Alex Smolin

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Place Anatole-France

Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS

1,485

SSRN CITATIONS

96

CROSSREF CITATIONS

70

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.
Downloads 493 ( 72,536)
Citation 43

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 20 Jul 2016
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 308 (123,624)

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selling information, experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049R
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 06 Jun 2017
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 185 (204,263)
Citation 2

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Information design, Price of information, Statistical experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Hypothesis testing

The Design and Price of Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11412
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 25 Jul 2016
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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Citation 24
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experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation., selling information

2.

Dynamic Evaluation Design

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 12 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2020
Alex Smolin
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 262 (147,105)
Citation 11

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evaluation, information design, career concerns, bandit experimentation, downward wage rigidity, up-or-out, internal labor markets

3.
Downloads 230 (167,041)
Citation 5

Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 04 Oct 2017
Alex Smolin
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 172 (217,760)

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Attributes, Information Design, Mechanism Design, Private Disclosure, Call Options, Multidimensional Screening, Demand Transformation

Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 22 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 28 Oct 2020
Alex Smolin
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 58 (454,054)
Citation 7

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advertising, attributes, call options, demand transformation, information design, intermediaries, linear disclosure, mechanism design, multidimensional screening, persuasion

4.

Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 25 May 2018
Gleb Romanyuk and Alex Smolin
Harvard University and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 227 (169,167)
Citation 10

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cream skimming, matching markets, market failure, information design, calculus of variations

5.

Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1952
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 190 (199,487)
Citation 3

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Experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Product differentiation, Selling information

6.

Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 22 Aug 2017
Chiara Margaria and Alex Smolin
Boston University and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 67 (416,204)
Citation 4

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Bayesian Games, Repeated Games, Communication, Folk Theorem

7.

Optimal Technology Design

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 10 Dec 2020
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics
Downloads 16 (669,604)
Citation 3

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moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory

8.

The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16394
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Sep 2021
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Maharashtra Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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mechanism design, revenue maximization, strong duality, upgrade pricing

9.

Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16543
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Laura Doval and Alex Smolin
Columbia University and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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Bayesian persuasion, information design, interim payoffs, reputation