Markus Schramm

RWTH Aachen University

Templergraben 55

52056 Aachen, 52056

Germany

  • RWTH Aachen University

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

217

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (4)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 76 (348,889)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Deterrence, fine size, type-I and type-II error, experiment

2.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Theory and Evidence from the Laboratory

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9388
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Oct 2015
Eberhard Feess, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 55 (412,365)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

deterrence, punishment, legal uncertainty, fines, laboratory experiment, partial and equilibrium effects

3.

Under-Delegation in Case of Pure Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Oliver Lorz and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 54 (415,702)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral hazard, gender, control premium, delegation, principal-agent, experiment, real-effort

4.

Monitoring Reduces Efficiency: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 32 (507,349)

Abstract:

Loading...

Monitoring, delegation, control premium, laboratory experiment