Abraham L. Wickelgren

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Professor

727 East Dean Keeton Street

Austin, TX 78705

United States

University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics

Professor

Austin, TX 78712

United States

  • University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

31

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5,173

CITATIONS
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Top 14,479

in Total Papers Citations

50

Scholarly Papers (31)

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1.

Third Party Litigation Funding with Informative Signals: Equilibrium Characterization and the Effects of Admissibility

Journal of Law and Economics, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. e521
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 21 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2019
Ronen Avraham and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Tel Aviv University - Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 594 (44,191)

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2.

Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 173, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 662, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-15
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 30 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 01 Apr 2010
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 352 (83,885)
Citation 3

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3.

The Use of Exclusive Contracts to Deter Entry

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 16 Oct 2001
John Simpson and Abraham L. Wickelgren
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 343 (86,458)
Citation 3

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Exclusive Contracts, Entry Deterrence, Antitrust

4.

A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 254
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 21 Aug 2003
Daniel P. O'Brien and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Compass Lexecon and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 339 (87,602)
Citation 18

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Critical Loss Analysis

5.

Ideological Persuasion in the Media

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 07 Jan 2005
David J. Balan, Patrick DeGraba and Abraham L. Wickelgren
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 335 (88,755)
Citation 6

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Ideology, Media Bias, Media Diversity, Persuasion

6.

Robust Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-12
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 04 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 16 Mar 2016
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 326 (91,476)

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antitrust, loyalty discounts, loyalty, discounts, market share discounts, exclusion, market division, exclusive dealing, fidelity rebates, loyalty rebates

7.

A New Angle on Rules versus Standards

Downloads 276 (109,616)
Citation 2

A New Angle on Rules versus Standards

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 241
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 25 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 19 Oct 2012
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 151 (193,708)
Citation 1

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A New Angle on Rules Versus Standards

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 212
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 07 Sep 2011
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 125 (225,617)
Citation 1

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8.

Anticompetitive Market Division through Loyalty Discounts without Buyer Commitment

Harvard Discussion Paper No. 723, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 239
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 262 (115,742)
Citation 2

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9.

The Efficiency of Affirmative Action with Purely Historical Discrimination

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Jan 2002
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 241 (126,129)
Citation 2

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Affirmative Action, Discrimination, Racial Preferences

10.

Innovation, Market Structure and the Holdup Problem: Investment Incentives and Coordination

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 23 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 241 (126,129)

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Holdup, Market Structure, Innovation Incentives

11.

The Impact of Access to Consumer Data on the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 25 Nov 2016
Jin-Hyuk Kim, Liad Wagman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Colorado at Boulder, Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 233 (130,429)
Citation 4

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Price Discrimination, Consumer Privacy, Data Broker, Horizontal Merger

12.

Anti-Competitive Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts

University of Texas Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 216
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 03 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 06 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 230 (132,070)

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13.

Robust Exclusion through Loyalty Discounts with Buyer Commitment

Harvard Discussion Paper No. 722, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 240
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 07 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 220 (137,943)
Citation 4

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14.

Moral Hazard, Mergers, and Market Power

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 16 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 219 (138,554)

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Moral Hazard, Mergers, Market Power, Managerial Incentives

15.

The Effect of Exit on Entry Deterrence Strategies

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 162 (182,139)

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Exit, Entry Deterrence

16.

Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 02 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 128 (220,764)

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Crime, Punishment, Imprisonment, Law and Economics

17.

Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Downloads 119 (233,216)

Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 282
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 119 (234,247)
Citation 3

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Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 2006
Posted: 23 Oct 2005
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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Bayesian juries, deterrence, crime, punishment

18.

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Downloads 100 (263,614)

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 19 Dec 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 76 (315,941)

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holdup, non-contractible investment, government procurement

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 221-229, April 2007
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 11 Dec 2007
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 24 (511,621)
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19.

Comment on Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Number of pages: 7 Posted: 18 Dec 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 94 (274,493)
Citation 1

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attorney-client, agency, contingent fees

20.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation: Multi-Period Robustness

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 259
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 02 Jun 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 85 (292,540)

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Moral Hazard, Agency, Renegotiation

21.

Bargaining and Conflict: The Impact of Unobservable Preparation

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 17 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 85 (292,540)

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Bargaining, Conflict, Unobservable Preparation

22.

Settlement and the Strict Liability-Negligence Comparison

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 213
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Sep 2011
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 84 (294,661)

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23.

Who (If Anyone) Should Be Liable for Injuries from Generic Drugs?

Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-19
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2016
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 83 (296,819)

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PLIVA, Generic Drugs, Product Liability, Failure-to-warn, Pharmaceuticals

24.

Managerial Incentives and the Price Effects of Mergers

Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 327-353, September 2005
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 03 Nov 2005
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 22 (507,490)
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25.

A Right to Silence for Civil Defendants?

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp. 92-114, 2010
Posted: 22 Feb 2010
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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26.

Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp. 144-157, 2010
Posted: 22 Feb 2010
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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27.

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments Under Unilateral and Consent Divorce

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 80-106, 2009
Posted: 13 Apr 2009
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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28.

The Limitations of Buyer-Option Contracts in Solving the Holdup Problem

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 127-140, 2007
Posted: 17 Jun 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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29.

Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 370-383, 2007
Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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30.

The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

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The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 2006
Posted: 22 Oct 2005
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 168-183, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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31.

Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment?

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 17, No. 1
Posted: 21 Jan 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

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