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New York, NY 10027
United States
Columbia University
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cheap talk, belief-based approach, securability, quasiconcave envelope, persuasion, information transmission, information design
networks, strategic uncertainty, conjectural equilibrium, forward induction
persuasion, weak institutions, cheap talk, belief-based approach, information design
delegation, limited commitment, repeated game, capital budgeting
information disclosure, rational inattention, costly information processing, paternalistic information design
job security, dynamic agency, career concerns, low-powered incentives
mechanism design, information design, contracting with externalities, unique implementation, pay discrimination, pay secrecy
optimal testing, group testing, pooled testing, batched testing, quarantine, pandemic, assortative batching
undiscounted repeated games, strategic communication
project selection, internal competition, team production, mechanism design without transfers, strategic experimentation
