Dong Beom Choi

Seoul National University - Business School

Seoul

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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30

CROSSREF CITATIONS

13

Scholarly Papers (13)

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Bank Wholesale Funding

Number of pages: 84 Posted: 12 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2019
Dong Beom Choi and Hyun-Soo Choi
Seoul National University - Business School and KAIST College of Business
Downloads 372 (117,094)
Citation 6

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Wholesale Funding Substitutions, Cross-sectional Heterogeniety, Liquidity Regulation

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Bank Wholesale Funding

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 759
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 20 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 30 Aug 2017
Dong Beom Choi and Hyun-Soo Choi
Seoul National University - Business School and KAIST College of Business
Downloads 78 (444,309)

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bank funding, monetary policy transmission, systemic stability, liquidity regulation, bank lending channel

Does Increased Shareholder Liability Always Reduce Bank Moral Hazard?

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 07 Sep 2021
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 320 (138,146)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Office of Financial Research Research Paper No. 18-06
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 54 (538,314)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression, Financial Stability

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2018-05
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 22 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 23 (732,082)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and During the Great Depression

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 869
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 16 (796,425)

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double liability, moral hazard, market discipline, bank runs, Great Depression

3.

A Theory of Collateral for the Lender of Last Resort

Review of Finance, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 28 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 15 Jan 2021
Dong Beom Choi, João A. C. Santos and Tanju Yorulmazer
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Koc University
Downloads 314 (141,714)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Central Bank, Liquidity, Macroprudential policy, Externality, Interbank Market, Lending Facilities

4.

Watering a Lemon Tree: Heterogeneous Risk Taking and Monetary Policy Transmission

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 724
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 07 Sep 2017 Last Revised: 08 Apr 2020
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Koc University
Downloads 226 (196,846)

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monetary policy transmission, financial frictions, heterogeneous agents, financial intermediation

5.

Debt-Equity Conflicts and Efficiency of Distressed Firms: Evidence From Banker-Directors in Japan

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 11 Jul 2022
Kentaro Asai and Dong Beom Choi
Australian National University (ANU) - College of Business and Economics and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 204 (216,583)

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debt-equity conflict, debt overhang, asset substitution, banker-directors, bank lending channel, stakeholders

6.

Securitization and Screening Incentives: Evidence from Mortgage Processing Time

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 06 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 11 Aug 2019
Dong Beom Choi and Jung-Eun Kim
Seoul National University - Business School and Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Downloads 160 (267,012)
Citation 3

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incentive misalignment, lending standard, loan sale, securitization, mortgage lending

7.

Hidden Cost of Better Bank Services: Carefree Depositors in Riskier Banks?

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 760
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 14 Jun 2018
Dong Beom Choi and Ulysses Velasquez
Seoul National University - Business School and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 154 (275,369)

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bank liability, funding cost, deposit, risk taking, market discipline

8.

Clogged Intermediation: Were Home Buyers Crowded Out?

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 07 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 28 Sep 2021
Dong Beom Choi, Hyun-Soo Choi and Jung-Eun Kim
Seoul National University - Business School, KAIST College of Business and Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Downloads 148 (284,439)
Citation 5

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Credit rationing, mortgage lending, operating capacity, monetary transmission, distributional effects

Heterogeneity and Stability: Bolster the Strong Not the Weak

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 09 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2013
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 83 (428,328)

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Heterogeneity and Stability: Bolster the Strong, Not the Weak

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 637
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 03 Oct 2013
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 23 (732,082)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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financial spillovers, panic, financial crises

10.

Whatever It Takes? Market Maker of Last Resort and its Fragility

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 30 Dec 2021 Last Revised: 21 Nov 2022
Dong Beom Choi and Tanju Yorulmazer
Seoul National University - Business School and Koc University
Downloads 102 (372,865)

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market maker of last resort, liquidity, central bank intervention, multiple equilibria, time inconsistency

11.

Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question, New Evidence

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 856
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 20 Jun 2018 Last Revised: 28 Dec 2019
Dong Beom Choi, Michael R. Holcomb and Donald P. Morgan
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 78 (439,550)
Citation 3

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Basel III regulation, bank risk, leverage limit, regulatory arbitrage, reaching for yield

12.

Are Socially Responsible Firms Really Responsible? Main Street Lending during the Great Recession

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Oct 2022
Dong Beom Choi and Seongjoon Jeong
Seoul National University - Business School and Seoul National University
Downloads 26 (686,747)

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corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, bank lending, social impact assessment, credit crunch, Great Recession

13.

Contagious Runs: Who Initiates?

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 31 Jan 2016
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 25 (694,335)

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Contagion, Self-fulfilling panic, Global games, Network