Yinghua He

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

21 allée de Brienne

Toulouse, 31015

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

47

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 37,350

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Top 37,350

in Total Papers Citations

18

CROSSREF CITATIONS

3

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets

IZA Discussion Paper No. 11967
Number of pages: 81 Posted: 17 Dec 2018
Yinghua He and Thierry Magnac
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 31 (558,311)

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Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, costly preference formation, screening, stable matching, congestion, matching market place

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-126
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 10 Sep 2020
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
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Kidney exchange, medium of exchange, dynamic matching

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants Without Money

NBER Working Paper No. w27765
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 14 May 2021
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
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3.

Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10907
Number of pages: 81 Posted: 28 Oct 2015
Gabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet and Yinghua He
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business, Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 1 (777,921)
Citation 17
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admission criteria, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism, school choice, stable matching, student preferences

4.

Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15082
Number of pages: 84 Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 16 Aug 2020
Yinghua He and Thierry Magnac
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and Toulouse School of Economics
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congestion, Costly Preference Formation, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism, Matching Market Design, screening, Stable matching