Gilles Chemla

Imperial College Business School

South Kensington Campus

London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ

United Kingdom

CNRS

CNRS

Dauphine Recherches en Management

Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny

Paris, 75016

France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • Imperial College Business School

    • Email
    • Tel: +44 207 594 9161
    • Fax: +44 207 594 9210

  • CNRS

    • Email
    • Tel: 331 44054970
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

25

DOWNLOADS
Rank 6,993

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 6,993

in Total Papers Downloads

9,694

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 4,064

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 4,064

in Total Papers Citations

141

CROSSREF CITATIONS

188

Scholarly Papers (25)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements

Downloads 2,956 ( 6,558)
Citation 30

An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements

NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 02-01; RICAFE Working Paper No. 006
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 10 Feb 2002
Gilles Chemla, Alexander Ljungqvist, Alexander Ljungqvist and Michel A. Habib
Imperial College Business School, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)Swedish House of Finance and University of Zurich
Downloads 2,422 (8,782)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Loading...

Shareholder Agreements, Put Options, Call Options, Pre-emption Rights, Catch-up Clauses, Drag-along Rights, Demand Rights, Tag-along Rights

An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements

NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-01-04
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 05 Nov 2008
Gilles Chemla, Michel A. Habib, Alexander Ljungqvist and Alexander Ljungqvist
Imperial College Business School, University of Zurich and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)Swedish House of Finance
Downloads 343 (132,535)

Abstract:

Loading...

Shareholder Agreements, Put Options, Call Options, Pre-emption Rights, Catch-up Clauses, Drag-along Rights, Demand Rights, Tag-along Rights

An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-01-066
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Gilles Chemla, Michel Gille, Alexander Ljungqvist and Alexander Ljungqvist
Imperial College Business School, affiliation not provided to SSRN and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)Swedish House of Finance
Downloads 159 (279,073)

Abstract:

Loading...

Shareholder Agreements, Put Options, Call Options, Pre-emption Rights, Catch-up Clauses, Drag-along Rights, Demand Rights, Tag-along Rights

An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3457
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 30 Aug 2002
Gilles Chemla, Alexander Ljungqvist, Alexander Ljungqvist and Michel A. Habib
Imperial College Business School, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)Swedish House of Finance and University of Zurich
Downloads 32 (693,331)
Citation 4
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Shareholder agreements, put options, call options, pre-emption rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, tag-along rights, catch-up clauses

2.

The Determinants of Investment in Private Equity and Venture Capital: Evidence from American and Canadian Pension Funds

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Jun 2004
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School
Downloads 2,074 (11,576)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Loading...

Pension fund, private equity, venture capital, assets, type, location, United States, Canada

3.

Learning Through Crowdfunding

Downloads 912 (39,447)
Citation 42

Learning Through Crowdfunding

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 16 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 14 Dec 2018
Gilles Chemla and Katrin Tinn
Imperial College Business School and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 912 (38,864)
Citation 54

Abstract:

Loading...

Reward-based crowdfunding, moral hazard, real options, learning, uncertainty, Kickstarter

Learning Through Crowdfunding

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11363
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 07 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 11 Dec 2017
Gilles Chemla and Katrin Tinn
Imperial College Business School and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Kickstarter, learning, moral hazard, real options, Reward-based crowdfunding, uncertainty

4.

Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers

Downloads 724 (53,845)
Citation 16

Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers

Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 05 Dec 2003
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and Gilles Chemla
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management and Imperial College Business School
Downloads 697 (55,890)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Loading...

corporate venture capital, venture capital, failure, competition, entrepreneur, manager

Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 03 Jan 2004
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and Gilles Chemla
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management and Imperial College Business School
Downloads 27 (731,855)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

5.

Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets

Downloads 442 (100,165)
Citation 4

Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2011
René Aïd, Gilles Chemla, Arnaud Porchet and Nizar Touzi
Université Paris-Dauphine, Imperial College Business School, Citibank, N.A. and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
Downloads 439 (100,051)

Abstract:

Loading...

hedging, forward, wholesale spot price, retail, vertical integration

Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8313
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 18 Apr 2011
René Aïd, Gilles Chemla, Arnaud Porchet and Nizar Touzi
Université Paris-Dauphine, Imperial College Business School, Citibank, N.A. and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
Downloads 3 (971,279)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

electricity markets, forward, hedging, producers, retailers, spot, vertical integration

6.

Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt

(Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics WP 196)
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 11 May 1997
Gilles Chemla and Antoine Faure-Grimaud
Imperial College Business School and London School of Economics
Downloads 442 (99,898)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

7.

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 18 Aug 2011 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2013
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 380 (118,935)
Citation 26

Abstract:

Loading...

securitization, skin in the game, risk-sharing, moral hazard

8.

Hold-Up, Stakeholders, and Takeover Threats

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 Jul 2004
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School
Downloads 271 (170,699)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

hold-up, stakeholders, entrepreneur, acquirer, takeovers, investment

9.

How Wise Are Crowds on Crowdfunding Platforms?

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 09 Jan 2020
Gilles Chemla and Katrin Tinn
Imperial College Business School and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 240 (192,494)

Abstract:

Loading...

crowdfunding, backers, reward-based, securities-based, ICOs, informational cascades, wisdom of crowds

10.

Signaling, Instrumentation, and CFO Decision-Making

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Mar 2020 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2021
Christopher Hennessy and Gilles Chemla
London Business School and Imperial College Business School
Downloads 213 (216,596)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

signal, selection, IV, fuzzy RDD, experiments, corporate finance, CFO, government policy

11.

Does Familiarity Breed Alternative Investment? Evidence from Corporate Defined Benefit Pension Plans

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 20 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 16 Apr 2020
Christina Atanasova and Gilles Chemla
Simon Fraser University (SFU) and Imperial College Business School
Downloads 208 (220,525)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

pension plans, sponsor, R&D, L&B, alternative assets, private equity, real estate, tilt, information, spillover, familiarity

12.

Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 10 Jun 2021 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2022
Gilles Chemla, Alejandro Rivera and Liyan Shi
Imperial College Business School, University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics and Carnegie Mellon University
Downloads 197 (232,627)

Abstract:

Loading...

Executive compensation, externalities, dynamic optimal contracts, short-termism, turnover.

13.

Government as Borrower of First Resort

Downloads 195 (233,711)
Citation 2

Government as Borrower of First Resort

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 06 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 16 Oct 2016
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 195 (233,385)

Abstract:

Loading...

safe assets, high-yield debt, speculator, uninformed investors, information, overheated debt markets

Government as Borrower of First Resort

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11362
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 07 Jul 2016
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

asymmetric information, corporate debt markets, governmet debt, issuers, speculators, uninformed investors

14.

Takeovers and the Dynamics of Information Flows

Downloads 164 (271,691)

Takeovers and the Dynamics of Information Flows

University of British Columbia Working Paper
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Sep 2003
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School
Downloads 143 (304,526)

Abstract:

Loading...

Takeovers, value, information, disclosure, buyer, price, trade credit

Takeovers and the Dynamics of Information Flows

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 29 Oct 2003
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School
Downloads 21 (783,640)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Takeovers, information, disclosure, buyer, price, value

15.

Rational Expectations and the Paradox of Policy-Relevant Natural Experiments

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 13 Nov 2015 Last Revised: 15 Apr 2020
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 118 (351,145)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

natural experiments, random assignment, econometrician, policy, endogeneity after-the-fact

16.

Subject Rational Expectations Will Contaminate Randomized Controlled Medical Trials

Downloads 69 (491,061)
Citation 1

Subject Rational Expectations Will Contaminate Randomized Controlled Medical Trials

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 25 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 19 May 2018
Gilles Chemla and Christopher Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 69 (497,402)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

double-blind randomized controlled trials, bayesian updating, treatment and control groups, drug, placebo

Subject Rational Expectations Will Contaminate Randomized Controlled Medical Trials

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11360
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 07 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 11 Dec 2017
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bias, Rational Expectations, RCTs

17.

Equilibrium Counterfactuals

Downloads 46 (598,003)

Equilibrium Counterfactuals

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 23 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2019
Gilles Chemla and Christopher Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 46 (610,655)

Abstract:

Loading...

counterfactuals, structural models, moments, policy, bias, algorithm

Equilibrium Counterfactuals

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14146
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Dec 2019
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

18.

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

Downloads 35 (655,306)
Citation 3

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 29 Jan 2001
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School
Downloads 35 (672,367)
Citation 3
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bargaining, Competition, Contracts, Foreclosure, Vertical Integration

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

Posted: 17 Sep 2003
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School

Abstract:

Loading...

19.

Security Design: Signaling Versus Speculative Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8336
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 18 Apr 2011
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 5 (909,045)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

issuer, pooling, security design, separating, speculator, type

20.

Privately Versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8403
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 26 May 2011
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 2 (944,715)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, originate to distribute, screening incentives, securitization, skin in the game, speculator, uninformed investors

21.

Signaling, Random Assignment, and Causal Effect Estimation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15175
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 12 Sep 2020
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 1 (957,981)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Causal effect, CEO, Corporate Finance, Government Policy, household finance, investment, random assignment, selection, signal

22.

The Paradox of Policy-Relevant Natural Experiments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11361
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 07 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 11 Dec 2017
Gilles Chemla and Chris Hennessy
Imperial College Business School and London Business School
Downloads 0 (971,484)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

firms, government, investment, natural policy experiments, pollution, randomized controlled trials

Abstract:

Loading...

24.

Hold-Up, Industrial Relations and Takeover Threats

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2021
Posted: 21 Apr 1999
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School

Abstract:

Loading...

25.

Implicit Contracts, Optimal Union Power and Takeovers

Posted: 25 Jul 1998
Gilles Chemla
Imperial College Business School

Abstract:

Loading...