Vahab Mirrokni

Google Inc.

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway

Second Floor

Mountain View, CA 94043

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

17

DOWNLOADS
Rank 9,880

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Top 9,880

in Total Papers Downloads

4,874

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 21,468

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 21,468

in Total Papers Citations

17

CROSSREF CITATIONS

20

Scholarly Papers (17)

1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 17 Dec 2019
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 732 (35,058)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Bank Account Mechanisms, Non-Clairvoyance, Dynamic Auctions, Approximations, Internet Advertising

2.

Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 17 Mar 2019
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc., Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 591 (46,714)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Boosted Second-price Auctions, Online Advertising, Heterogeneity, Brand, Retargeting

3.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 28 Nov 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 522 (54,717)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

4.

Optimizing Display Advertising Markets: Challenges and Directions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 27 Jun 2015 Last Revised: 29 Oct 2015
Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni and Hamid Nazerzadeh
Google Inc., Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 475 (61,559)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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5.

Fair Resource Allocation in a Volatile Marketplace

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 06 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2018
Google Inc., University of Cincinnati - Lindner College of Business, INSEAD and Google Inc.
Downloads 423 (70,869)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Dynamic Resource Allocation, Fairness, Matching Problems, Network Revenue Management, Online Advertising

6.

Product Ranking on Online Platforms

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 06 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 05 Jun 2019
University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Yale School of Management and Google Inc.
Downloads 412 (73,237)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Two-Stage Consumer Search, Product Ranking, Search Costs, Online Platforms

7.

Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions

Number of pages: 90 Posted: 22 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 19 Feb 2020
Negin Golrezaei, Adel Javanmard and Vahab Mirrokni
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of Southern California and Google Inc.
Downloads 396 (76,665)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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pricing, robust learning, strategic buyers repeated second-price auctions, online advertising

8.

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

Number of pages: 87 Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 13 Jul 2018
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 285 (110,775)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Repeated Auctions, Internet Advertising, Budget Constraints

9.

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 19 Nov 2015 Last Revised: 15 Nov 2018
Anthony Kim, Vahab Mirrokni and Hamid Nazerzadeh
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 277 (114,234)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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10.

Overcommitment in Cloud Services - Bin Packing with Chance Constraints

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 13 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 17 Mar 2018
McGill University, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 250 (127,115)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Bin packing, Approximation algorithms, Cloud computing, Overcommitment

11.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2019
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 148 (205,219)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

12.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren and Song Zuo
Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 144 (209,926)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

13.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 89 (296,369)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

14.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 40 (440,142)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers

15.

A Black-Box Reduction in Mechanism Design with Private Cost of Capital

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 32 (474,950)

Abstract:

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16.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 12 Jul 2019
Yuan Deng, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Duke University, Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 31 (479,795)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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dynamic mechanism design, general constraints, public correlation, repeated auctions, budget, non-clairvoyance, bank account mechanisms

17.

Robust Pricing in Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 19 Jun 2019
Yuan Deng, Sebastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni
Duke University, Google Research and Google Inc.
Downloads 27 (500,296)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Pricing; Non-clairvoyance; Dynamic Mechanism Design