Florian Smuda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

D-68034 Mannheim, 68034

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

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Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-050
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Jul 2012
Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 233 (128,168)

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cartels, overcharges, Europe, fines, deterrence, damages

2.

Estimating Consumer Damages in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-069
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 30 Sep 2013
Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 185 (159,318)

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cartels, damages, consumers, detergents, private damage claims

3.

The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-084
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 13 Nov 2014
University of Pennsylvania, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 163 (178,158)

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Collusion, cartel, antitrust enforcement, cement

4.

Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2012
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 131 (213,158)

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Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

5.

A Primer on Damages of Cartel Suppliers – Determinants, Standing US vs EU and Econometric Estimation

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-063
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 02 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2014
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 114 (236,692)

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Competition policy, comparative law, private enforcement, cartels, suppliers, quantification of damages, standing

6.

Determinants of Self-Reporting Under the European Corporate Leniency Program

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-043
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Aug 2014
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Telecom ParisTech and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 80 (298,295)

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competition policy, cartels, leniency, European Union

7.

Suppliers to a Sellers’ Cartel and the Boundaries of the Right to Damages in U.S. Versus EU Competition Law

European Journal of Law and Economics, Online First Article, Forthcoming, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-017-9571-6, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 17/19
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 14 Dec 2017
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 55 (363,725)

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Competition policy, Comparative law, Private enforcement, Cartels, Suppliers, Quantification of damages, Standing

8.

Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 36
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 15 Jun 2013
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 37 (426,681)

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Antitrust policy, cartels, mergers, cartel breakdown, European Union

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-062
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Florian Smuda, Patrice Bougette and Kai Hüschelrath
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 24 (502,225)

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Law and economics, antitrust policy, cartels, appeals, European Union

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, Issue 6, pp. 1352-1369, 2015
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 26 Oct 2015
Florian Smuda, Patrice Bougette and Kai Hüschelrath
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
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law and economics, antitrust policy, cartels, appeals, European Union

10.

The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 330-357, 2016
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 12 May 2016
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 1 (633,036)
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11.

The Appeals Process: An Empirical Assessment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-063
Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

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Law and Economics, appeals, antitrust policy, cartels, European Union