Ilya R. Segal

Stanford University

Associate Professor of Economics

Stanford, CA 94305

United States

  • Stanford University

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    • Tel: 650-724-4905
    • Fax: 650-725-5702
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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CITATIONS
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216

Scholarly Papers (14)

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1.

Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 335
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Dec 2006
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Downloads 2,398 (4,916)
Citation 7

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antitrust, enforcement, litigation, deterrence

2.

Property Rights

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 394
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 28 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2010
Michael D. Whinston and Ilya R. Segal
Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 638 (37,909)
Citation 7

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3.

Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Jun 2010
Alessandro Pavan, Ilya R. Segal and Juuso Toikka
Northwestern University, Stanford University and Department of Economics, MIT
Downloads 368 (75,337)
Citation 9

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asymmetric information, stochastic processes, incentives

4.

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

Downloads 349 ( 80,065)
Citation 20

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 312
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 24 Oct 2005
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Downloads 313 (90,071)
Citation 20

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Antitrust in Innovative Industries

NBER Working Paper No. w11525
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 15 Sep 2005 Last Revised: 30 Oct 2014
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (426,445)
Citation 20

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5.

What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 11 Jun 2009 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2012
Przemyslaw Jeziorski and Ilya R. Segal
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business and Stanford University
Downloads 334 (84,253)
Citation 6

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sponsored search advertising, structural model estimation, method of moments, user experience, click-through rate, impression optimization

6.

Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 16 Mar 1999
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Downloads 290 (98,534)
Citation 57

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7.

Contracting with Externalities

Downloads 275 (104,172)
Citation 98

Contracting with Externalities

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University
Downloads 275 (103,672)
Citation 98

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Contracting with Externalities

Quarterly Journal of Economics
Posted: 18 Jan 1999
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University

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8.

Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 26 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2018
Gabriel D. Carroll and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 271 (105,844)

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auctions with resale; duality in auction design; non-local incentive constraints; robust revenue maximization; ACV auction; worst-case

9.

Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2002
Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University
Downloads 187 (152,435)
Citation 8

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10.

Persuasion with Rational Inattention

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 17 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2018
Alexander W. Bloedel and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 168 (168,541)

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Bayesian Persuasion, Rational Inattention, Costly Communication, Information Acquisition, Information Design, Monotone Partition, Cheap Talk

11.

A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining)

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 12 Jan 2009 Last Revised: 25 Mar 2010
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Downloads 45 (383,779)
Citation 4

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12.

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 583-601, 2002
Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Paul R. Milgrom and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University and Stanford University

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13.

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing)

Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 1-45, January 2002
Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics

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14.

Naked Exclusion: Comment

American Economic Review
Posted: 01 Dec 1999
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston
Stanford University and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics

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