Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - Department of Finance
Capital Structure, Contracting, Multi-Tasking
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Capital Structure, Contracting, Multi-tasking
Dynamic Contract, Moral Hazard, Risk-Taking, Risk Management
Capital Budgeting, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Managerial Compensations, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Internal Capital Market
Credit Default Swaps, Debt Overhang, Investment, Empty Creditor, Credit Risk
Security Bid, Auction, Information Acquisition, Investment, Security Design, Oil and Gas Lease Auctions
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