Dana Foarta

Stanford Graduate School of Business

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

41

CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

The Management of Talent for Innovation: Optimal Contracting for Selection and Incentives

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 18-21
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 17 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 29 Mar 2019
Dana Foarta and Takuo Sugaya
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 27 (475,803)

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optimal employment contracts, adverse selection, moral hazard, acqui-hiring

2.

Wait-and-See or Step in? Dynamics of Interventions

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 18-41
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 16 Oct 2018
Dana Foarta and Takuo Sugaya
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 11 (567,590)

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Interventions, Early Warnings, Institutional Structure, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard

Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12575
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Stanford Graduate School of Business, American University, Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and World Bank
Downloads 2 (660,070)
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Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

NBER Working Paper No. w24194
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 17 Jan 2018
American University, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and World Bank
Downloads 1 (674,628)
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4.

The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach

American Economic Review, 2018, 108(4-5): 1187-1213
Posted: 24 Apr 2019
Dana Foarta
Stanford Graduate School of Business

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partial banking union, cross-country transfers, bailouts

5.

The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-6
Posted: 12 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 23 Mar 2019
CREI, Stanford Graduate School of Business and CREi and UPF

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product design; information frictions, information transmission; signaling; complexity; regulation; financial products