Box 143
Konstanz, 78457
Germany
University of Konstanz
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Central Banks, Inflation Targeting, Monetary Targeting, Signaling, Commitment
central banks, transparency, voting
Central banks, transparency, voting, monetary union
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Central banks, transparency voting
central banks, transparency, commitment, Federal Reserve, policy inclinations, signaling
Central Bank Objectives, Transparency
committees, career concerns, experts, transparency, information acquisition
career concerns, committees, experts, information acquisition, transparency
banking on the average, equity-capital requirements, banking system, banking crisis
banking crisis, banking on the average, banking system, equity-capital requirements
reciprocity, voting, median voter theorem
zero lower bound, fiscal multiplier, liquidity trap, new Keynesian model, multiple equilibria, inflation target
experts, committees, career concerns, verifiable information
Central Banks, Wage Bargaining, Information Asymmetries, Indicators for Monetary Policy, Controlling Inflation
Experts, Committees, Career Concerns, Verifiable Information, Information Aggregation
experts, committees, career concerns, verifiable information, information aggregation
trend inflation, inflation target, sticky wages, sticky prices, overlapping-generations models
search, matching, unemployment
New Keynesian model, multiple equilibria, discretionary equilibrium, inflation persistence, reputation
forward guidance, zero lower bound, central banks, incentive contracts, transparency
reciprocity, committees, log-rolling, voting
Fairness, Inequity Aversion, Voting, Median Voter Theorem, Politicians
central banks, banking regulation, capital requirements, optimal monetary policy
bounded rationality, inflation perceptions, monetary-policy transmission, optimal monetary policy
central banks, incentive contracts, transparency, inflation targeting, inflation forecast targeting, intermediate targets
central banks, incentive contracts, inflation forecast targeting, inflation targeting, intermediate targets, transparency
constitutional design, provision of public projects, voting, taxes and subsidies
price dynamics, increases in market power, menu costs, monetary non-neutrality, endogenous TFP, real rigidities, Kimball aggregator
Trend Inflation, Optimal Inflation Target, New Keynesian Model, Welfare Costs of Inflation
price stickiness, price point, sticky information
Monetary policy committees, term length, committee size, New Keynesian model
monetary policy, transparency, signaling, heterogeneous information
committees, information aggregation, transparency, voting, monetary policy committees
Discretion, Commitment, LQ RE models, Reputation, Time-Inconsistency, Optimal Delegation
conservative central banker, optimal monetary policy, information acquisition, Phillips curve, transparency
committee decision-making, information aggregation, adverse selection, efficiency wages, transparency, career concerns
signaling games, transparency, monetary policy, central banks, communication
term length, conservative central banker, New Keynesian model
strategic communication, voting, leaks, transparency, monetary policy committees, committee decision-making, information aggregation
trust, organizations, reputation, communication, time inconsistency
Central banks, inflation targeting, monetary targeting, signalling, commitment
Cooperation, committees, repeated games, time inconsistency
constitutional design, provision of public projects, taxes and subsidies, voting
central banks, commitment, ECB, Federal Reserve, policy inclinations, transparency
