Marina Halac

Columbia University

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS

206

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 15,611

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 15,611

in Total Papers Citations

86

CROSSREF CITATIONS

11

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.
Downloads 69 (644,749)
Citation 5

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-34
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 03 Apr 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 47 (787,184)

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Policy Rules, Private Information, Delegation, Mechanism Design

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

NBER Working Paper No. w24496
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 12 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 21 (1,020,472)
Citation 1

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Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12872
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 23 Apr 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 1 (1,271,615)
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delegation, mechanism design, Policy Rules, private information

2.
Downloads 54 (724,739)
Citation 7

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Self-Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w23919
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 11 May 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 53 (746,787)
Citation 4

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Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Self-Enforcement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12571
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 1 (1,271,615)
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deficit bias, Fiscal policy, private information, Self-Enforcing Rules

3.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 19 Jan 2019
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 33 (874,771)

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Private Information, Fiscal Policy, Deficit Bias, Enforcement Constraints

4.
Downloads 24 (958,112)
Citation 16

Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification

NBER Working Paper No. w22936
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 04 Mar 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 23 (998,446)
Citation 15

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Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12572
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 1 (1,271,615)
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costly verification, escape clause, optimal delegation

5.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy

NBER Working Paper No. w21492
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 25 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 24 Mar 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 22 (978,553)
Citation 7

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6.

Experimenting with Career Concerns

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12569
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer and Ilan Kremer
Columbia University and University of WarwickHebrew University of Jerusalem
Downloads 2 (1,206,537)
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bad loans, banks, career concerns, Dynamic games, private learning, strategic experimentation

7.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14218
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 14 Jan 2020
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 1 (1,219,334)
Citation 10
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deficit bias, Enforcement Constraints, Fiscal policy, private information

8.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12570
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 1 (1,231,665)
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Asymmetric and Private Information, institutions, Macroeconomic Policy, political economy, Structure of Government