Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium
KU Leuven
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
marriage market, stable matching, Pareto efficient household consumption, testable implications, sharing rule identi cation, preference heterogeneity
marriage market, divorce, Malawi, agricultural production, revealed preference
Consumption, labor supply, intra-household allocation, non-cooperative model, public goods
marriage market, intrahousehold allocation, economies of scale, revealed preference, PSID
time use, home production, identification, production shifter
individual welfare, collective model, revealed preferences, sharing rule, money metric welfare index, identification, labor supply
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
children, collective model, Experiment, Intra-household allocation, Kenya
marriage stability, household consumption, nonparametric testable implications, transferable utility
two-selves model, self-control, revealed preferences
household consumption, marital stability, unobserved match quality, revealed preference analysis, intrahousehold allocation
household behaviour, labor supply, gender differences, amenities, job flexibility, child care
Household consumption, Intrahousehold Allocation, marital stability, revealed preference analysis, unobserved match quality
revealed preferences, Self-Control, Two-selves model
