Alex Thevaranjan

Syracuse University - School of Management

Assistant Professor

Department of Accounting

900 S. Crouse Avenue

Syracuse, NY 13244-2130

United States

  • Syracuse University - School of Management

    • Email
    • Tel: 315-443-3355
    • Fax: 315-443-5457
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

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3,030

CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (6)

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1.

Ethics and Agency Theory: Incorporating a Standard for Effort and an Ethically Sensitive Agent

Syracuse University Working Paper
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Jan 2003
Douglas E. Stevens and Alex Thevaranjan
Georgia State University - Robinson College of Business and Syracuse University - School of Management
Downloads 921 (24,247)
Citation 2

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ethics, agency theory, productivity, flat salary contracts,

2.

Managerial Myopia and Non-Financial Measures: The Case of Customer Satisfaction Mitigating Hard-Selling

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 28 Mar 2000
Alex Thevaranjan, Kissan Joseph and Dhinu Srinivasan
Syracuse University - School of Management, University of Kansas - School of Business and University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business
Downloads 826 (28,313)
Citation 3

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3.

A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem

Downloads 629 ( 40,968)

A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 28 May 2008
Douglas E. Stevens and Alex Thevaranjan
Georgia State University - Robinson College of Business and Syracuse University - School of Management
Downloads 629 (40,388)
Citation 2

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Agency theory, Moral hazard, Moral sensitivity, Firm productivity, Optimal contracts

A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Forthcoming
Posted: 09 Apr 2009
Douglas E. Stevens and Alex Thevaranjan
Georgia State University - Robinson College of Business and Syracuse University - School of Management

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Agency theory, Moral hazard, Moral sensitivity, Firm productivity, Optimal contracts

4.

Is There Room within Principal-Agent Theory for Ethics?

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 28 Apr 2005
Douglas E. Stevens and Alex Thevaranjan
Georgia State University - Robinson College of Business and Syracuse University - School of Management
Downloads 588 (44,830)

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Principal-agent theory, ethics, incentives, optimal contracts

5.

How to Deal with Unprofitable Customers? A Salesforce Compensation Perspective

ESMT Working Paper No. 13-05
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 12 Jun 2013
Sumitro Banerjee and Alex Thevaranjan
Grenoble Ecole de Management and Syracuse University - School of Management
Downloads 66 (338,236)

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salesforce compensation, target markets, adverse selection, screening, pooling, principal-agent models, agency theory

6.

The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures

Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming in the Summer Issue of 2002
Posted: 18 Feb 2002
Augustine Duru, Raghavan J. Iyengar and Alex Thevaranjan
American University - Kogod School of Business, North Carolina Central University - School of Business and Syracuse University - School of Management

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