Laurent Lamy

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan

Paris, 75014 75014

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

1

SSRN CITATIONS

4

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10758
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 11 Aug 2015
Philippe Jehiel and Laurent Lamy
University College London - Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
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Citation 1
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competing exchange platforms, competing mechanisms, endogenous entry, free riding, local public goods, mechanism design, Tiebout hypothesis

2.

On the Benefits of Set-Asides

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11564
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Oct 2016
Philippe Jehiel and Laurent Lamy
University College London - Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
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asymmetric buyers, auctions with endogenous entry, entry deterrence, government procurement, incumbents, set-asides

3.

Correcting for Sample Selection from Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11376
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 11 Jul 2016
Laurent Lamy, Manasa Patnam and Michael Visser
Paris School of Economics (PSE), National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST) and National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)
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Sample Selection; Structural Econometrics of Auctions; Wage-Performance Elasticity

4.

On Discrimination in Procurement Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9790
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Jun 2014
Philippe Jehiel and Laurent Lamy
University College London - Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
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asymmetric buyers, auctions with endogenous entry, bid preference programs, cartels, favoritism, government procurement, incumbents, optimal auction design, Poisson games

5.

On Absolute Auctions and Secret Reserve Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9791
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Jun 2014
Philippe Jehiel and Laurent Lamy
University College London - Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
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Citation 3
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absolute auctions, analogy-based expectations, competing auctions, endogenous entry, rational expectations, secret reserve prices