Stefan Thomas

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law

Professor

Geschwister Scholl Platz

Tuebingen, 72074

Germany

http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/thomas

  • University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law

    • Email
    • Tel: 0049-7071-29-72556
    • Fax: 0049-7071-29-2105
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS

685

SSRN CITATIONS

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Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Control of Buyer Power

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 13 May 2015 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2018
Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 216 (143,575)

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buyer power, monopsony, abuse of dominance, merger control, waterbed effect, spiral effect, allocative efficiency, dynamic efficiency, consumer welfare

2.

Harmful Signals - Cartel Prohibition and Oligopoly Theory in the Age of Machine Learning

Journal of Competition Law & Economics (Forthcoming)
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 12 Sep 2019
Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 102 (265,959)

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algorithms, cartel, collusion, machine learning, oligopoly, signaling

3.

Close Competitors in Merger Review

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, p. 391 - 401
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 22 Jun 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jun 2015
Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 100 (269,535)

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antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects, market definition, market dominance, relevant market, upward pricing pressure

4.

Guilty of a Fault that One Has Not Committed: The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried Out by the Commission and the European Courts In EU-Antitrust Law

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, 11-28
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 03 Jul 2015
Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 86 (296,936)

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antitrust, economic entity, fine, parent company

5.

The Draft Provisions on Antitrust Fines in the Commission's Ecn Proposal

Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht (ZWeR - Journal of Competition Law) 2018
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 23 Feb 2018
Stefan Thomas and Manuel Dueñas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law and University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 58 (368,895)

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antitrust sanctions, national competition authorities, leniency application, European competition network, antitrust compliance, economic entity doctrine

6.

Common Ownership and Mergers between Portfolio Companies

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 26 Jul 2019
Roman Inderst and Stefan Thomas
Goethe University Frankfurt and University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 52 (391,540)

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common ownership, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, horizontal effects, innovation competition, merger control, unilateral effects

7.

Price Pressure Indices, Innovation and Mergers Between Commonly Owned Firms

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 26 Jul 2019
Roman Inderst and Stefan Thomas
Goethe University Frankfurt and University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 40 (431,642)

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8.

De-Merger Regimes in Europe - Are National Deconcentration Powers an Appropriate Tool for Enhancing Competition in the EU?

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, 201-216
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 30 Jul 2015
Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law
Downloads 31 (470,465)

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antitrust, dominance, deconcentration, de-merger, breaking up firms

9.

Evasive Courts: A Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Conflict Avoidance

Posted: 25 Oct 2018
Jochen von Bernstorff, Olaf Kramer, Johannes Saurer and Stefan Thomas
University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law, University of Tuebingen, University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law and University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law

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Judicial Reasoning, Law and Rhetorical Sciences, Courts and Societal Conflicts, Comparative Research, Constitutional Law, EU Law, International Law, Judicial Conflict Avoidance, Judicial Evasion