Vasilis Syrgkanis

Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England

Researcher

One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor

Cambridge, MA 02142

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

374

CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 23 Apr 2013 Last Revised: 26 Jan 2014
Vasilis Syrgkanis, David Kempe and Eva Tardos
Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England, University of Southern California - Department of Computer Science and Cornell University - Department of Computer Science
Downloads 204 (84,414)

Abstract:

common value, asymmetric information, revenue ranking, failure of linkage principle

2.

Robust Data-Driven Guarantees in Auctions

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 05 May 2015 Last Revised: 25 Feb 2016
Darrell Hoy, Denis Nekipelov and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Independent, University of Virginia and Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England
Downloads 4 (440,313)

Abstract:

Econometrics, Auctions, Welfare, Price of Anarchy

3.

Optimal Learning from Multiple Information Sources

Number of pages: 76 Posted: 13 Mar 2017
Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Microsoft Research, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England
Downloads 0 (271,622)

Abstract:

learning, information, dynamic