2500 University DR NW
University of Calgary
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dynamic games, estimation, identification, market entry-exit, rational behavior, rationalizability
Electoral Institutions, Independent Candidates, Voter Turnout, Political Representation, Ethnic Parties
Comparative Advantage, Labor Market Discrimination, Consumer Discrimination, Wage Differentials, Services
Games of Incomplete Information, Dynamic Games, Identification, Multiple Equilibria in the Data, Equilibrium Selection
Regionalism, Political Violence, Civil Conflict, Elections, Tribal Populations.
Dynamic programming discrete choice models; Euler equations; Policy iteration; Estimation; Approximation bias.
full retirement age, social security, regression discontinuity design, reference dependence
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