Steven Lalley

Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

Professor

Eckhart Hall Room 108

5734 S. University Avenue

Chicago, IL 60637

United States

http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

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12,131

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 30,293

in Total Papers Citations

14

CROSSREF CITATIONS

15

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.

Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 13 Feb 2012 Last Revised: 26 Dec 2017
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 11,412 (491)
Citation 27

Abstract:

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

2.

An Online Appendix to 'Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy'

Number of pages: 2 Posted: 08 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 26 Dec 2017
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 541 (64,705)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

3.

Nash Equilibria for Quadratic Voting

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 30 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 18 Jul 2019
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 178 (211,583)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading, Bayes-Nash equilibrium