Patrick DeGraba

Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I

Economist

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Rm. 4249

Washington, DC 20580

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

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CITATIONS
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Top 16,312

in Total Papers Citations

21

Scholarly Papers (10)

1.

Volume Discounts, Loss Leaders and Competition for More Profitable Customers

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 260
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 26 Jun 2003
Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I
Downloads 256 (85,715)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loss leader, multi-product pricing, counter cyclical pricing

2.

Theories of Harm in the Intel Case

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 09 Nov 2010
Patrick DeGraba and John David Simpson
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I and The Brattle Group
Downloads 246 (83,382)
Citation 2

Abstract:

exclusive contracts

3.

Ideological Persuasion in the Media

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 07 Jan 2005
David J. Balan, Patrick DeGraba and Abraham L. Wickelgren
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 241 (86,718)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Ideology, Media Bias, Media Diversity, Persuasion

4.

Efficient Inter-Carrier Compensation for Competing Networks when Customers Share the Value of a Call

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 251
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 20 Jun 2003
Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I
Downloads 147 (158,179)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interconnection, Access Rates, Bill-and-Keep

5.

Naked Exclusion by a Dominant Supplier: Exclusive Contracting and Loyalty Discounts

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 09 Dec 2009 Last Revised: 16 Dec 2009
Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I
Downloads 118 (176,770)

Abstract:

Exclusive Dealing, Loyalty Discounts, Naked Exclusion

6.

Quantity Discounts from Risk Averse Sellers

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 276
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 04 May 2005
Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I
Downloads 106 (196,815)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Quantity Discounts, Risk Aversion, Large Customer Discounts

7.

Reconciling the Off-Net Cost Pricing Principle with Efficient Network Utilization

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 265
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Apr 2004
Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I
Downloads 86 (228,900)

Abstract:

Access charges, interconnection

8.

The Year in Economics at the FCC, 2010-11: Protecting Competition Online

Review of Industrial Organization, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 31 Aug 2011
American University - Washington College of Law, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I, Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Downloads 79 (211,955)

Abstract:

9.

Downstream Integration by a Bottleneck Input Supplier Whose Regulated Wholesale Prices Are Above Costs

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2
Posted: 13 Aug 2001
Gary Biglaiser and Patrick DeGraba
University of North Carolina and Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I

Abstract:

10.

Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies

Rand Journal Of Economics, Vol. 30, Issue 4
Posted: 16 Nov 1999
Patrick DeGraba and Rafi Mohammed
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I and The Monitor Company

Abstract: