655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Stanford Graduate School of Business
in Total Papers Downloads
in Total Papers Citations
capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, “too big to fail,” systemic risk, bank equity, debt overhang, underinvestment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs, Basel
capital structure, leverage, agency costs of debt, dynamic capital structure, tradeoff theory of capital structure, capital regulation, bank equity, debt overhang, under-investment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs
capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, 'too big to fail,' systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel, market discipline
shareholder activism, exit, agency, Corporate Governance, monitoring, manager-shareholders conflict, mutual funds
D53, D82, G10, G30, G34
Financial Crisis, Crisis, Risk Model, Transparency, Financial Regulation, Incentives
capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, banking regulation, “too big to fail,” systemic risk
liability holding companies,financial holding companies, financial institution corporate structure, corporate finance, corporate governance
Asymmetric Information, Internet, Efficiency of Communication, Overconfidence
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: iere.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
Inside investors, Agency problems, Venture capitalists, Financial contracts, Information asymmetry, Contracts & agreements
Equity-bond return correlation, equity and fixed income factors, flight-to-quality, flight-to-liquidity, contagion, regimes in equity-bond return correlation, cumulative co-movement in equity and bond returns, fed management of bond yields
Cookies are used by this site. To decline or learn more, visit our Cookies page.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.467 seconds