Miyu Lee

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics

Spandauer Str. 1

Berlin, D-10099

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

207

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (3)

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1523
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics and KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)
Downloads 92 (278,665)

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Merger, deterrence, European Commission, merger policy, competition policy, antitrust

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 01 Dec 2015
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics and KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)
Downloads 19 (539,455)

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Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 1884-1903, 2016
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics and KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)
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Citation 1
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2.

Competitors in Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard or Also Listened To?

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2019
Thomas Giebe and Miyu Lee
Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics and Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics
Downloads 95 (270,879)

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merger control, antitrust, European Commission, signaling, efficiency, competitors, rivals, game theory

3.

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10959
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 01 Dec 2015
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics and KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)
Downloads 1 (643,830)
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competition policy, deterrence, European Commission, merger policy