Jerome Renault

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Place Anatole-France

Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS

179

SSRN CITATIONS

4

CROSSREF CITATIONS

2

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory, HEC Paris Research Paper No. 966/2013
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 09 Mar 2013
Jerome Renault, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences and HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences
Downloads 87 (356,698)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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sender-receiver, dynamic games, bayesian games, communication, repeated games

2.

Secure Message Transmission on Directed Networks

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 27 Jun 2012
Jerome Renault, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Queen Mary University of London and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Downloads 50 (475,423)

Abstract:

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secure communication, protocols, communication

3.

Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31996
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 07 Nov 2013
Joyee Deb, Julio Gonzalez Diaz and Jerome Renault
Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics, University of Santiago de Compostela - Department of Statistics and Operations Research and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 19 (644,505)

Abstract:

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anonymous random matching; uniform equilibria; repeated games

4.

Acyclic Gambling Games

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2018-34
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 30 May 2018
Rida Laraki and Jerome Renault
Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 14 (681,130)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Markov Decision Processes, Zero-Sum Stochastic Games, Asymptotic Value, Gambling Houses, Mertens-Zamir System, Splitting Games, Persuasion

5.

On a Competitive Selection Problem

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 09 Aug 2021 Last Revised: 13 Aug 2021
Fabien Gensbittel, Dana Pizarro and Jerome Renault
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Toulouse School of Economics- Université Toulouse 1 Capitole and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 9 (720,100)

Abstract:

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Optimal stopping, Competing agents, Recall, Prophet inequalities, Price of anarchy, Price of stability, Game theory

6.

Playing Off-Line Games with Bounded Rationality

Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2008
Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Jerome Renault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza and HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Abstract:

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Zero-sum games, Periodic sequences, Bounded recall, de Bruijn graphs, Oblivious strategy

7.

Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals

Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2008
Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Jerome Renault, Marco Scarsini and sergio scarlatti
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza and affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract:

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Repeated games, Imperfect monitoring, Public equilibria, Private equilibria, Pareto-efficiency, Discount factor

8.

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 32, pp. 873-889, 2007
Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Jerome Renault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza and HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Abstract:

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folk theorem, de Bruijn sequence, imperfect monitoring, uniform equilibrium, public equilibrium, private equilibrium

9.

A Folk Theorem for Minority Games

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2005
Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Jerome Renault, sergio scarlatti and Marco Scarsini
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN and LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Abstract:

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Repeated games, Imperfect monitoring, Public signals