Valerie Y. Suslow

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Professor

100 International Drive

Baltimore, MD 21202

United States

  • Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

17

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9,146

TOTAL CITATIONS
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Top 8,273

in Total Papers Citations

198

Scholarly Papers (17)

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1.

What Determines Cartel Success?

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2006
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 10 Feb 2002 Last Revised: 16 Sep 2009
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 4,259 (5,124)
Citation 117

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cartel, price-fixing, collusion, antitrust, competition policy, price war

2.

Cartels and Collusion - Empirical Evidence

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1182
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 30 Nov 2012
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 1,331 (32,082)
Citation 11

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cartels, collusion, antitrust, competition

3.

International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 03 Apr 2001
Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Oxford - Said Business School, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 1,130 (40,677)
Citation 3

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4.

Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1150
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 16 Sep 2010
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 514 (115,557)
Citation 12

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international cartels, price fixing, collusion, organization

5.

The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions

American University International Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, Ross School of Business Paper No. 897
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 11 Nov 2004 Last Revised: 16 Sep 2009
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 484 (124,217)
Citation 16

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Competition policy, antitrust, collusion, market access, exporting trading company act, Webb-Pomerene act

6.

Higher Prices from Entry: Pricing of Brand-Name Drugs

U of California, Berkeley, Competition Policy Working Paper No. CPC99-03
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 26 Feb 2004
Jeffrey M. Perloff, Valerie Y. Suslow and Paul J. Seguin
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management
Downloads 374 (167,509)
Citation 24

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Bertrand, monopoly price, product marketing

7.

Price-Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of U.S. Price Fixing Conspiracies

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1290
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 17 Nov 2015
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 335 (189,005)
Citation 14

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cartel duration, cartel formation, leniency, antitrust, competition policy

8.

The Economic Impact of the U.S. Export Trading Company Act

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1036, Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 27, No. 2, 2007
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 16 Aug 2006 Last Revised: 29 May 2015
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 218 (292,728)
Citation 1

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Export cartel, antitrust, Export Trading Company Act, Webb-Pomerene Act

9.

Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 23-05, “Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market” Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow, and Helen Wang, The Antitrust Bulletin 68:1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368.
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 18 Oct 2022 Last Revised: 24 Feb 2023
Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow and Zhihan (Helen) Wang
Spotify Economics, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center, Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School and University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 212 (300,583)

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antitrust, price-fixing, cartels, vertical Integration, price index, salmon industry

10.

International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w9511
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 26 Feb 2003 Last Revised: 29 Dec 2022
Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow and Lynda J. Oswald
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center, Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School and University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 131 (455,543)

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11.

Strategic Use of Public Price Indexes as a Collusive Device

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, July 2023
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 30 Oct 2023
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 74 (667,908)

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Antitrust, price-fixing, cartels, collusion, price index, information sharing

12.

The 2023 Merger Guidelines and Coordinated Effects: Recommendations for Robust Protection of Competition

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 24-11, George Mason Law Review, 2023 Merger Guidelines, Vol. 31, 2024, pp. 999-1018
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 23 Sep 2024
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 44 (857,058)

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mergers, merger guidelines, coordinated effects, merger guidelines, coordinated effects

13.

Cartels and Vertical Restraints: Horizontal and Vertical Working in Tandem

Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2020, pp. 15-40.
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Dec 2023 Last Revised: 23 Dec 2023
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School
Downloads 40 (890,982)

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antitrust, price-fixing, cartels, collusion, vertical restraints

14.

How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints? Reflections on Bork's the Antitrust Paradox

Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 57, No. S3, The Contributions of Robert Bork to Antitrust Economics (August 2014), pp. S33-S50, Ross School of Business Paper No. 1231
Posted: 05 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 30 May 2015
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

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Robert Bork, Antitrust Paradox, collusion, cartel, vertical restraints, resale price maintenance, distribution, ancillary agreements, price fixing

15.

The Effect of Competition on Trade Patterns: Evidence from the Collapse of International Cartels

International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 39, March 2015, Pages 56–70, Ross School of Business Paper No. 1147
Posted: 23 Jun 2010 Last Revised: 05 Jun 2015
Margaret C. Levenstein, Jagadeesh Sivadasan and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

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Multimarket collusion, gravity, cross-hauling, cartels, market allocation, antitrust policy

16.

Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War International Cartels

Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 14, Issue 5, pp. 705-744, 2005
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Valerie Y. Suslow
Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

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Cartel duration, international cartels, price-fixing, collusion, antitrust

17.

Preconditions for Private Restraints on Market Access and International Cartels

Posted: 08 Jan 2001
Simon J. Evenett and Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

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