Vahab Mirrokni

Google Inc.

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway

Second Floor

Mountain View, CA 94043

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

21

DOWNLOADS
Rank 7,800

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,800

in Total Papers Downloads

8,253

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 17,117

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 17,117

in Total Papers Citations

43

CROSSREF CITATIONS

20

Scholarly Papers (21)

1.

Product Ranking on Online Platforms

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 06 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 17 Feb 2021
University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Yale School of Management and Google Inc.
Downloads 1,228 (23,622)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Two-Stage Consumer Search, Product Ranking, Search Costs, Online Platforms

2.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 5
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2020
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 989 (32,251)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic mechanism design, revenue optimization, non-clairvoyance.

3.

Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 17 Mar 2019
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc., Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 898 (36,936)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Boosted Second-price Auctions, Online Advertising, Heterogeneity, Brand, Retargeting

4.

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

Number of pages: 110 Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2020
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 689 (52,844)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Repeated Auctions, Internet Advertising, Budget Constraints

5.

Fair Resource Allocation in a Volatile Marketplace

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 06 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2018
Google Inc., Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management, INSEAD and Google Inc.
Downloads 602 (62,848)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Resource Allocation, Fairness, Matching Problems, Network Revenue Management, Online Advertising

6.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 28 Nov 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 585 (65,170)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Loading...

dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

7.

Optimizing Display Advertising Markets: Challenges and Directions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 27 Jun 2015 Last Revised: 29 Oct 2015
Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni and Hamid Nazerzadeh
Google Inc., Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 573 (66,901)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Loading...

8.

Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions

Number of pages: 90 Posted: 22 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 19 Feb 2020
Negin Golrezaei, Adel Javanmard and Vahab Mirrokni
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of Southern California and Google Inc.
Downloads 546 (71,101)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

pricing, robust learning, strategic buyers repeated second-price auctions, online advertising

9.

The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 392 (105,395)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Autobidding, Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization

10.

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 19 Nov 2015 Last Revised: 15 Nov 2018
Anthony Kim, Vahab Mirrokni and Hamid Nazerzadeh
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 351 (119,364)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

Overcommitment in Cloud Services - Bin Packing with Chance Constraints

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 13 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 17 Mar 2018
Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 268 (158,314)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Bin packing, Approximation algorithms, Cloud computing, Overcommitment

12.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 May 2021
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 236 (179,288)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

13.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren and Song Zuo
Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Inc.
Downloads 174 (236,303)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

14.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 136 (288,763)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

15.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 131 (297,007)

Abstract:

Loading...

dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

16.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 01 Jun 2021
Yuan Deng, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Duke University, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 116 (324,494)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

dynamic mechanism design, general constraints, public correlation, repeated auctions, budget, non-clairvoyance, bank account mechanisms

17.

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Apr 2022
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 104 (349,714)

Abstract:

Loading...

internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, budget constraints, return-on-spend constraints

18.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 68 (449,522)

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers

19.

A Black-Box Reduction in Mechanism Design with Private Cost of Capital

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 59 (482,419)

Abstract:

Loading...

20.

Causal Inference with Bipartite Designs

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 27 Feb 2021
affiliation not provided to SSRN, Temple University - Department of Statisitcs, affiliation not provided to SSRN, Harvard University - Department of Statistics, Google Inc. and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 57 (490,206)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

bipartite graph, causal inference, market experiments

21.

Robust Pricing in Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 19 Jun 2019
Yuan Deng, Sebastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni
Duke University, Google Research and Google Inc.
Downloads 51 (514,906)

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Pricing; Non-clairvoyance; Dynamic Mechanism Design