Paolo Buccirossi

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)

Via di Monserrato 48

Rome, 00186

Italy

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

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Top 21,243

in Total Papers Downloads

4,509

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 7,916

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,916

in Total Papers Citations

87

CROSSREF CITATIONS

130

Scholarly Papers (10)

1.
Downloads 1,162 (34,777)
Citation 9

Leniency and Damages

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 20 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 10 Oct 2016
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), Technological University Dublin and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 1,158 (34,415)
Citation 9

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Private and public enforcement, cartels, competition policy, Leniency Program

Leniency and Damages

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10682
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 29 Jun 2015
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), Technological University Dublin and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 4 (1,151,735)
Citation 1
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cartels, competition policy, Leniency Program, private and public enforcement

2.

Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers - Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?

Lear Research Paper No. 05-01
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 28 Dec 2005
Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 1,119 (36,693)
Citation 9

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Antitrust Amnesty, Cartels, Collusion, Corporate crime, Debt, Deterrence, Extended liability, Fines, Law enforcement, Leniency, Immunity, Imprisonment, Judgment proofness, Optimal fines, Optimal sanctions, Optimal liability, Organized crime, Political economy, Rewards, Sunk cost bias, Whistleblowers

3.

Preventing Collusion in Procurement: A Primer

HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT, Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga, Giancarlo Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 21 Apr 2006
University of Rome Tor Vergata, University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.), Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) and Arthur D. Little, SPA.
Downloads 980 (44,364)
Citation 1

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procurement, oligopoly, collusion

Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

WZB Working Paper No. SP II 2009 12
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 21 Nov 2009 Last Revised: 01 Dec 2009
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), European University Institute, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), University of Rome Tor Vergata and Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation
Downloads 492 (107,408)
Citation 5

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Competition Policy, Productivity Growth, Institutions, Deterrence, OECD

Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7470
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 07 Oct 2009
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), European University Institute, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), University of Rome Tor Vergata and Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation
Downloads 9 (1,105,104)
Citation 8
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Antitrust, Competition Policy, Deterrence, Institutions, Productivity Growth

They Played the Merger Game: A Retrospective Analysis in the UK Videogames Market

DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1330
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 04 Oct 2013
European Union - Directorate General for Competition, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), UK Competition Commission and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
Downloads 340 (164,415)
Citation 2

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Mergers, ex-post evaluation, videogames market, retail sector

They Played the Merger Game: A Retrospective Analysis in the UK Videogames Market

Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 908
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 08 Oct 2013
European Union - Directorate General for Competition, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), UK Competition Commission and Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation
Downloads 52 (717,194)
Citation 4

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Mergers, Ex-post Evaluation, Videogames market, Retail sector

Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud

Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics Working Paper No. 42
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 28 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 29 Aug 2017
Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), CSEF - University of Naples Federico II and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 278 (203,428)
Citation 4

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Whistleblowers Rewards, False Allegations, Judicial Errors, Standard of Proof, Corporate Fraud

Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12260
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), CSEF - University of Naples Federico II and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 0
Citation 5
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Corporate Fraud, False allegations, Judicial errors, Standard of proof, Whistleblowers rewards

7.

Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5465
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 03 May 2006
Giancarlo Spagnolo and Paolo Buccirossi
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)
Downloads 32 (844,275)
Citation 1
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Cartels, collusion, corporate crime, debt, deterrence, extended liability, fines, law enforcement, leniency, immunity, imprisonment, judgement proofness, optimal fines, optimal sanctions, optimal liability, organized crime, political economy, rewards, sunk cost bias, whistleblower

8.

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5442
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Apr 2006
Giancarlo Spagnolo and Paolo Buccirossi
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)
Downloads 25 (906,100)
Citation 3
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Amnesty, corruption, collusion, financial fraud, governance, hold up, hostages, illegal trade, immunity, law enforcement, leniency, organized crime, self-reporting, whistleblowers

9.

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6349
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 29 May 2008
Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 20 (954,939)
Citation 3
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Amnesty, Antitrust, Cartels, CEO compensation, Collusion, Corporate crime, Corporate fraud, Corporate governance, Corporate liability, Corruption, Deterrence, Employee liability, Fines, Immunity, Imprisonment, Indemnification, Judgement proofness, Leniency, Managerial incentives, Optimal sanctions, Rewards, Whistleblowers

10.

Access to an Essential Facility: Efficient Component Pricing Rule or Unrestricted Private Property Rights?

Posted: 29 Dec 1999
Paolo Buccirossi
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)

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Other Papers (1)

Total Downloads: 12
1.

Leniency and Damages

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Jan 2016
Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR), Technological University Dublin and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 12

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Private and public enforcement, cartels, competition policy, Leniency Program