Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
Toulouse School of Economics
selling information, experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation
Information design, Price of information, Statistical experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Hypothesis testing
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experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation., selling information
evaluation, information design, career concerns, bandit experimentation, downward wage rigidity, up-or-out
Attributes, Information Design, Mechanism Design, Private Disclosure, Call Options, Multidimensional Screening, Demand Transformation
attributes, call options, demand transformation, information design, intermediaries, linear disclosure, mechanism design, multidimensional screening, persuasion
Experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Product differentiation, Selling information
cream skimming, matching markets, market failure, information design, calculus of variations
Bayesian Games, Repeated Games, Communication, Folk Theorem
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