Mengxi Zhang

Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn

Postdoctoral Researcher

Bonn, 53113

Germany

http://https://sites.google.com/bu.edu/mengxizhang

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

396

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement

Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-53
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 04 Dec 2015 Last Revised: 08 Mar 2016
Mengxi Zhang and Keith N. Hylton
Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn and Boston University - School of Law
Downloads 146 (218,314)

Abstract:

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Optimal Patent Damages, Patent Infringement, Optimal Injunction Scope

2.

Auctions vs. Negotiations: Optimal Selling Mechanism with Endogenous Bidder Values

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 31 Jul 2017 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2018
Mengxi Zhang
Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 68 (364,014)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design; R&D Investment; Endogenous Bidder Values; Favoritism

3.
Downloads 60 (391,244)
Citation 2

A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 27 Mar 2020 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2020
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II, Yale, Department of Economics and Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 60 (396,835)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Auctions, Mechanism Design, Investments, Endogenous Valuations

4.

Optimal Auctions for Dual Risk Averse Bidders: Myerson meets Yaari

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 27 Mar 2020 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2020
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II, Yale, Department of Economics and Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 50 (422,153)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Auction Design, Yaari Preferences, Rank Dependent Utility, Non-Linear Probability Weighting

5.

When the Principal Knows Better than the Agent: Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Disclosure Mechanism

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2018
Mengxi Zhang
Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 41 (457,298)

Abstract:

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Subjective Evaluation; Information Disclosure; Costly Signaling; Ex-Ante Contracting; Mechanism Design

6.

Contest with Incomplete Information: When to Turn Up the Heat, and How?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 24 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 04 May 2020
Mengxi Zhang
Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 31 (502,942)

Abstract:

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contest, incomplete information, mechanism design, risk aversion