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Anat R. Admati

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Joseph McDonald Professor of Finance and Economics

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

  • Stanford Graduate School of Business

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    • Tel: 650-723-4987
    • Fax: 650-725-6152
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

18

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202

Scholarly Papers (18)

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1.

Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 114, MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2012/5
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 30 Mar 2012
Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,316 (7,936)
Citation 6

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, “too big to fail,” systemic risk, bank equity, debt overhang, underinvestment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs, Basel

2.

Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 31 Jul 1998
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,228 (12,231)
Citation 78

Abstract:

3.

The Leverage Ratchet Effect

Forthcoming, Journal of Finance, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2013/13, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 146
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 02 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 18 Sep 2017
Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,127 (14,494)

Abstract:

capital structure, leverage, agency costs of debt, dynamic capital structure, tradeoff theory of capital structure, capital regulation, bank equity, debt overhang, under-investment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs

4.

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013/23, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 161, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-7
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 04 Nov 2013 Last Revised: 12 Jan 2016
Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 689 (602)
Citation 48

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, 'too big to fail,' systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel, market discipline

5.

The Parade of the Bankers’ New Clothes Continues: 31 Flawed Claims Debunked

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 143, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-58
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 11 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 12 Jan 2016
Anat R. Admati and Martin F. Hellwig
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Downloads 624 (17,759)
Citation 1

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, capital regulation, too big to fail, systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital

6.

The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Downloads 600 ( 36,026)
Citation 53

The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1918(R2), Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 22
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 21 Sep 2007 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 600 (35,497)
Citation 53

Abstract:

shareholder activism, exit, agency, Corporate Governance, monitoring, manager-shareholders conflict, mutual funds

The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 7, pp. 2445-2485, 2009
Posted: 22 Jun 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

D53, D82, G10, G30, G34

7.

Increased-Liability Equity: A Proposal to Improve Capital Regulation of Large Financial Institutions

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2043, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 68
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 07 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 11 Mar 2010
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 523 (38,824)
Citation 5

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, banking regulation, “too big to fail,” systemic risk

8.

The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking

Downloads 351 ( 70,105)

The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking

Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 26 Oct 2013 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2014
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 237 (107,494)

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, bank equity, owner and shareholder equity

The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking

Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 3030
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 05 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 03 Dec 2014
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 114 (205,630)

Abstract:

9.

Liability Holding Companies

UCLA Law Review, Vol. 59, 2012, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 103 , Stanford Law and Economics Olin Research Paper No. 416
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 30 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 01 May 2012
Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 301 (73,767)
Citation 1

Abstract:

liability holding companies,financial holding companies, financial institution corporate structure, corporate finance, corporate governance

10.

Noisytalk.com: Broadcasting Opinions in a Noisy Environment

Stanford GSB Working Paper
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Jan 2001
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 266 (93,477)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Asymmetric Information, Internet, Efficiency of Communication, Overconfidence

11.

Does Debt Discipline Bankers? An Academic Myth About Bank Indebtedness

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 132
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 13 Feb 2013 Last Revised: 20 Feb 2013
Anat R. Admati and Martin F. Hellwig
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Downloads 248 (71,781)

Abstract:

bank debt, bank equity, banking theory, fragility of bank funding, debt overhang

12.

The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital Regulation

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 216, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 16-6
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 13 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 29 Jan 2016
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 243 (105,189)

Abstract:

Banking regulation, capital regulations, banking, equity in banking, capital structure, leverage, agency costs, leverage ratchet effect Basel, risk weights, TLAC

13.

Rethinking Financial Regulation: How Confusion Has Prevented Progress

Forthcoming in Rethinking Macroeconomics III: Progress or Confusion? Olivier J. Blanchard, Raghuram Rajan, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Lawrence H. Summers, editors, MIT Press., Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 207, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-41
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 29 Jun 2015 Last Revised: 30 Oct 2015
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 149 (56,603)

Abstract:

regulation of financial institutions, financial crises, capital structure and payouts, Basel, risk weights, shadow banking, leverage,

14.

Statement for Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection -- Hearing on 'Examining the GAO Report on Expectations of Government Support for Bank Holding Companies' Held July 31, 2014

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 190, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 14-33
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 21 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 12 Sep 2014
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 52 (284,743)

Abstract:

banking regulation, too big to fail, implicit guarantees, capital regulation, living wills, Titles 1 and 2 of Dodd Frank Act, GAO report, funding subsidies

15.

Broadcasting Opinions with an Overconfident Sender

International Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 467-498, May 2004
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 26 May 2004
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 13 (486,121)
Citation 1
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Abstract:

16.

A Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31 No. 3, 2017, pp 131-150, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 227, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-51
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 26 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2017
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 0 (77,934)

Abstract:

Political Economy of Corporation, Corporate Fraud, Political Bargains, Corporate Accountability, Corporate Settlements, Rent Seeking

17.

It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System

Forthcoming in "Just Financial Market? Finance in a Just Society," Lisa Herzog, Editor, Oxford University Press, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 219, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 16-26
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 01 Aug 2017
Anat R. Admati
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 0 (19,514)

Abstract:

financial system; systemic risks; reforms; capital regulations, capture, conflicts of interest; ignorance; willful blindness; accountability

18.

Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship
Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

Inside investors, Agency problems, Venture capitalists, Financial contracts, Information asymmetry, Contracts & agreements

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