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Bayesian persuasion , information design , sharing rules , splitting games , statistical experiments.
Network games, dynamic flows, price of seasonality, price of anarchy, max-flow min-cut
experiments, value of information, multiple priors, maximin, rectangularity
financial market microstructure, belief-free equilibria, informed market makers, price volatility
Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, efficiency of equilibria, price of anarchy, price of stability, price of correlated stability.
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implementation, Markov Process, undetectability, efficiency
Folk theorem, Braess’s paradox, Network routing games, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Anonymous games, Strategic complexity, Contagion strategy, Calendar strategy
Zero-sum games, Periodic sequences, Bounded recall, de Bruijn graphs, Oblivious strategy
folk theorem, de Bruijn sequence, imperfect monitoring, uniform equilibrium, public equilibrium, private equilibrium
