Johan Eyckmans

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies

Dr.

Naamsestraat 69

Leuven, B-3000

Belgium

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 9,266

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16

CROSSREF CITATIONS

88

Scholarly Papers (13)

1.

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

FEEM Working Paper No. 155.04
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 14 Jan 2005
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 223 (138,158)
Citation 33

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Coalition games, Partition function, Externalities, Sharing schemes

2.

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

FEEM Working Paper No. 88.2003
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 22 Nov 2003
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 177 (171,185)
Citation 1

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Design of climate treaty protocol, Coalition formation, Non-cooperative game theory

3.

Is Kyoto Fatally Flawed? An Analysis with Macgem

FEEM Working Paper No. 43.2002
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 23 Jul 2002
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, KU Leuven - Center for Economic Studies and Belgian Federal Ministry for the Environment
Downloads 169 (178,275)
Citation 9

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Environmental Economics, Climate Change, Permit Trade, Kyoto Protocol, Carbon Sinks

4.

Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

FEEM Working Paper No. 75.2001
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 01 Nov 2001
Johan Eyckmans and Henry Tulkens
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 158 (188,782)
Citation 13

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Environmental economics, climate change, burden sharing, simulations, core of cooperative games

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

FEEM Working Paper No. 50.05, University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 44/06
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 141 (207,853)
Citation 5

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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5046
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 15 Sep 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 16 (570,979)
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, climate policy, transfers, international environmental agreements

6.

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2003/88
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Apr 2007
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 143 (204,989)
Citation 12

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design of climate treaty protocol, coalition formation, non-cooperative game theory

7.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Voluntary Solid Waste Reduction Policies: Methodology and a Flemish Case Study

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 26 Oct 2007
Simon De Jaeger and Johan Eyckmans
European University College, Brussels and Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies
Downloads 114 (244,037)

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Residential solid waste, difference-in-differences, voluntary agreements, municipalities, endogeneity bias

8.

Simulating with Rice Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics Working Paper No. 9926, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 228
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 05 Jan 2000
Henry Tulkens and Johan Eyckmans
Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) and Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies
Downloads 111 (248,727)

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Moral Concerns on Tradable Pollution Permits in International Environmental Agreements

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 02 Sep 2009
Johan Eyckmans and Snorre Kverndokk
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
Downloads 61 (361,750)
Citation 2

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Tradable emission permits, international environmental agreements, non-cooperative game theory, moral motivation, identity

Moral Concerns on Tradable Pollution Permits in International Environmental Agreements

University of Oslo Department of Economics Memorandum Paper No. 13/2009
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Aug 2009
Johan Eyckmans and Snorre Kverndokk
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
Downloads 20 (544,831)
Citation 2

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Tradable emission permits, international environmental agreements, non-cooperative game theory, moral motivation, identity.

10.

Development Aid and Climate Finance

CREE Working Paper No. 15/2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 01 Mar 2014
Johan Eyckmans, Sam Fankhauser and Snorre Kverndokk
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
Downloads 44 (412,836)
Citation 2

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inequality aversion; mitigation; adaptation; climate change finance; development assistance; aid effectiveness

11.

The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models

FEEM Working Paper 5.2014, CMCC Research Paper No. RP0229
Number of pages: 2 Posted: 07 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 27 Jul 2017
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Bocconi University, Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici - European Institute onEconomy and the Environment (EIEE), Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, Wageningen University and State University of New York at Binghamton
Downloads 37 (440,367)
Citation 2

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Coalition Stability, International Environmental Agreements, Numerical modeling, Transfers

12.

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?

FEEM Working Paper No. 109.2009
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 04 Feb 2010
Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 37 (440,367)

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International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations

13.

The European Union's Potential for Strategic Emissions Trading Through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2809
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 12 Oct 2009
Johan Eyckmans and Cathrine Hagem
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO)
Downloads 37 (440,367)

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emissions permit, post-Kyoto climate agreement, strategic permit trade