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János Flesch

Maastricht University

P.O. Box 616

Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD

Netherlands

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

301

TOTAL CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

Doing it Now, Later, or Never

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 18 Jul 2015
Maastricht University, Maastricht University, Tilburg University and Maastricht University
Downloads 93 (730,864)

Abstract:

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centipede games; subgame prefect ϵ-equilibria, time–inconsistent preferences, upper semi-continuous functions, sophisticated players, naive players

2.

Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 21 Mar 2019
Maastricht University, Tilburg University, Maastricht University and Maastricht University - Department of Economics
Downloads 88 (759,537)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Almost Perfect Information, Subgame Perfect ϵ-Equilibrium, Individual Upper Semicontinuity

3.

Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once

Maastricht University, RM/16/036
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Dec 2016
Maastricht University, Maastricht University, Tilburg University and Maastricht University - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (1,041,696)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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minority games, subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria, upper semicontinuous functions, infi nitely many players

4.

Subgame Maxmin Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 31 Aug 2018
Maastricht University, Tilburg University, Maastricht University and Maastricht University
Downloads 52 (1,041,696)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Stochastic Games, Zero-Sum Games, Subgame φ-Maxmin Strategies

5.

Externalities in Sender-Receiver Stopping Games with Multiple Senders

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 Feb 2026
Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen
Ashoka University, Maastricht University and Maastricht University
Downloads 15 (1,500,778)

Abstract:

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Sender-Receiver games, Stopping games, Multiple senders, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Externality of an additional sender