Florian Smuda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

D-68034 Mannheim, 68034

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

DOWNLOADS
Rank 40,669

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 40,669

in Total Papers Downloads

1,035

CITATIONS
Rank 38,053

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 38,053

in Total Papers Citations

13

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-050
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Jul 2012
Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 235 (129,231)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

cartels, overcharges, Europe, fines, deterrence, damages

2.

Estimating Consumer Damages in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-069
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 30 Sep 2013
Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 185 (162,019)

Abstract:

Loading...

cartels, damages, consumers, detergents, private damage claims

3.

The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-084
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 13 Nov 2014
University of Pennsylvania, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 164 (180,160)

Abstract:

Loading...

Collusion, cartel, antitrust enforcement, cement

4.

Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2012
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 133 (214,134)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

5.

A Primer on Damages of Cartel Suppliers – Determinants, Standing US vs EU and Econometric Estimation

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-063
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 02 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2014
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 117 (235,988)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Competition policy, comparative law, private enforcement, cartels, suppliers, quantification of damages, standing

6.

Determinants of Self-Reporting Under the European Corporate Leniency Program

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-043
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Aug 2014
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 80 (303,195)

Abstract:

Loading...

competition policy, cartels, leniency, European Union

7.

Suppliers to a Sellers’ Cartel and the Boundaries of the Right to Damages in U.S. versus EU Competition Law

European Journal of Law and Economics (EJLE), Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 397-437, June 2018, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-017-9571-6, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 17/19
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 19 Jun 2019
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 58 (360,388)

Abstract:

Loading...

Competition policy, Comparative law, Private enforcement, Cartels, Suppliers, Quantification of damages, Standing

8.

Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 36
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 15 Jun 2013
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 37 (433,987)

Abstract:

Loading...

Antitrust policy, cartels, mergers, cartel breakdown, European Union

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-062
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Florian Smuda, Patrice Bougette and Kai Hüschelrath
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 25 (505,048)

Abstract:

Loading...

Law and economics, antitrust policy, cartels, appeals, European Union

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, Issue 6, pp. 1352-1369, 2015
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 26 Oct 2015
Florian Smuda, Patrice Bougette and Kai Hüschelrath
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

law and economics, antitrust policy, cartels, appeals, European Union

10.

The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 330-357, 2016
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 12 May 2016
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 1 (648,128)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

The Appeals Process: An Empirical Assessment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-063
Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract:

Loading...

Law and Economics, appeals, antitrust policy, cartels, European Union