Luca Panaccione

University of Rome I - Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks

Rome

Italy

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

126

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games

CEIS Working Paper No. 529
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 14 Dec 2021 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2021
University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Luiss Guido Carli University, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Rome I - Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks and Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 42 (556,865)

Abstract:

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Coordination Games, Experimental Studies, Bank Runs.

2.

Inefficiency of Competitive Equilibrium with Hidden Action and Financial Markets

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/96
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 06 Dec 2006
Luca Panaccione
University of Rome I - Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks
Downloads 40 (567,049)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Hidden action, enforcement, constrained efficiency

3.

Suboptimality of Probability Matching − a Formal Proof, a Graphical Analysis and an Impulse Balance Interpretation

CEIS Working Paper No. 490
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 08 Jun 2020
Vittorio Larocca and Luca Panaccione
Luiss Guido Carli University and University of Rome I - Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks
Downloads 27 (642,832)

Abstract:

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probability matching, individual decision making, impulse balance equilibrium

4.

Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria With Hidden Action: The Role of Separable Preference

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/19
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 31 Mar 2007
Luca Panaccione
University of Rome I - Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks
Downloads 17 (717,613)

Abstract:

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hidden action, separable preferences, constrained efficiency