Paul C. Pfleiderer

Stanford Graduate School of Business

William F. Sharpe Professor of Financial Economics

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,775

in Total Papers Citations

202

Scholarly Papers (13)

1.

Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 114, MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2012/5
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 30 Mar 2012
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,316 (7,976)
Citation 6

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, “too big to fail,” systemic risk, bank equity, debt overhang, underinvestment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs, Basel

2.

Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 31 Jul 1998
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,228 (12,331)
Citation 78

Abstract:

3.

The Leverage Ratchet Effect

Forthcoming, Journal of Finance, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2013/13, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 146
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 02 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 18 Sep 2017
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 1,144 (14,330)

Abstract:

capital structure, leverage, agency costs of debt, dynamic capital structure, tradeoff theory of capital structure, capital regulation, bank equity, debt overhang, under-investment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs

4.

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013/23, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 161, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-7
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 04 Nov 2013 Last Revised: 12 Jan 2016
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 689 (605)
Citation 48

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, 'too big to fail,' systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel, market discipline

The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1918(R2), Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 22
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 21 Sep 2007 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 601 (35,682)
Citation 53

Abstract:

shareholder activism, exit, agency, Corporate Governance, monitoring, manager-shareholders conflict, mutual funds

The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 7, pp. 2445-2485, 2009
Posted: 22 Jun 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

D53, D82, G10, G30, G34

6.

The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis: Risk Model Transparency and Incentives

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 72
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 14 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 31 Jan 2010
Terry Marsh and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Quantal International Inc. and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 532 (39,969)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Financial Crisis, Crisis, Risk Model, Transparency, Financial Regulation, Incentives

7.

Increased-Liability Equity: A Proposal to Improve Capital Regulation of Large Financial Institutions

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2043, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 68
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 07 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 11 Mar 2010
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 523 (39,156)
Citation 5

Abstract:

capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, banking regulation, “too big to fail,” systemic risk

8.

On the Relevancy of Modigliani and Miller to Banking: A Parable and Some Observations

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 93
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 17 Dec 2010
Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 484 (36,675)

Abstract:

9.

Liability Holding Companies

UCLA Law Review, Vol. 59, 2012, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 103 , Stanford Law and Economics Olin Research Paper No. 416
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 30 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 01 May 2012
Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 301 (74,040)
Citation 1

Abstract:

liability holding companies,financial holding companies, financial institution corporate structure, corporate finance, corporate governance

10.

Noisytalk.com: Broadcasting Opinions in a Noisy Environment

Stanford GSB Working Paper
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Jan 2001
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 266 (93,776)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Asymmetric Information, Internet, Efficiency of Communication, Overconfidence

11.

Broadcasting Opinions with an Overconfident Sender

International Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 467-498, May 2004
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 26 May 2004
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 13 (488,478)
Citation 1
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Abstract:

12.

Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship
Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Anat R. Admati and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

Inside investors, Agency problems, Venture capitalists, Financial contracts, Information asymmetry, Contracts & agreements

13.

The Relation between Fixed Income and Equity Return Factors

Journal of Investment Management, Vol. 4, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 2006
Posted: 29 Nov 2006 Last Revised: 17 Jan 2010
Terry Marsh and Paul C. Pfleiderer
Quantal International Inc. and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

Equity-bond return correlation, equity and fixed income factors, flight-to-quality, flight-to-liquidity, contagion, regimes in equity-bond return correlation, cumulative co-movement in equity and bond returns, fed management of bond yields