Marco Battaglini

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

12

DOWNLOADS

41

CITATIONS
Rank 36,109

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 36,109

in Total Papers Citations

5

Scholarly Papers (12)

1.

Political Economy of Debt and Growth

NBER Working Paper No. w21660
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 26 Oct 2015
Marco Battaglini and Levon Barseghyan
Cornell University and Cornell University
Downloads 15 (538,048)
Citation 1

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The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

NBER Working Paper No. w22968
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 27 Dec 2016
Marco Battaglini and Bård Harstad
Cornell University and University of Oslo - Department of Economics
Downloads 7 (610,994)

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The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11713
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 03 Jan 2017
Marco Battaglini and Bård Harstad
Cornell University and University of Oslo - Department of Economics
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elections, environmental agreements, international agreements, political economy, sanctions, technology.

The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study

NBER Working Paper No. w22406
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 18 Jul 2016
Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas R. Palfrey
Cornell University, Bocconi University and California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Downloads 6 (617,771)
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The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11357
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 07 Jul 2016
Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas R. Palfrey
Cornell University, Bocconi University and California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
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laboratory experiment, public debt

The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13097
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 06 Aug 2018
Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas R. Palfrey
Cornell University, Bocconi University and California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
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Bargaining, Dynamic Political Economy, Laboratory experiments, public debt

Effectiveness of Connected Legislators

NBER Working Paper No. w24442
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Mar 2018
Cornell University, University of Florida and Cornell University
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Effectiveness of Connected Legislators

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12796
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Mar 2018
Cornell University, University of Florida and Cornell University
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economics of networks, Legislative effectiveness

Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13656
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 09 Apr 2019 Last Revised: 16 Apr 2019
Cornell University, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), Goethe University Frankfurt and Cornell University
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tax enforcement, tax evasion

Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs?

NBER Working Paper No. w25745
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 15 Apr 2019
Cornell University, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), Goethe University Frankfurt and Cornell University
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Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining

NBER Working Paper No. w25664
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 19 Mar 2019
Marco Battaglini
Cornell University
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Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13581
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 18 Mar 2019 Last Revised: 08 Apr 2019
Marco Battaglini
Cornell University
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head of state, Hold up, legislative bargaining

7.
Downloads 1 (632,947)

Influencing Connected Legislators

NBER Working Paper No. w22739
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Marco Battaglini and Eleonora Patacchini
Cornell University and Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
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Influencing Connected Legislators

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11571
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Marco Battaglini and Eleonora Patacchini
Cornell University and Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
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economics of networks, interest groups

8.

Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 124, No. 1, 2016
Posted: 18 Mar 2017
Marco Battaglini and Bård Harstad
Cornell University and University of Oslo - Department of Economics

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9.

Self-Control and Peer Groups: An Empirical Analysis

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11563
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 10 Oct 2016
Marco Battaglini, Carlos Diaz and Eleonora Patacchini
Cornell University, Syracuse University and Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
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peer effects, Self-Control

10.

The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11356
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 07 Jul 2016
Marco Battaglini, Ernest Lai, Wooyoung Lim and Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Cornell University, Lehigh University - Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics and National Taiwan University - Department of Economics
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information transmission, laboratory experiment, legislative committees

11.

Optimal Dynamic Contracting: The First-Order Approach and Beyond

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10956
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 01 Dec 2015
Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba
Cornell University and Pennsylvania State University - College of the Liberal Arts
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contract theory, dynamic contracts

12.

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10788
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Aug 2015
Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas R. Palfrey
Cornell University, Bocconi University and California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
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durable public goods, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism