 871, 2002, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-02, NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 02-04
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 22 May 2002 Last Revised: 24 Nov 2015
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,228 (17,700)
Citation 6

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Takeovers, Poison Pills, Corporate Governance

6.

The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 02 Jan 2003
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar
New York University School of Law and Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law
Downloads 1,202 (18,315)
Citation 14

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Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Corporate Governance, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Barriers to Entry, Network Externalities, Federalism, Legislation, Public Choice, Political Economy, Franchise Tax

7.

An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 29 Sep 1997
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,191 (18,568)
Citation 3

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8.

The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover Statutes

By permission of the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 68 STAN. L. REV. [page cite or “___” (2016, Forthcoming)], NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-30, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 274/2014
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2015
Emiliano Catan and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,182 (18,785)
Citation 24

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9.

An Institutional Innovation to Reduce the Agency Costs of Public Corporate Bonds

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 15 Jan 2001
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade and Marcel Kahan
New York University - Stern School of Business, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,182 (18,785)

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10.

When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder

Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 1293, 2011, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-10, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-20
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 27 May 2010 Last Revised: 15 May 2011
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,013 (23,601)
Citation 3

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Governmental bailout, minority shareholders, firm value maximization, corporate purposes, displacement of regulatory structures with ownership influence, structuring government ownership to weaken political influence, governmental equity and control, government corporations

11.

Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights

Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 281, 2009, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-02, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 100/2008, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-09
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 05 Apr 2009
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 1,012 (23,642)

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Banking and Finance, Contracts, Corporations, Economics, Law and Economics, Hedge funds, bondholders, contractual rights, acceleration remedy, defeasance option, make-whole premium

12.

Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and What Can Be Done About it?

Duke Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 27-53, 1989, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 50, 1988
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 28 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 922 (27,055)
Citation 6

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Investment bankers, fairness opinions, takeovers, freezeouts, corporate governance, conflict of interest, professionals

13.

Anti-Activist Poison Pills

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-08, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 364/2017
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 08 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 21 Aug 2017
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 846 (30,582)

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Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism, Hedge Funds, Poison Pill

14.

Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections

Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 3, P. 35, 2013, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-28, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-29
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 23 Aug 2011 Last Revised: 23 Feb 2018
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute and New York University School of Law
Downloads 820 (31,943)
Citation 10

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Corporations, securities, mutual funds, shareholder voting, corporate governance, ISS, Institutional Shareholder Services, proxy advisor recommendations, voting patterns, mutual fund families, empirical research

15.

Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?

Downloads 813 ( 32,345)
Citation 5

Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 83, P. 1119, 2016, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 310/2016, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-31
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 18 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2018
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute, New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 710 (38,278)

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Empirical studies, corporate governance reform, board, director elections, majority voting rule, MVR, plurality voting rule, PVR, shareholder activism, stock exchanges, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., ISS

Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?

CFS Working Paper, No. 553
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 08 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 11 Jan 2018
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute, New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 103 (285,291)
Citation 6

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16.

The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership

129 Yale Law Journal 1392 (2020), NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-29, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 423/2018
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 30 Jul 2018 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2020
C. Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 766 (35,019)
Citation 3

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airlines, antitrust, common shareholding, common ownership, collusion, executive compensation, horizontal, HHI, institutional investors, MHHI, modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, shareholdings, Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street

17.

The Insignificance of Proxy Access

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, pp. 1347, 2011, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 10-26, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-51
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 23 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 10 Dec 2011
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 756 (35,685)
Citation 1

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Corporations, securities regulation, proxy votes by shareholders, new SEC rules on proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, corporate elections, shareholder rights, shareholder activism, corporate governance, directors, boards, institutional investor, influence on proxy voting

18.

Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts

Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Randall K. Morck, ed., University of Chicago Press), pp. 247-259, 2000, New York University, Center for Law & Business, Working Paper No. 99-008, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 248, January 1999
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 01 Feb 1999 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 716 (38,394)
Citation 8

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Corporate freezeouts, minority shareholders, private benefits of control, expropriation, agency costs, appraisal

19.

Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution

Downloads 689 ( 40,464)
Citation 11

Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-04, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-06
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 13 Feb 2016
Jennifer Arlen and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 390 (81,839)
Citation 11

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Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution

University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-38, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-31
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 02 Sep 2016
Jennifer Arlen and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 299 (110,677)

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20.

Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-22, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1127282, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 02 May 2008 Last Revised: 07 May 2008
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute and New York University School of Law
Downloads 689 (40,464)
Citation 5

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proxy advisors, corporate governance, shareholder voting, ISS, institutional investors

21.

Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors

Southern California Law Review, Vol. 82, Pg. 649, 2009, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 16 Aug 2008 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2010
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics, European Corporate Governance Institute and New York University School of Law
Downloads 627 (45,886)
Citation 19

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corporations, securities law, shareholder voting, proxy recommendations, proxy advisory services, election of directors, regression analysis

22.

How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity

Emory Law Journal, Vol. 58, p. 713, 2009, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-17, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-40
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Aug 2008 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2009
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 587 (50,012)
Citation 3

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corporate takeovers, Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, intervention, deal protection measures, Delaware courts, corporations, Delaware corporate and procedural law, conflict of laws, financial collapse, mergers and acquisitions, corporate charter competition

23.

Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics

Boston University Law Review, Vol. 94, Pg. 1997, 2014, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-6, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-07
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 05 Mar 2014 Last Revised: 03 Dec 2014
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 580 (50,796)
Citation 2

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Corporations, politics, corporate governance controversies, public interest or public choice explanations, corporate control, symbols, myths, Thurman Arnold, legal realism, interdisciplinary scholarship, capitalism, gap between rhetoric and reality, folklore

24.

Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 58, p. 1573, 2005, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-020, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 04-12
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Jul 2004 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2009
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 553 (53,905)
Citation 36

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corporate law-making, Delaware, federalism

25.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 08 Nov 2015
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian JM Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe and Helen S. Scott
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, Widener University Delaware Law School, Yale University - Law School, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Stanford Law School, Harvard Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, BC Law School, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School and New York University (NYU)
Downloads 549 (54,393)

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corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

26.

Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-39
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 05 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 20 Oct 2019
Edward B. Rock and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 528 (57,197)
Citation 1

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Index funds, passive investing, active funds, institutional investors, corporate governance, monitoring, agency problems, shareholder activism, corporate law, hedge fund activism, mutual funds, public pension funds, shareholder voting, incentives to become informed, dispersed shareholders

27.

Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment

NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 03-08, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, P. 473, 2003, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-20
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 19 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 19 Nov 2015
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 512 (59,448)
Citation 3

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28.

The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals

NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-07, 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 87, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 25 Jan 2006
Stephen J. Choi and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 486 (63,436)
Citation 2

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mutual funds, regulation, investor protection

29.

Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 25 Sep 2000
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar
New York University School of Law and Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law
Downloads 486 (63,436)
Citation 20

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30.

First-Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and Rights of First Offer

American Law and Economics Review 12(2), pp. 331-337 (2012), NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-42
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 13 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2013
Marcel Kahan, Shmuel Leshem and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
New York University School of Law, Independent and New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 477 (64,957)
Citation 1

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31.

A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests

California Law Review, Vol. 78, 1071-1136, 1990, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 77, 1990
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 10 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 463 (67,330)
Citation 4

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corporate governance, proxy contests, proxy fights, corporate voting, corporate elections, boards, shareholders, institutional investors, shareholder activism

32.

The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?

Downloads 450 ( 69,728)

The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 21 Jun 2004
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law
Downloads 450 (69,074)
Citation 11

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The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 2006, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-017
Posted: 23 Feb 2006
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law

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The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 340-365, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law

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33.

The State of State Competition for Incorporations

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 263/2014, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-19
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 02 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2014
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law
Downloads 386 (83,574)
Citation 3

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State competition, regulatory competition, race to the top, race to the bottom, Delaware

34.

Cash America and the Structure of Bondholder Remedies

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2018-44, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-25
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 26 Jun 2018 Last Revised: 01 Aug 2018
G. Mitu Gulati and Marcel Kahan
Duke University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 365 (89,183)

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Corporate Bonds, Acceleration, Make-Whole, Redemption, Boilerplate

35.

The Efficiency and Welfare Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers

NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 02-03
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 26 Aug 2002
Yakov Amihud, Marcel Kahan and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
New York University - Stern School of Business, New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 345 (95,090)

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36.

Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities

Downloads 251 (133,754)

Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-95-026
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 11 Nov 2008
Marcel Kahan and David Yermack
New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business
Downloads 182 (181,095)

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Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-96-031
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 11 Nov 2008
Marcel Kahan and David Yermack
New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business
Downloads 69 (365,716)

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Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities

Posted: 28 Feb 1997
Marcel Kahan and David Yermack
New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

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Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 14 No. 1, Spring 1998
Posted: 11 Apr 1998
Marcel Kahan and David Yermack
New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

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37.

Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate 'Contracts'

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-28
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 11 Aug 2017
Helen Hershkoff and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 211 (158,135)
Citation 2

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38.

The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers

Downloads 208 (160,310)
Citation 17

The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-02-009
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Yakov Amihud, Marcel Kahan and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
New York University - Stern School of Business, New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 149 (215,327)

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The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers

NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-02-04
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 04 Nov 2008
Yakov Amihud, Marcel Kahan and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
New York University - Stern School of Business, New York University School of Law and New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Downloads 59 (397,113)
Citation 2

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39.

The Never-Ending Quest for Shareholder Rights: Special Meetings and Written Consent

New York University School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-37, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, 2019
Number of pages: 44
Emiliano Catan and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 190

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Corporate Governance, Corporate Law, Takeovers, Shareholder Proposals, Special Meetings, Written Consent, Shareholder Rights

40.

Contracts of Inattention

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-62, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 19-35
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 25 Aug 2019 Last Revised: 11 May 2020
G. Mitu Gulati and Marcel Kahan
Duke University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 186 (177,642)

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corporate bonds, contract stickiness, Wilmington v. Cash America, make-whole, boilerplate

41.

Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper, Working Paper No. 17-27
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 09 Aug 2017
Ryan Bubb and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 186 (177,642)

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42.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 22 Corporate Law Professors, Mark Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et aL, No. 16-1466

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Jan 2018
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coffee, Bernard S. Black, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, James D. Cox, Marcel Kahan, Reinier Kraakman, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ronald J. Gilson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Henry Hansmann, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian JM Quinn, Michal Barzuza, Mira Ganor, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott, Holger Spamann and Randall S. Thomas
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School, Duke University School of Law, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School, University of Michigan Law School, Stanford Law School, Yale University - Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, BC Law School, University of Virginia School of LawUniversity of Virginia - School of Law, University of Texas at Austin - School of Law, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School, New York University (NYU), Harvard Law School and Vanderbilt University - Law School
Downloads 139 (227,199)

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corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

43.

The 'Lemons Effect' in Corporate Freeze-Outs

NBER Working Paper No. w6938
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2008
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan
Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law
Downloads 136 (231,225)

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44.

When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 409, 2010
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 23 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2010
Edward B. Rock and Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law
Downloads 126 (245,277)
Citation 1

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Delaware, Journal, Corporate Law, Corporate, Chancery Rule 19, Controlling shareholder, Government, Sovereign immunity, Government-controlled, Federal government

45.

Sovereign Debt and Moral Hazard: The Role of Collective Action and Contractual Ambiguity

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-29
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 11 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2017
Marcel Kahan and Shmuel Leshem
New York University School of Law and Independent
Downloads 113 (265,749)
Citation 1

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Sovereign debt, pari passu clauses, strategic bargaining

46.

The Scope of Section 316(B) After Marblegate

Capital Markets Law Journal (Forthcoming), NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-01
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 06 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2018
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law
Downloads 84 (322,936)

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47.

Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Tradeoff between Individual and Collective Rights

Posted: 08 May 2002
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law

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48.

The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance

Posted: 22 Oct 2001
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law

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49.

A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds

Posted: 18 Sep 1998
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade and Marcel Kahan
New York University - Stern School of Business, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and New York University School of Law

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50.

Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities: A Guide Through the Maze

2 Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance 147.
Posted: 26 Jun 1998
Marcel Kahan
New York University School of Law

Abstract:

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51.

Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, 1996.
Posted: 26 Jun 1998
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

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52.

Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases

Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).
Posted: 03 Jun 1998
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

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Abstract:

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54.

Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 'the Economics of Boilerplate')

Posted: 18 Jul 1997
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

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55.

Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims,

Supreme Court Review, (1997).
Posted: 15 Jan 1997
Marcel Kahan and Linda Silberman
New York University School of Law and New York University School of Law

Abstract:

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