Thomas Wiseman

University of Texas at Austin

Texas

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

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166

TOTAL CITATIONS
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2

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.
Downloads 165 (360,043)
Citation 2

Strategic Ignorance and Information Design

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 01 Jan 2022 Last Revised: 28 Mar 2023
Ina Taneva and Thomas Wiseman
University of Edinburgh and University of Texas at Austin
Downloads 164 (361,695)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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incomplete information games, information design, robustness, strategic ignorance, Bayes correlated equilibrium

Strategic Ignorance and Information Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16892
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 04 Feb 2022
Ina Taneva and Thomas Wiseman
University of Edinburgh and University of Texas at Austin
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, incomplete information games, information design, robustness, strategic ignorance

2.

Robust Relational Contracts with Subjective Performance Evaluation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17312
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 May 2022
University of Texas at Austin, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin
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Private monitoring, Relational Contracts, repeated games