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Ilya R. Segal

Stanford University

Associate Professor of Economics

Stanford, CA 94305

United States

  • Stanford University

    • Email
    • Tel: 650-724-4905
    • Fax: 650-725-5702
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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CITATIONS
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217

Scholarly Papers (13)

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1.

Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 335
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Dec 2006
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,976 (4,555)
Citation 7

Abstract:

antitrust, enforcement, litigation, deterrence

2.

Property Rights

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 394
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 28 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2010
Michael D. Whinston and Ilya R. Segal
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 553 (35,722)
Citation 7

Abstract:

3.

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

Downloads 343 ( 71,344)
Citation 20

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 312
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 24 Oct 2005
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 311 (79,116)
Citation 20

Abstract:

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

NBER Working Paper No. w11525
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 15 Sep 2005
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (398,747)
Citation 20

Abstract:

4.

Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Jun 2010
Alessandro Pavan, Ilya R. Segal and Juuso Toikka
Northwestern University, Stanford University and Department of Economics, Stanford University
Downloads 314 (70,148)
Citation 9

Abstract:

asymmetric information, stochastic processes, incentives

5.

What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 11 Jun 2009 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2012
Przemyslaw Jeziorski and Ilya R. Segal
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business and Stanford University
Downloads 281 (75,076)
Citation 7

Abstract:

sponsored search advertising, structural model estimation, method of moments, user experience, click-through rate, impression optimization

6.

Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 16 Mar 1999
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 280 (87,586)
Citation 57

Abstract:

7.

Contracting with Externalities

Downloads 264 ( 95,584)
Citation 98

Contracting with Externalities

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University
Downloads 264 (95,088)
Citation 98

Abstract:

Contracting with Externalities

Quarterly Journal of Economics
Posted: 18 Jan 1999
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University

Abstract:

8.

Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2002
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University
Downloads 168 (137,264)
Citation 8

Abstract:

9.

A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining)

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 12 Jan 2009 Last Revised: 25 Mar 2010
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 38 (356,521)
Citation 4

Abstract:

10.

Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 26 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 11 Aug 2017
Gabriel D. Carroll and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 0 (144,343)

Abstract:

auctions with resale; duality in auction design; non-local incentive constraints; robust revenue maximization; ACV auction; worst-case

11.

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 583-601, 2002
Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Paul R. Milgrom and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University and Stanford University

Abstract:

12.

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 1-45, January 2002
Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

13.

Naked Exclusion: Comment

American Economic Review
Posted: 01 Dec 1999
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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