SSRN logo
Public User
Advanced Search

Abraham L. Wickelgren

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Professor

727 East Dean Keeton Street

Austin, TX 78705

United States

University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics

Professor

Austin, TX 78712

United States

  • University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

32

DOWNLOADS
Rank 7,893

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,893

in Total Papers Downloads

4,668

CITATIONS
Rank 18,042

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 18,042

in Total Papers Citations

18

Scholarly Papers (32)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 173, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 662, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-15
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 30 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 01 Apr 2010
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 327 (70,361)
Citation 2

Abstract:

2.

The Use Of Exclusive Contracts To Deter Entry

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 16 Oct 2001
John Simpson and Abraham L. Wickelgren
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 314 (73,068)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Exclusive Contracts, Entry Deterrence, Antitrust

3.

A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 254
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 21 Aug 2003
Daniel P. O'Brien and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Bates White Economic Consulting and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 307 (75,678)

Abstract:

Critical Loss Analysis

4.

A New Angle on Rules versus Standards

Downloads 261 ( 95,432)
Citation 1

A New Angle on Rules versus Standards

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 241
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 25 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 19 Oct 2012
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 139 (172,274)
Citation 1

Abstract:

A New Angle on Rules Versus Standards

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 212
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 07 Sep 2011
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 122 (191,134)
Citation 1

Abstract:

5.

Ideological Persuasion in the Media

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 07 Jan 2005
David J. Balan, Patrick DeGraba and Abraham L. Wickelgren
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 241 (86,356)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Ideology, Media Bias, Media Diversity, Persuasion

6.

The Efficiency of Affirmative Action with Purely Historical Discrimination

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Jan 2002
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 231 (107,392)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Affirmative Action, Discrimination, Racial Preferences

7.

Innovation, Market Structure and the Holdup Problem: Investment Incentives and Coordination

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 23 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 230 (106,009)

Abstract:

Holdup, Market Structure, Innovation Incentives

8.

Anticompetitive Market Division through Loyalty Discounts without Buyer Commitment

Harvard Discussion Paper No. 723, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 239
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 219 (101,984)
Citation 1

Abstract:

9.

Anti-Competitive Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts

University of Texas Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 216
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 03 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 06 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 215 (116,325)

Abstract:

10.

Moral Hazard, Mergers, and Market Power

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 16 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 210 (116,325)

Abstract:

Moral Hazard, Mergers, Market Power, Managerial Incentives

11.

Third Party Litigation Funding - A Signaling Model

DePaul Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 233, 2014, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 521
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 30 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 21 May 2014
Ronen Avraham and Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 209 (92,046)

Abstract:

12.

Robust Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-12
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 04 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 16 Mar 2016
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 203 (84,039)

Abstract:

antitrust, loyalty discounts, loyalty, discounts, market share discounts, exclusion, market division, exclusive dealing, fidelity rebates, loyalty rebates

13.

Robust Exclusion through Loyalty Discounts with Buyer Commitment

Harvard Discussion Paper No. 722, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 240
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 07 Aug 2012
Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 190 (118,466)
Citation 1

Abstract:

14.

The Effect Of Exit On Entry Deterrence Strategies

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 156 (154,265)

Abstract:

Exit, Entry Deterrence

15.

Admissible Third Party Litigation Funding Contracts as a Way to Constrain the Exploitation of Plaintiffs

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 242
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 07 Mar 2012
Ronen Avraham and Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 134 (142,512)

Abstract:

signaling, third party funding

16.

Justifying Imprisonment: On The Optimality Of Excessively Costly Punishment

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 02 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 117 (189,222)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Crime, Punishment, Imprisonment, Law and Economics

17.

Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Downloads 112 (203,016)
Citation 4

Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 282
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 112 (203,914)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 2006
Posted: 23 Oct 2005
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

Bayesian juries, deterrence, crime, punishment

18.

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Downloads 97 (224,639)

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 19 Dec 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 73 (270,732)

Abstract:

holdup, non-contractible investment, government procurement

Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 221-229, April 2007
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 11 Dec 2007
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 24 (433,250)

Abstract:

19.

Comment on Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Number of pages: 7 Posted: 18 Dec 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 87 (236,021)

Abstract:

attorney-client, agency, contingent fees

20.

Bargaining and Conflict: The Impact of Unobservable Preparation

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 17 Oct 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 78 (246,457)

Abstract:

Bargaining, Conflict, Unobservable Preparation

21.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation: Multi-Period Robustness

FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 259
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 02 Jun 2003
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 76 (252,061)

Abstract:

Moral Hazard, Agency, Renegotiation

22.

Settlement and the Strict Liability-Negligence Comparison

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 213
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Sep 2011
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 66 (257,764)

Abstract:

23.

Who (If Anyone) Should Be Liable for Injuries from Generic Drugs?

Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-19
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2016
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 47 (276,620)

Abstract:

PLIVA, Generic Drugs, Product Liability, Failure-to-warn, Pharmaceuticals

24.

Managerial Incentives and the Price Effects of Mergers

Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 327-353, September 2005
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 03 Nov 2005
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 22 (430,691)

Abstract:

25.

The Impact of Access to Consumer Data on the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 25 Nov 2016
Jin-Hyuk Kim, Liad Wagman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Colorado at Boulder, Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 0 (194,105)

Abstract:

Price Discrimination, Consumer Privacy, Data Broker, Horizontal Merger

26.

Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp. 144-157, 2010
Posted: 22 Feb 2010
Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

27.

A Right to Silence for Civil Defendants?

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp. 92-114, 2010
Posted: 22 Feb 2010
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

28.

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments Under Unilateral and Consent Divorce

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 80-106, 2009
Posted: 13 Apr 2009
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

29.

The Limitations of Buyer-Option Contracts in Solving the Holdup Problem

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 127-140, 2007
Posted: 17 Jun 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

30.

Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 370-383, 2007
Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

31.

The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

Downloads 0 (553,143)

The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 2006
Posted: 22 Oct 2005
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 168-183, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

32.

Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment?

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 17, No. 1
Posted: 21 Jan 2001
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Abstract:

Submit a Paper Section 508 Text Only Pages

Quick Links

Research Paper Series Conference Papers Partners in Publishing Organization Homepages Newsletter Sign Up

Rankings

Top Papers Top Authors Top Organizations

About

SSRN Objectives Network Directors Presidential Letter Announcements Contact us FAQs
Elsevier logo
Copyright Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy

Cookies are used by this site. To decline or learn more, visit our Cookies page. This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.718 seconds

Relx Group logo