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Oliver Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics

Littauer Center

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

  • Harvard University - Department of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: 617-496-3461
    • Fax: 617-495-7730

  • National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

41

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21,036

CITATIONS
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2,510

Scholarly Papers (41)

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1.

Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Downloads 3,961 ( 1,628)
Citation 33

Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 04/2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 336
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Apr 2003 Last Revised: 08 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,832 (1,709)
Citation 33

Abstract:

Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions

Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

NBER Working Paper No. w8633
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 129 (183,148)
Citation 33

Abstract:

2.

Financial Contracting

Downloads 2,345 ( 4,148)

Financial Contracting

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1924; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 327
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 08 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 2,279 (4,286)
Citation 112

Abstract:

Financial contracting, decision rights, control rights

Financial Contracting

NBER Working Paper No. w8285
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 11 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 66 (286,941)
Citation 112

Abstract:

Financial Contracting

Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature
Posted: 14 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Financial contracting, decision rights, control rights

3.

A Theory of Firm Scope

Downloads 1,912 ( 5,897)
Citation 137

A Theory of Firm Scope

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-42
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 18 Dec 2002
Oliver Hart and Bengt R. Holmström
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,838 (6,180)
Citation 137

Abstract:

A Theory of Firm Scope

NBER Working Paper No. w14613
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 15 Jan 2009
Oliver Hart and Bengt R. Holmström
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 74 (268,915)
Citation 135

Abstract:

4.

Different Approaches To Bankruptcy

Downloads 1,671 ( 7,527)
Citation 42

Different Approaches To Bankruptcy

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1903
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Oct 2000
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,567 (8,152)
Citation 42

Abstract:

Different Approaches to Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w7921
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 26 Sep 2000
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 104 (215,433)
Citation 42

Abstract:

5.

Norms and the Theory of the Firm

Downloads 1,591 ( 8,124)

Norms and the Theory of the Firm

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1923; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 326
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 08 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,520 (8,577)
Citation 100

Abstract:

Contracts, theory of the firm

Norms and the Theory of the Firm

NBER Working Paper No. w8286
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 11 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 71 (275,396)
Citation 100

Abstract:

Norms and the Theory of the Firm

Forthcoming in University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Posted: 14 May 2001
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Contracts, theory of the firm

6.

A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

Downloads 1,096 ( 14,767)
Citation 42

A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

FEEM Working Paper No. 124.2009
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 11 Jan 2010
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 684 (28,995)
Citation 42

Abstract:

Banks, Capital Requirement, Too Big to Fail

A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 09-36
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 02 Oct 2009
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 397 (58,721)
Citation 42

Abstract:

A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7298
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 15 Jul 2009
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 15 (485,427)
Citation 42

Abstract:

banks, Capital requirement, too big to fail

7.

Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

Downloads 889 ( 20,247)
Citation 59

Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 12 Jun 2003
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 889 (19,873)
Citation 59

Abstract:

public-private partnerships, ownership, incomplete contracts

Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

Economic Journal, Vol. 119, March 2003
Posted: 12 Jun 2003
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

public-private partnerships, ownership, incomplete contracts

8.

Debt Enforcement Around the World

Downloads 812 ( 23,125)
Citation 100

Debt Enforcement Around the World

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 147/2007
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Dec 2006
Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Shleifer
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Harvard University - Department of Economics, World Bank - International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 726 (26,691)
Citation 100

Abstract:

bankruptcy, legal origins

Debt Enforcement Around the World

NBER Working Paper No. w12807
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 05 Jan 2007
Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Shleifer
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Harvard University - Department of Economics, World Bank - International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 86 (245,118)
Citation 100

Abstract:

9.

On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization

Downloads 750 ( 25,906)
Citation 51

On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization

Harvard Institute of Economics Research Paper No. 1880
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 27 Jul 2000
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 647 (31,306)
Citation 51

Abstract:

On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE375
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 57 (309,744)
Citation 51

Abstract:

On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization

NBER Working Paper No. w7388
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 21 Oct 1999
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 46 (342,627)
Citation 51

Abstract:

On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, pp. 675-702, August 2005
Posted: 09 Aug 2005
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics

Abstract:

10.

Contracts as Reference Points

Downloads 723 ( 27,286)
Citation 57

Contracts as Reference Points

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 14 Nov 2006
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 486 (45,637)
Citation 57

Abstract:

contracts, reference points, entitlements, aggrievement

Contracts as Reference Points

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 572
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 12 Jan 2007
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 208 (119,890)
Citation 57

Abstract:

Contracts as Reference Points

NBER Working Paper No. w12706
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 20 Nov 2006
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 29 (407,964)
Citation 57

Abstract:

11.

Theories of Optimal Capital Structure: A Managerial Discretion Perspective

NBER Working Paper No. R1806
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 27 Apr 2000
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 691 (25,765)
Citation 21

Abstract:

12.

Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In

Downloads 655 ( 31,289)
Citation 14

Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 465; Harvard Institute of Econ. Research Disc. Paper 2032
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 21 Mar 2004
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 584 (35,951)
Citation 14

Abstract:

agreements to agree, ruling out but not ruling in, bargaining, ex post inefficiency

Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out But Do Not Rule in

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE472
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 39 (366,733)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out But Do Not Rule in

NBER Working Paper No. w10397
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 09 Apr 2004
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 32 (394,314)
Citation 14

Abstract:

13.

Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives

NBER Working Paper No. R0398
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 18 Aug 2004
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 356 (57,689)
Citation 179

Abstract:

14.

Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine

Downloads 339 ( 71,377)
Citation 1

Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 30 May 2013
T. Christopher Borek, Angelo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart
Analysis Group, Inc., United States Department of Justice and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 323 (74,955)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? a Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine

NBER Working Paper No. w19081
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 31 May 2013
T. Christopher Borek, Angelo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart
Analysis Group, Inc., United States Department of Justice and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 16 (479,641)
Citation 1

Abstract:

15.

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Downloads 323 ( 75,481)

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE358
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 216 (115,451)
Citation 132

Abstract:

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

NBER Working Paper No. w6726
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Aug 2000
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 107 (211,111)
Citation 132

Abstract:

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1846
Posted: 09 Sep 1998
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics

Abstract:

16.

Making the Case for Contract Theory

American Economic Association, Ten Years and Beyond: Economists Answer NSF's Call for Long-Term Research Agendas
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 12 Aug 2011
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 313 (58,036)

Abstract:

17.

Inefficient Provision of Liquidity

Downloads 313 ( 78,131)
Citation 2

Inefficient Provision of Liquidity

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-27
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 01 Aug 2011
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 295 (83,006)
Citation 2

Abstract:

liquidity, money, banking

Inefficient Provision of Liquidity

NBER Working Paper No. w17299
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 28 Aug 2011
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 18 (468,157)
Citation 2

Abstract:

18.

One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control

NBER Working Paper No. w2347
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 26 Mar 2007
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 273 (91,016)
Citation 265

Abstract:

19.

Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership

Downloads 225 (111,303)

Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership

NBER Working Paper No. w6421
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 04 Aug 2000
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 132 (179,781)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Cooperatives Vs. Outside Ownership

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE346
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 93 (232,921)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1816
Posted: 20 Jul 1998
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics

Abstract:

20.

Banks Are Where the Liquidity Is

Downloads 215 (116,434)
Citation 1

Banks Are Where the Liquidity Is

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-27, Fama-Miller Working Paper
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 26 Jul 2014
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 190 (130,720)
Citation 1

Abstract:

liquidity, bailout, banking

Banks are Where the Liquidity is

NBER Working Paper No. w20207
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jun 2014
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 23 (439,343)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Banks are Where the Liquidity is

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10017
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 2 (558,210)
Citation 1

Abstract:

bailout, banking, Liquidity

21.

Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence

Downloads 171 (144,169)
Citation 61

Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3889
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 22 Dec 2008
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 94 (231,200)
Citation 61

Abstract:

contracts, reference points, experiment

Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 12 Mar 2009
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 51 (327,145)
Citation 61

Abstract:

Contracts, Reference Points, Experiment

Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence

NBER Working Paper No. w14501
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 25 Nov 2008
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 26 (422,903)
Citation 61

Abstract:

22.

A New Capital Requirement for Large Financial Institutions

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 17 Mar 2010
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 148 (151,916)
Citation 34

Abstract:

Capital requirements, banking, CDS

23.

The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform

NBER Working Paper No. w4097
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart and John Moore
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 118 (180,354)
Citation 88

Abstract:

24.

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

Downloads 101 (218,791)
Citation 1

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No. 43
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 02 Feb 2012
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 41 (359,501)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Contractual reference points, informal agreements, renegotiation, experiment

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2011
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 36 (377,977)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Incomplete Contracts, Contractual Reference Points, Renegotiation, Informal Agreements, Laboratory Experiment

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6095
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 13 Nov 2011
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 14 (491,338)
Citation 1

Abstract:

contracts, reference points, fairness, renegotiation, informal agreement

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

NBER Working Paper No. w17545
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 29 Oct 2011
Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Lausanne
Downloads 10 (514,092)
Citation 1

Abstract:

25.

The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons

Downloads 89 (237,891)
Citation 172

The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons

NBER Working Paper No. w5744
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 08 Jan 1997
Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny
Harvard University - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 89 (239,705)
Citation 172

Abstract:

The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, November 1997
Posted: 28 Apr 1998
Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny
Harvard University - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

26.

A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital

NBER Working Paper No. w3906
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 28 Dec 2006
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 80 (208,651)
Citation 288

Abstract:

27.

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3073
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 11 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Oliver Hart
Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 64 (288,249)
Citation 23

Abstract:

Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions

28.

A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims

NBER Working Paper No. w3431
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 03 Feb 2001
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 61 (266,305)
Citation 8

Abstract:

29.

A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions

Downloads 57 (305,487)

A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions

NBER Working Paper No. w6278
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 08 Jul 2000
Oliver Hart, Robert W. Drago, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - Department of Labor Studies and Industrial Relations, SKEMA Business School and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 57 (309,744)
Citation 10

Abstract:

A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions

European Economic Review, 1997.
Posted: 25 Sep 1997
Oliver Hart, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics, SKEMA Business School and University of Edinburgh - Economics

Abstract:

30.

Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

Downloads 57 (305,487)

Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

NBER Working Paper No. w5907
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 07 Aug 2000
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 57 (309,744)
Citation 199

Abstract:

Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

Harvard Institue of Economic Research Paper No. 1792
Posted: 07 Mar 1997
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics

Abstract:

31.

Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 29 Apr 2009
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 43 (316,285)
Citation 6

Abstract:

32.

Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm

NBER Working Paper No. w13481
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (333,796)
Citation 32

Abstract:

33.

Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points

NBER Working Paper No. w13540
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 24 Oct 2007
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (355,965)
Citation 11

Abstract:

34.

Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management

NBER Working Paper No. w4886
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Oliver Hart and John Moore
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Edinburgh - Economics
Downloads 30 (352,621)
Citation 179

Abstract:

35.

Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks

NBER Working Paper No. w0975
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Jul 2004
Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver Hart and Eric Maskin
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (381,117)
Citation 6

Abstract:

36.

Liquidity and Inefficient Investment

Downloads 15 (467,300)

Liquidity and Inefficient Investment

NBER Working Paper No. w19184
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 29 Jun 2013
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 14 (491,338)

Abstract:

Liquidity and Inefficient Investment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9537
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 09 Jul 2013
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales
Harvard University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 1 (568,590)

Abstract:

aggregate shocks, fiscal policy, liquidity, nonpledgeability, pecuniary externalities

37.

Short-Term, Long-Term, and Continuing Contracts

NBER Working Paper No. w21005
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 09 Mar 2015
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Oliver Hart
University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 11 (472,539)

Abstract:

38.

Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points

NBER Working Paper No. w16929
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 11 Apr 2011
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 5 (457,077)
Citation 2

Abstract:

39.

More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts

NBER Working Paper No. w19001
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 28 Apr 2013
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Oliver Hart
University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (431,109)

Abstract:

40.

Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm

Economica, Vol. 75, Issue 299, pp. 404-411, August 2008
Number of pages: 8 Posted: 17 Jul 2008
Oliver Hart
Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (525,161)
Citation 6

Abstract:

41.

Continuing Contracts

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 03 Sep 2016
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Oliver Hart
University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (252,288)

Abstract:

short‐term, long‐term, continuing contracts, fairness, good faith bargaining, for‐cause, at-will

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