Matthew E. Souther

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

1705 College St

Francis M. Hipp Building

Columbia, SC 29208

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS
Rank 22,616

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 22,616

in Total Papers Downloads

2,628

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 34,510

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 34,510

in Total Papers Citations

17

CROSSREF CITATIONS

6

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.

At the Table But Can’t Break Through the Glass Ceiling: Board Leadership Positions Elude Diverse Directors

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, 2nd Annual Financial Institutions, Regulation and Corporate Governance Conference
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 19 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2019
Laura Casares Field, Matthew E. Souther and Adam S. Yore
University of Delaware - Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics, University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business and University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance
Downloads 1,108 (23,120)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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boards of directors, diversity, gender, women, minorities, chairman of the board, board committees, director compensation, pay gap, leadership gap, under-representation, committee chair

2.

The Effects of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 10 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2016
Matthew E. Souther
University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 398 (88,993)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Takeover defenses, executive compensation, discounts, closed-end funds

3.

Shining a Light in a Dark Corner: EDGAR Search Activity Reveals the Strategically Leaked Plans of Activist Investors

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 01 Jun 2020 Last Revised: 26 Mar 2021
Ryan Flugum, Choonsik Lee and Matthew E. Souther
University of Northern Iowa, University of Rhode Island and University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 320 (113,857)

Abstract:

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Activist campaigns, Investor coordination, Investor search activity, Proxy fights

4.

Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods

Management Science, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 18 May 2017 Last Revised: 31 Mar 2020
Choonsik Lee and Matthew E. Souther
University of Rhode Island and University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 254 (144,858)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Electronic proxy rules, Retail shareholder, Proxy vote

5.

External Monitoring and Returns to Hedge Fund Activist Campaigns

Review of Financial Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 17 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 24 Jun 2019
Ryan Flugum and Matthew E. Souther
University of Northern Iowa and University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 172 (208,017)

Abstract:

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Hedge Fund Activism, Analyst Coverage, Institutional Ownership

6.

The Effects of Internal Board Networks: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 30 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 13 Jun 2018
Matthew E. Souther
University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 161 (220,005)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Boards of director networks, Social ties, Director compensation, Board independence, Closed-end funds, Disclosure

7.

Stakeholder Value: A Convenient Excuse for Underperforming Managers?

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Nov 2020
Ryan Flugum and Matthew E. Souther
University of Northern Iowa and University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 120 (277,445)

Abstract:

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stakeholder value, governance, earnings transcripts

8.

Does Board Independence Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Forthcoming, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 25 Sep 2019
Matthew E. Souther
University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business
Downloads 95 (325,334)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Board independence, Boards of directors, Closed-end funds