48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
Paris School of Economics (PSE)
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent- Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation
Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
corruption, incomplete contracts, moral hazard, principal-agent-supervisor model, public-private partnerships, risk allocation
contract theory, incentives, asymmetric information, enforcement, breach of contracts, dynamic contracts
optimal control, non-smooth optimization, convex analysis
menu auctions, influence games, common agency, screening contracts, public goods games, lobbying games
game theory, aggregate games, common agency
common agency, asymmetric information, menu auctions, delegated contracting games, public goods, lobbying
Drugs, decriminalization
Markets, Trade, Mathematical Models, Trade Policies, International Trade, Trade Negotiations, Asymmetric Information, Double-Edged Incentives, Tariff Equilibrium, Behind-The-Border Policies
Common agency, Complete information, Asymmetric information, Common screening device, Equilibrium selection, Public good
