Manuel Foerster

University of Hamburg - Department of Economics

Post-doctoral research associate

Von-Melle-Park 5

room 2128 C rise

Hamburg, 20146

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

DOWNLOADS

359

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (10)

1.

Strategic Communication under Persuasion Bias in Social Networks

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 27 May 2015
Manuel Foerster
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics
Downloads 84 (298,209)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Social networks, strategic communication, persuasion bias, conflict of interest, persistent disagreement, belief fluctuations

2.

Anonymous Social Influence

FEEM Working Paper No. 51.2013
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 07 Jun 2013
Manuel Foerster, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - CERMSEM and CNRS - Paris School of Economics
Downloads 66 (342,046)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Influence, Anonymity, Ordered Weighted Averaging Operator, Convergence, Consensus, Speed Of Convergence, Fuzzy Linguistic Quantifier

3.

Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks

FEEM Working Paper No. 50.2014
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 28 May 2014
Manuel Foerster, Ana Mauleon and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics, Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 62 (353,241)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Social networks, Trust, Manipulation, Opinion leadership, Consensus, Wisdom of Crowds

4.

Dynamics of Strategic Information Transmission in Social Networks

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 21 Dec 2016
Manuel Foerster
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics
Downloads 50 (390,959)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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cheap talk, information aggregation, learning, social networks, strategic communication

5.

Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-019/I
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 07 Mar 2018
Manuel Foerster and Joel J. van der Weele
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics and University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED)
Downloads 32 (461,073)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Cheap Talk, Cooperation, Image Concerns, Information Aggregation, Public Goods

6.

Persuasion, Justification and the Communication of Social Impact

Tinbergen Instiutute Discussion Paper 2018-067/I
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 05 Sep 2018
Manuel Foerster and Joel J. van der Weele
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics and University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED)
Downloads 26 (491,176)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Cheap Talk, Image Concerns, Information Aggregation, Charitable Giving, Economic Experiments

7.

Believe Me, I Am Dumb, but Not Corrupt

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 02 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2019
Manuel Foerster and Achim Voss
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics and University of Hamburg - Department of Economics
Downloads 16 (549,160)

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political agency, asymmetric information, signaling, elections, incompetence, corruption

8.

Shadow Links

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 18 Oct 2018
Manuel Foerster, Ana Mauleon and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics, Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 14 (561,286)

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network formation, peer-confirming beliefs, private information, rationalizability, shadow links, stability

9.

Strategic Transmission of Imperfect Information: Why Revealing Evidence (Without Proof) Is Difficult

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 08 May 2019 Last Revised: 20 Aug 2019
Manuel Foerster
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics
Downloads 9 (592,935)

Abstract:

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cheap talk, imperfect information, strategic communication, evidence, verification

10.

Distorted Voronoi Languages

Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 458
Posted: 20 Mar 2012
Manuel Foerster and Frank Riedel
University of Hamburg - Department of Economics and Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Abstract:

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Cheap Talk, Signaling Game, Communication Game, Voronoi tesselation, Conflict of Interest