Nathalie Fombaron

Université Paris X Nanterre

92, av. de la République, Nanterre

Room G301, Building G

Paris, Nanterre Cedex 92001

France

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Scholarly Papers (1)

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Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting

Number of pages: 74 Posted: 22 Aug 2012
Georges Dionne, Nathalie Fombaron and Neil A. Doherty
HEC Montreal - Department of Finance, Université Paris X Nanterre and University of Pennsylvania - Insurance & Risk Management Department
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Citation 37

Abstract:

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Adverse selection, insurance markets, monopoly, competitive contracts, self-selection mechanisms, single-period contracts, multi-period contracts, commitment, contract renegotiation, accident underreporting, risk categorization, participating contracts