975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States
http://https://wsb.wisc.edu/directory/faculty/dmitry-orlov
University of Wisconsin School of Business
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strategic communication, bayesian persuasion, dynamic games, real options
Stress Tests, Capital Requirements, Systemic Risk, Macro-Prudential Regulation, Mechanism Design, Dynamic mechanisms, Bayesian Persuasion.
personnel economics, dynamic signaling, career concerns, real options
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career concerns, Compensation, Dynamic adverse selection, Dynamic signaling, real options
repeated moral hazard, dynamic contracts, monitoring, communication, performance evaluations, interventions
Bayesian persuasion, stochastic games, real options.
