21 allée de Brienne
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
in Total Papers Citations
Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, costly preference formation, screening, stable matching, congestion, matching market place
Kidney exchange, medium of exchange, dynamic matching
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admission criteria, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism, school choice, stable matching, student preferences
congestion, Costly Preference Formation, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism, Matching Market Design, screening, Stable matching
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