Elisa S. Kao

New York University School of Law

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012-1099

United States

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Scholarly Papers (1)

1.

Moral Hazard During the Savings and Loan Crisis and the Financial Crisis of 2008-09: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk Through Disincentive Structures to Manage Firm Size and Interconnectedness

New York University Annual Survey of American Law, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 817-860, 2012
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 24 Aug 2013
Elisa S. Kao
New York University School of Law
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Citation 1

Abstract:

banking, Dodd-Frank, moral hazard, systemic risk, too big to fail, financial crisis, savings and loan crisis, financial institutions, regulation