Florian Smuda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

D-68034 Mannheim, 68034

Germany

  • ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

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CROSSREF CITATIONS

11

Scholarly Papers (10)

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1.

Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-050
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Jul 2012
Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 490 (93,774)
Citation 8

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cartels, overcharges, Europe, fines, deterrence, damages

2.

Estimating Consumer Damages in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-069
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 30 Sep 2013
Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 251 (195,423)
Citation 1

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cartels, damages, consumers, detergents, private damage claims

3.

The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-084
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 13 Nov 2014
Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
University of Pennsylvania, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 184 (261,173)
Citation 6

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Collusion, cartel, antitrust enforcement, cement

4.

Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2012
Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 183 (262,422)

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Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

5.

A Primer on Damages of Cartel Suppliers – Determinants, Standing US vs EU and Econometric Estimation

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-063
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 02 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2014
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 153 (305,714)
Citation 1

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Competition policy, comparative law, private enforcement, cartels, suppliers, quantification of damages, standing

6.

Determinants of Self-Reporting Under the European Corporate Leniency Program

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-043
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Aug 2014
Cung Hoang, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 100 (419,954)
Citation 1

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competition policy, cartels, leniency, European Union

7.

Suppliers to a Sellers’ Cartel and the Boundaries of the Right to Damages in U.S. versus EU Competition Law

European Journal of Law and Economics (EJLE), Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 397-437, June 2018, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-017-9571-6, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 17/19
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 19 Jun 2019
Eckart Bueren and Florian Smuda
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 86 (462,299)

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Competition policy, Comparative law, Private enforcement, Cartels, Suppliers, Quantification of damages, Standing

8.

Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 36
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 15 Jun 2013
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 58 (572,369)
Citation 1

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Antitrust policy, cartels, mergers, cartel breakdown, European Union

9.

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-062
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Florian Smuda, Patrice Bougette and Kai Hüschelrath
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 36 (694,200)
Citation 1

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Law and economics, antitrust policy, cartels, appeals, European Union

10.

The Appeals Process: An Empirical Assessment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-063
Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Kai Hüschelrath and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

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Law and Economics, appeals, antitrust policy, cartels, European Union