Dong Beom Choi

Seoul National University - Business School

Seoul

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

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Scholarly Papers (10)

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Bank Wholesale Funding

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 12 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 07 Sep 2017
Dong Beom Choi and Hyun-Soo Choi
Seoul National University - Business School and KAIST College of Business
Downloads 230 (129,367)

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Wholesale Funding Substitutions, Cross-sectional Heterogeniety, Liquidity Regulation

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Bank Wholesale Funding

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 759
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 20 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 30 Aug 2017
Dong Beom Choi and Hyun-Soo Choi
Seoul National University - Business School and KAIST College of Business
Downloads 24 (502,209)

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bank funding, monetary policy transmission, systemic stability, liquidity regulation, bank lending channel

2.

A Theory of Collateral for the Lender of Last Resort

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 28 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 25 Jan 2019
Dong Beom Choi, João A. C. Santos and Tanju Yorulmazer
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Downloads 188 (157,052)

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Central Bank, Liquidity, Macroprudential policy, Externality, Interbank Market, Lending Facilities

3.

Watering a Lemon Tree: Heterogeneous Risk Taking and Monetary Policy Transmission

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 724
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 07 Sep 2017 Last Revised: 14 Nov 2017
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York and University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Downloads 186 (158,599)

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monetary policy transmission, financial frictions, heterogeneous agents, financial intermediation

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 114 (237,868)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Office of Financial Research Research Paper No. 18-06
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 22 (514,452)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression, Financial Stability

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2018-05
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 22 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 12 (578,163)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and During the Great Depression

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 869
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 11 (584,718)

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double liability, moral hazard, market discipline, bank runs, Great Depression

Heterogeneity and Stability: Bolster the Strong Not the Weak

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 09 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2013
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 78 (305,806)

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Heterogeneity and Stability: Bolster the Strong, Not the Weak

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 637
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 03 Oct 2013
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 19 (533,260)

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financial spillovers, panic, financial crises

6.

Hidden Cost of Better Bank Services: Carefree Depositors in Riskier Banks?

FRB of NY Staff Report No. 760
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 14 Jun 2018
Dong Beom Choi and Ulysses Velasquez
Seoul National University - Business School and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 91 (275,622)

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bank liability, funding cost, deposit, risk taking, market discipline

7.

Clogged Intermediation: Were Home Buyers Crowded Out?

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 07 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2018
Dong Beom Choi, Hyun-Soo Choi and Jung-Eun Kim
Seoul National University - Business School, KAIST College of Business and Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Downloads 60 (348,702)

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Credit rationing, mortgage lending, operating capacity, monetary transmission, distributional effects

8.

Securitization and Screening Incentives: Evidence from Mortgage Processing Time

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 06 Mar 2018
Dong Beom Choi and Jung-Eun Kim
Seoul National University - Business School and Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Downloads 56 (360,630)

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moral hazard, lending standard, loan sale, securitization, mortgage lending

9.

Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: New Evidence on a Recurring Question

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 856
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 20 Jun 2018 Last Revised: 08 Nov 2018
Dong Beom Choi, Michael R. Holcomb and Donald P. Morgan
Seoul National University - Business School, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 36 (430,682)

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Basel III regulation, bank risk, leverage limit, regulatory arbitrage, reaching for yield

10.

Contagious Runs: Who Initiates?

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 31 Jan 2016
Dong Beom Choi
Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 19 (515,269)

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Contagion, Self-fulfilling panic, Global games, Network